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Foreword 
Seven years ago I set foot in Denmark having one and only one thing in my mind; a PhD. I was 
thinking back then that if I am to leave Greece and live in another country why not make it count and 
chase what I have been dreaming for many years. The desired for me was to learn how knowledge is 
produced. How all these books get filled with words and meaning? Where do scholars learn and how 
do they decide what is to be put on paper? I have to admit that this focus on knowledge production 
steepened upwards my learning process and added an extra layer of uncertainty on several stages of 
this journey. No question was simple and answers usually led to more complex questions. As a  
person striving to answer as many questions as possible, this ‘hobby’ of mine led to moments of 
desperation and disappointment. If I regret any of my choices during these four years? Not really. 
Life is more a journey than a destination. We make mistakes and fail until we get something done. I 
was however certain for two things; first, that I will somehow finish the PhD, and second that in my 
PhD defense there will be a new member in the family.  
It is fair to say that I am grateful for all the support I received in Denmark. Not only for welcoming 
me, my dreams and ambitions, but also for the kindness and compassion I found in people here. First 
and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors Hans Krause Hansen, Jeremy Moon, and Antje 
Vetterlein. I feel forever indebted to my supervision team and I look up to your professional and 
personal ethos as well as mentorship. Your door was always open and your feedback and advice 
always sharp enough to ease my struggle and inspire me to push forward. It has been an absolute 
pleasure and honor to work with you all. Hans took over supervision when I was lost in my data and 
books and prior to my main fieldtrip to China. Although we had limited time available he was able 
to support me not only in making the decisions I needed to, but also to follow them consistently. 
Han’s well-organized supervision and feedback allowed my interdisciplinary approach to settle first 
in me, and then as a scholarly contribution. I am really thankful for that. Jeremy, has been with me 
since the beginning of the PhD and regardless my ups and downs, certainties and uncertainties, he 
has always been there steadfast and ready to support me. No matter the question or challenge I was 
facing, Jeremy has been there to help until the finish. I truly have no words to express my gratitude. 
I started my PhD scholarship with Antje Vetterlein and I am grateful to her too for her guidance and 
support as well as the opportunity to start this endeavor in the first place.  
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Along the way many other scholars have helped me with their feedback and advice. Many thanks to 
Jean Pascal Gond, Steen Valentin, Eleni Tsingou, Glen Whelan, Andreas Rasche, Dirk Matten, 
Rieneke Slager, Steven Sampson, John Campbell, Lars Bo Kaspersen and so many others who offered 
their constructive feedback and support whenever I asked for advice. I would also like to thank my 
good friends and colleagues at the Interdisciplinary Center for Organizational Architecture, Aarhus 
University where I did my internship as a Masters student. This PhD became possible because of your 
trust, support and guidance. My gratitude to Panos Mitkidis, Børge Obel, Dorte Døjbak Håkonsson, 
Lars A. Bach, Ioana Christea, Charles Snow, Luca Giustiniano, Anders Møllekær, Iben Duvald 
Pedersen, Marianne Sejthen and many others for being my ‘family’ in Denmark these first years.  
 The Department of Management, Society and Communication (MSC), and the Department of 
Business and Politics (DBP) also proved excellent environments for this journey. I could not have 
made it without the support from both the academic and administrative staff. Many thanks to 
Caroline, Janine, Dennis, Dorte, Bente, Annika, Majbritt, Tine, Lisbeth, Lise, Mette, Loni and the 
rest of the administrative support. I am truly grateful. My gratitude also goes to the Sino-Danish 
Center for Education and Research (SDC) for funding my PhD. Many thanks and appreciation to 
Stine and Madeleine and the rest of the SDC people for being there especially in my trips to China. 
My research took a different path than the one I expected in the beginning of the PhD so I really hope 
that I will have the chance to make up for this in the future.  
In these four years, I have also been lucky to meet exceptional PhD scholars and friends. DBP’s 
Friday PhD breakfasts and Svjek meetings will always have a special place in my memories as the 
most reconstructive and relaxing times as a PhD fellow. Many thanks for these unique moments to 
Rasmus, Tim, Maj, Christian, Mart, Niels, Louise, Lea, the two Emmas, Caroline, and Saila. 
Likewise, I found an excellent community of PhD fellows at MSC. MSC Superstars Sarosh, Anna, 
Louisa, Erin, Tali, Majbritt, Edmonia, Laura, Kerstin, Ivan, Frederik, Pernille, Sofie, Farah, Anna, 
Sara, Daniel, Esther, Charlotte and many others, you rock. My office ‘neighbors’ provided also for 
the fruitful environment I had the luck to work within with their smile and constructive advice and 
support. Thank you Lena, Søren, Thilde, Jacobo, Kristjan, Jan, Maria, Stefano, and Michael. Special 
thanks to my roomies Jacob and Amanda as well as my good friend Henrik for all the moments and 
chats that gave meaning and joy to everyday routine. I am going to miss you all. 
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I would also like to thank the people from the industry in Denmark and China who participated in 
my research and offered their views and experience. This project could not be completed without 
your expertise, support and kindness. Many thanks to Christine, Jeppe, Tommaso, Ken, Judith, and 
William, for their support and guidance in critical moments of my research. 
Last but certainly most importantly I would like to thank the loves of my life, my partner Angeliki 
and our baby-daughter Maria. Angeliki, I cannot even describe how much your support and faith to 
me means. Your smile and good heart motivate me to keep going. Maria, you do not know it yet but 
your arrival makes me so happy and complete. This dissertation is dedicated to you and your mommy. 
Onwards now to new journeys and although all good things have an end, they also have a start. I am 
thankful to Associate Professor Cristiana Parisi for giving me the opportunity to work with her in the 
REFLOW project at the department of Operations Management. I am looking forward to putting all 
the experience and knowledge I acquired so far to good and fruitful practice. 
Many thanks to all of you who in one way or another have been part of this journey. 
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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis I analyze anti-corruption in multinational companies by examining how it is practiced 
by compliance officers. In light of a growing number of studies conceptualizing anti-corruption as a 
macro-structural norm or a micro-exchange between individuals, and scholarly calls for more 
attention to anti-corruption in the private sector, I theorize anti-corruption as situated and recursive 
activity. As a situated practice, anti-corruption happens within the socio-material context of 
multinational companies in global governance and globalization. As a recursive activity, anti-
corruption is analyzed as the discursive and non-discursive action of compliance officers. In this 
sense, the broad question I ask in this study is how is anti-corruption practiced by compliance officers 
in multinational companies? To answer this question, I employ a praxiography-inspired methodology 
which allows for the reconstruction of the practice of anti-corruption. Fieldwork took place in 
Denmark and China to address both the design and implementation of anti-corruption corporate 
programs, and consisted of semi-structured interviews with anti-corruption and compliance experts, 
participant observation in relevant events, and document analysis of public and private documents 
and other written material.  
The analysis of the collected data resulted in three papers; in the first paper, ‘Translating corporate 
anti-corruption: How ethics are integrated in business’, I examine how compliance officers translate 
anti-corruption into business practices. I build on Actor-network theory and in particular its concept 
of translations and show that the sociopolitical role of the corporation can be found also in the 
relationship between the company and its members. In the second paper, ‘Anti-corruption and its 
inherent tension: When rationalities of self-responsibility meet business identities’, I investigate how 
compliance officers think about anti-corruption. I draw on Foucauldian studies and argue that there 
are tensions between business ethics and risk management principles in anti-corruption discourse and 
practice. In the third paper, ‘Anti-corruption in practice’, I draw inspiration by the International 
Practice theory and I take departure in four regular but not exclusive to anti-corruption practices. I 
point out the benefits of using a practice theoretical framework in the study of anti-corruption, while 
I also show how both the intended and unintended consequences of the practice of anti-corruption are 
necessary for its constitution as practice. 
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I argue that anti-corruption is constantly negotiated between organizational members, and it is 
governed through technologies and rationalities of self-responsibility from compliance officers who 
consider themselves as business advisors. I therefore position this thesis within the field of anti-
corruption studies with strong ties to the broader business ethics literature. More precisely, I make 
the following theoretical and empirical contributions; theoretically I offer an understanding of anti-
corruption beyond the agency/structure dichotomy by highlighting agency as situated action shaping 
and shaped by compliance officers. In so doing, I bridge the conceptual gap between normative 
corruption control approaches and the dominant anti-corruption discourse. Second, I argue that the 
sociopolitical role of corporations is not to be found only in inter-organizational relations but also in 
the relationship between the organization and its members. And third, I critically analyze and show 
how anti-corruption has been normalized and rationalized in and around corporations. Empirically, I 
emphasize the emergence and proliferation of compliance as a default corporate function; the role of 
anti-corruption in enabling communication in corporations, and the importance of human capital in 
anti-corruption. 
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DANSK RESUME 
Hvordan praktiseres antikorruption af medarbejdere i multinationale virksomheder? Dette er det 
spørgsmål, jeg besvarer i denne afhandling. Anti-korruption er blevet en standardfunktion i 
virksomhedsdrift gennem oprettelse af compliance-afdelinger og korruptionskontrolmekanismer i 
virksomheder. Men vi ved meget lidt om antikorruption som fænomen. På den ene side 
konceptualiserer strukturelle tilgange antikorruption som norm, der skaber individers adfærd. På den 
anden side overdrives anti-korruption i aktørbaserede tilgange ved at konceptualisere den som en 
cost-benefit beregning for individet. Begge fremgangsmåder ignorerer rollen for de ansvarlige 
medarbejdere og mere præcist den handling, der tages når virksomheder udøver anti-korruption. 
Derfor teoriserer jeg anti-korruption som praksis. Praksis er ofte blevet knyttet til menneskers 
gentagne handling i en social kontekst. Jeg anvender en praxiografi-inspireret metode, der muliggør 
rekonstruktion af udøvelsen af anti-korruption. Feltarbejde fandt sted i Danmark og Kina for at dække 
både design og implementering af anti-korruptions virksomhedspolitikker, og bestod af semi-
strukturerende interviews med anti-korruption- og complianceeksperter, observationsstudier ved 
relevante arrangementer, og dokumentanalyse af offentlige og private dokumenter og andet skriftligt 
materiale.  
Analysen på baggrund af det indsamlede data resulterede i tre videnskabelige artikler. I den første, 
”Translating corporate anti-corruption: How ethics are integrated in business”, undersøger jeg 
hvordan compliancemedarbejdere oversætter anti-korruption til virksomhedspraksis. Jeg bygger på 
aktør-netværks teori og særlig dets koncept for oversættelser og viser at virksomhedens socio-
politiske rolle også findes i forholdet mellem virksomheden og dens medarbejdere. I den anden 
artikel, ”Anti-corruption and its inherent tension: when rationalities of self-responsibility meet 
business identities”, udforsker jeg, hvad compliance medarbejdere tænker om anti-korruption. Her 
trækker jeg på Foucault og viser, at der er spændinger mellem virksomhedsetik og 
risikostyringsprincipper i anti-korruptions diskurs og praksis. I den tredje artikel, ”Anti-corruption in 
practice”, fokuserer jeg på fire gængse, men ikke eksklusive for, anti-korruption praksisser, på 
baggrund af inspiration fra ”the International Practice Theory”. Jeg påpeger fordelene ved at bruge et 
praksisteoretisk perspektiv når man forsker i anti-korruption, mens jeg også viser, hvordan både de 
tiltænkte og de uforudsete konsekvenser af at praktisere anti-korruption er nødvendige for, at det 
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konstitueres i praksis. Jeg argumenterer for, at anti-korruption er i konstant forhandling mellem de 
organisatoriske medlemmer, og styres ved hjælp af teknologier og rationalet for selv-ansvar for 
compliancemedarbejdere, som betragter dem selv som virksomhedsrådgivere. Derfor er denne 
afhandling situeret i anti-korruptionsstudier med stærke bånd til den bredere litteratur om 
virksomhedsetik.  
Mere specifikt, kommer jeg i denne afhandling med de følgende teoretiske og empiriske bidrag: 
teoretisk tilbyder jeg en forståelse af anti-korruption der bryder med aktør/struktur dikotomien ved at 
understrege aktør som situeret handling, der former og er formet af compliancemedarbejdere. Derved 
bygger jeg bro over den begrebsmæssige kløft mellem normativ korruptionskontrol tilgange og den 
dominerende diskurs indenfor anti-korruption. For det andet, argumenterer jeg for, at virksomhedens 
socio-politiske rolle ikke kun findes mellem andre organisationer, men også i forholdet mellem 
organisationen og dens medlemmer. For det tredje, viser jeg, og kritisk analyserer, hvordan anti-
korruption er blevet normaliseret og rationaliseres i og omkring virksomheder. Empirisk understreger 
jeg fremkomst og spredning af compliance som en standard funktion i virksomheder; anti-korruptions 
rolle i at etablere kommunikation i virksomheder, og vigtigheden af menneskelig kapital i anti-
korruption.  
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Anti-corruption in action: How is anti-corruption practiced in multinational companies? 
 
‘Anti-corruption is usually referred to as compliance and it usually stands on two pillars. One 
pillar is ethics and the other pillar is regulations. So the ethics is all about what the company 
believes in. It is the values that you have in a particular company that would like to promote 
and you want all employees to share these values. But you can say a lot of this is actually 
common sense. The reality is, though, that common sense is not that common, so that’s why a 
lot of things need to be documented. And then you have the other pillar which is regulations 
but that’s pretty much the laws the company is under. Could be global laws, could be regional 
laws, could be local laws and could be requirements which are not legal requirements but those 
the companies decided to follow. Anti-corruption is just a set of measurements and a set of 
controls to actually make sure the company is staying legally and ethically compliant.’ 
(Interviewee A8, 21-02-2017) 
 
1. Introduction 
This thesis is about how anti-corruption is practiced in multinational companies. As anti-corruption 
has been considered a global norm (McCoy & Heckel, 2001; Rose, 2015), crusade (Brown & Cloke, 
2004) movement (della Porta, 2017), industry (Sampson, 2010), and regime (Getz, 2006), the legal 
(Nichols, 2012), financial and ethical (Ethisphere, 2017) risks associated with corruption in the 
private sector have contributed the most to the establishment and proliferation of the practice of anti-
corruption in multinational companies (MNC). This practice gets realized with the establishment of 
corporate compliance and business ethics departments with the objective of ensuring ‘integrity and 
ethical conduct throughout the organization’ (Gottschalk, 2014, p. 64). 
Anti-corruption in the private sector can be traced back to 1977 and the introduction of the US Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), as a response of the US authorities to hard evidence that US companies 
regularly had payed illegal payments to foreign officials in order to obtain contracts (Darrough, 2010). 
The FCPA criminalized bribery in international transactions, but it took almost two decades before 
anti-corruption emerged as an international and global matter of concern. This development took 
place only after the control of corruption was prioritized in World Bank’s and the International 
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) agendas due to the harm corruption causes to economic and social 
development (Rose-Ackerman, 1997). The OECD and UN Conventions that followed in the late 
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1990s and early 2000s pushed countries to update their anti-corruption legislation (Baughn, Bodie, 
Buchanan, & Bixby, 2010; Rose, 2015a), while the introduction of the tenth principle of the UN 
Global Compact required signatory companies to report on their progress on anti-corruption (United 
Nations Global Compact, 2011). This regulatory and normative framework was further enhanced and 
globally diffused by the works of non-governmental organizations such as Transparency International 
as well as the initiatives taken by business and other private and multi-stakeholder initiatives (Fenton 
Villar & Papyrakis, 2017; International Chamber of Commerce, 2017; Sousa et al., 2009).  
Multinational companies have economic and sociopolitical interests in the above developments. First, 
there is a business case for complying with bribery laws let alone the threat of fines from multiple 
jurisdictions with extra-territorial authority, which a corruption case may trigger (Nichols, 2012). 
Second, other scholars maintain that reputation matters (Sampath, Gardberg, & Rahman, 2018). 
Companies have more than enough motivation to be compliant and aligned with the norms and 
expectations of social responsibility when doing business since reputation and the ability to deliver 
social goods have been at the center of attention of interest groups and investors as well (Gond & 
Piani, 2012). Third, many scholars point out that corruption is harmful for business (Almond & 
Syfert, 1997). Indeed, corruption can be seen as problematic for corporations as for countries and 
societies not only because bribes and fines increase the overall costs of doing business (Pantzalis, 
Chul Park, & Sutton, 2008), but also because corruption creates market entry barriers for companies 
(Campos, Estrin, & Proto, 2010), hurts their innovation and productivity capabilities (De Rosa et al., 
2010; Paunov, 2016), forces them to leave markets due to high costs (Hallward-Driemeier, 2009), 
decreases profits per firm (Ades & Di Tella, 2003), reduces the quality of products (Nwabuzor, 2005), 
and negatively impacts long-term performance (Baucus & Baucus, 1997).   
Corruption is broadly defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency 
International, 2017). Under this umbrella definition, it covers or extensively overlaps with 
phenomena such as bribery, fraud, or money laundering. For the purpose of this study,  I focus on 
bribery and in particular its commercial and transnational form which restricts the object of 
investigation to transnational business to public or business to business relationships (Lord, 2013). 
According to the UK Bribery Act (2010), bribery refers to the offering, promising, giving, requesting, 
or accepting of a financial or other advantage with the intention to induce or reward improper 
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performance. In this case, bribery differs from fraud and money laundering in that it includes also 
non-financial inducements that may be used for the benefit of a commercial organization or 
individual. It is often related more to the intention to obtain an undue advantage than the value of the 
actual bribe. Bribery can appear in several forms such as in direct channeling of inducements through 
intermediaries, secretly negotiated payment between parties as in ‘kickbacks’, or requested in 
advance as ‘grease money’ or facilitation payment to expedite a routine procedure (International 
Chamber of Commerce, 2017).  
Anti-corruption in corporations is practiced by compliance officers. This is not to say that only 
corporate employees with the title of compliance officer practice anti-corruption. Rather, anti-
corruption is more a dynamic than a static function (Miller, 2014). Depending on the company’s size, 
sector, operation, and maturity in terms of anti-corruption, the role of the compliance officer may be 
played also by CSR, communication, and sustainability managers, consultants, the executive 
management, and various internal and external and anti-corruption experts. Likewise, in some 
companies there are established compliance departments also known as ‘Business ethics and 
compliance’, whereas in other companies, compliance is a part-time responsibility of the legal, 
sustainability, internal audit, human resources, CSR, or communications departments. Nevertheless, 
the responsibility of the compliance officer and department is to ensure that the organization stays 
compliant with the internal and external ethical and legal regulatory framework the company operates 
within (Freeman, MCP, & MCT, 2007; Sampson, 2016). In order to do so, compliance officers utilize 
a set of corruption control mechanisms and logics prescribed by the global regulatory framework. 
Wrapped up under compliance, business ethics, and risk management logics, these programs include 
bribery risk assessments, due-diligence, training of employees, a Code of Conduct, whistleblower 
hotline, proper book-keeping, regular review and revision also known as ‘best practices’.  
In this thesis I utilize the broad theoretical concept of practice (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b; Callon et al., 
1986; Dean, 2009; Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011; Nicolini, 2012; Schatzki, 1996) to analyze and 
understand anti-corruption. Practices have often been associated with situated action. By action I 
mean both discursive and non-discursive activity without giving priority to either.1 Situated activity 
                                                          
1 I elaborate and discuss the ontological matter of discursive and non-discursive practices in methodological sub-
section 6.5 
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refers to those discursive, historical, and material conditions within which action takes place (Nicolini 
& Monteiro, 2016). To understand therefore anti-corruption in action means to study the action of 
those who practice anti-corruption in MNCs. In order to do so, I employ a qualitative methodology 
(Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012) inspired by praxiography (Bueger, 2014) to generate data from 
expert interviews with anti-corruption and compliance professionals, corporate private and public 
documents, and participant observation in selected anti-corruption and compliance events in 
Copenhagen/Denmark and Beijing/China. The outcome is a reconstructed practice where anti-
corruption is constantly negotiated between organizational members and governed through 
technologies and rationalities of self-responsibility from compliance officers who consider 
themselves as business advisors. 
The remainder of this thesis consists of nine sections. In the second section, the history of anti-
corruption as a global movement is briefly reviewed. In the third section, anti-corruption is discussed 
in relation to Denmark and China as the main locales where fieldwork took place. In section four, the 
extant literature on anti-corruption and corruption is outlined and discussed leading thus to section 
five where the research question and sub-questions are presented. Section six follows with the 
development of the theoretical framework which builds on practice approaches and theory. The 
section concludes with a discussion on the study’s ‘flattened’ ontology and its implications for the 
study of anti-corruption. Section seven is about the interpretive and praxiography-inspired 
methodology applied, followed by a discussion of the methods used, namely interviews, participant 
observation, and documents. The section closes with a discussion on the data analysis performed and 
knowledge production. In section eight summaries and brief discussion of the three papers is offered. 
The thesis concludes with the ninth section in which the main findings and theoretical and empirical 
contributions are summarized and discussed along with the study’s practitioner implications, 
limitations and suggestions for future research.  
2. A brief history of anti-corruption 
Anti-corruption can be traced back to the late 1970s and early 1980s and one can distinguish three 
major stages or phases in its development (Jakobi, 2013b; McCoy & Heckel, 2001). The first stage 
concerns mostly the efforts of the US authorities to limit the phenomenon of bribery of foreign 
officials. In the second phase from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, anti-corruption was 
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internationalized and institutionalized through a series of international conventions and initiatives. 
From the mid-2000s onwards, anti-corruption entered its third and current phase as it has been 
internalized in the bureaucratic mechanisms of public and private organizations.  
In 1977, the US FCPA was enacted as a response of the US authorities to the Watergate scandal as 
well as to hard evidence and indications of US companies making illegal payments to foreign officials 
for obtaining contracts (Darrough, 2010). The FCPA consists of two provisions, namely anti-bribery 
and accounting. The anti-bribery provision prohibits ‘companies and individuals from corruptly 
providing, offering, or promising anything of value to foreign government officials to obtain or retain 
a business advantage’ (Mark, 2012, p. 427). Its accounting provision requires companies to make and 
maintain accurate books and records of their transactions, and it also requires the establishment of a 
system of internal controls to ensure that the previous two provisions are followed accurately (Mark, 
2012). As the first of its kind law with extra-territorial and extra-national jurisdiction, the FCPA 
enabled the prosecution of both national and foreign persons for their actions in the US and overseas. 
Although the FCPA was not regularly enforced during the first twenty years of its existence and its 
effectiveness in battling corruption has been criticized (Weismann et al., 2014), it is arguably the 
departure point for the anti-corruption movement that followed in the 1990s (Darrough, 2010). As 
we shall see in the following lines, it rendered compliance and business ethics programs as essential 
for organizations, and provided the blueprint and driver for the OECD Convention and treaty which 
contributed to the international diffusion of anti-corruption internationally and beyond the OECD 
area (Gabel et al., 2009). 
Other early initiatives on anti-corruption include the introduction of the International Chamber of 
Commerce Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery (ICC Rules) of 1977, also due to the 
series of corruption scandals in the mid-1970s. ICC Rules were revised and updated in 2005; they are 
of a general nature and are promoted as a form of self-regulation and good practice, meaning that 
they lack legal effect (UN Global Compact, 2006). Around the same time, the first International Anti-
corruption Conference (IACC) took place in Washington in 1983 (Blalock, 2001). Since then, and 
with the support of Transparency International, IACC, regularly takes place every two years in 
various places around the world as a ‘premier global forum for bringing together heads of state, civil 
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society, the private sector and more to tackle the increasingly sophisticated challenges posed by 
corruption’ (IACC, 2018). 
In the second stage, anti-corruption took off as a movement in the 1990s through its 
internationalization and institutionalization (McCoy & Heckel, 2001). A particular role in this 
development was played by the shift in the agendas of the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund which framed corruption as ‘cancer’2 (Wesberry, 1997). Corruption was found to increase 
inequality and hurt the poorest and weakest layers of society the most, erode trust in governments 
and institutions by wasting public resources, undermine the rule of law, impede investment and 
especially in social services and welfare, and to increase the cost of doing business by distorting 
market mechanisms and fair competition. In addition, in 1993, the leading anti-corruption INGO, 
Transparency International (T.I) was founded; T.I, is a global organization exclusively dedicated to 
stopping corruption and promoting transparency, accountability and integrity at all levels and across 
all sectors of society worldwide (T.I, 2019). By the mid-1990s, corruption was no more just a matter 
of political will but also a matter of economic policy (McCoy & Heckel, 2001), attracting wide 
attention from the media. The Financial Times, for example, declared 1995 as the year of corruption 
(cited in Tanzi, 1998). 
The shift of institutional actors towards an economic view of corruption had its roots in the growing 
realization of the power, role, and importance of MNCs in the global economic system (Babic et al., 
2017; Strange, 1988). Being able to transcend spatial borders and therefore evade the regulatory nets 
of national agencies, MNCs were seen as ‘breeders’ of corruption (Wrage & Wrage, 2005). The 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions (OECD Convention) of 1997, and the UN Convention against Corruption (UN 
Convention) of 2004 aimed at addressing exactly this regulatory gap (Moran, 1999). The OECD 
Convention and treaty criminalized the bribery of foreign officials in all member states and attributed 
an international character to anti-corruption. Through its peer-review monitoring mechanism, it 
pushed its member states to update their anti-corruption legislation to match the Convention’s 
                                                          
2 Corruption was first framed as ‘cancer’ by World Bank’s President James Wolfensohn's in his speech in the World 
Bank/IMF 1996 Annual Meetings in Washington, DC. 
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provisions and in so doing to create a uniform legal framework for MNCs based within the territories 
of the OECD member states (Getz, 2006).  
The UN Convention only added to this effort. It is similar to the OECD Convention in that it aims to 
establish a common legal framework and a peer-review mechanism to ensure the implementation of 
anti-corruption, but it differs in scope and reach. In contrast to the OECD Convention’s focus on 
bribing foreign officials, the UN Convention adopted a broader definition of corruption which 
includes also extortion, embezzlement, misappropriation of funds, trading in influence, abuse of 
functions, and illicit enrichment in public to private, and private to private relationships (Argandoña, 
2007). In terms of reach, the UN Convention has been characterized as ‘the first genuinely global, 
legally binding instrument on corruption and related matters’ (Argandoña, 2007, p. 485) as opposed 
to OECD’s limited application in its 36 member-states. It was ratified by 159 member states by 2012 
(Joutsen & Graycar, 2012). Moreover, the UN Convention is not restricted to governments and their 
role in combating corruption. It calls for attention and awareness of a wider audience including public, 
private, and civil society actors across the globe.  
In its third and current stage, anti-corruption started to be internalized in the operation of public and 
private organizations as a matter of good governance (Jakobi, 2013b). Taking its departure from the 
recommendations and requirements of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Companies, and major 
treaties such as the OECD and UN Conventions, anti-corruption has been organizationally 
operationalized through a set of mechanisms and corruption control measures. These measures 
include but are not limited to corruption risk assessments, due-diligence, training, book-keeping, 
whistleblower hotlines, codes of ethics, and CSR reports just to name but a few. Along with the 
diffusion of anti-corruption measures, the profession of the compliance officer also emerged as a 
default management position to advice corporate leadership in matters related to anti-corruption 
(Sampson, 2016). A particular role in the internalization of anti-corruption was also played by the 
UN Global Compact (UNGC) and its tenth principle that Businesses should work against corruption 
in all its forms, including extortion and bribery (UNGC, 2019). By 2019, the UNGC has been 
voluntarily signed by almost 10,000 companies from 159 countries. It requires that signatory 
companies will annually report on their achievements with regards to the UNGC’s ten principles 
(Voegtlin & Pless, 2014)including anti-corruption.    
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In addition, anti-corruption’s course towards its internalization as organizational and corporate 
function was greatly facilitated if not promoted by a wave of private, collective, and non-public 
organizations offering advice and guidance on the importance, implementation, and consolidation of 
a ‘culture of integrity’ in organizations. The International Chamber of Commerce for example 
through regular publication urges companies to introduce, implement and regularly review their 
organizational compliance function so to counter corrupt practices (International Chamber of 
Commerce, 2017).In so doing, such organizations and initiatives raise attention and therefore the 
prospect and need for anti-corruption measures to be implemented (Hansen, 2011, 2012). Similar 
approaches to spreading anti-corruption have been increasingly adopted and used by accountancy, 
consultancy, and law firms offering anti-corruption services globally to induce companies to the 
practice of anti-corruption. Indeed, as Sampson (2010) points out, anti-corruption nowadays 
resembles more to a multi-million ‘industry’ than the concern US authorities once attempted to 
address.  
3. Anti-corruption and fieldwork in Denmark and China 
In this section, I discuss the reasons underlying my choice to conduct fieldwork in Denmark and 
China. To start with, anti-corruption has been quite popular as a policy and movement in both 
countries during the last decade, although for different reasons. In Denmark, it was the introduction 
of the UK Bribery Act in 2010 which played an alarming role mostly for Danish MNCs. Between the 
mid-1990s and 2010, corporate anti-corruption in Denmark has been considered as part of the broader 
CSR agenda and therefore within the voluntary discretion of businesses to project an ethical social 
profile (Morsing & Thyssen, 2003). According to Jensen (2014), Denmark’s excellent performance 
in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) as one of the least, if not the least, 
corrupt countries in the world as well as the ‘high level of quality of government and global position 
as a best performer in terms of fighting corruption’ (Jensen, 2014, p. 2) can be traced back to the 17th 
century and Denmark’s state building process.  
Such a background and tradition on curbing corruption may be one of the reasons why in Denmark 
the development of anti-corruption in the private sector took place after 2010; within Denmark there 
was not much reason to do so. However, suspicions for the involvement of Danish companies in 
illegal transactions (Volcker et al., 2005), and the growth of the Danish economy and exports, 
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especially towards developing countries, uncovered the risk of corruption and exposure to anti-
corruption rules and legislation as especially threatening to the Danish competitive advantage of 
sustainable development (Dansk Industri, 2014). Evident of this shift has been the tightening of the 
rules regarding CSR reporting including anti-corruption by the Danish government with the Danish 
Financial Statements Act (Danish Commerce and Companies Agency, 2010), the establishment of 
anti-corruption function in compliance departments in major Danish MNCs, and collective initiatives 
such as the organization of the International Conference on Anti-Corruption (IACC, 2018), and the 
Fight Against Facilitation Payments Initiative (FAFPI, 2018). 
China, the second largest economy in the world, experienced an increased interest in anti-corruption 
during the 2010s as well. Because of the country’s unprecedented economic growth and social 
development, by 1994, corruption had penetrated the social, political, ideological, economic, and 
cultural life of the country leading to widespread social unrest (Kim, Li, & Tarzia, 2018). The causes 
of corruption have been attributed to several factors such as the lack of firm democratic institutions, 
the culture of Guanxi, economic and social inequality, as well as the current transitional phase of the 
country’s economy and society (Berger, Herstein, Silbiger, & Barnes, 2018; Dong & Torgler, 2013; 
He, 2000; Holmes, 2015). In 2012, President Xi Jinping famously stated his determination to catch 
both ‘tigers’ and ‘flies’ corrupting the country and the party (Branigan, 2013). His anti-corruption 
campaign has led so far to hundreds of thousands of investigations and had 1,5 million officials tried 
and punished (The Washington Post, 2018). Yet China’s rankings in the Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perception Index remain quite stable and regardless the Chinese government’s efforts to 
counter the phenomenon. More recently, the focus of the Chinese government’s endeavors to curb 
corruption shifted towards the private and financial sectors of the Chinese economy including foreign 
MNCs. GlaxoSmithKline, a British pharmaceutical company, for instance, has been found, 
prosecuted, and fined for the bribery of health professionals in China (Moore, 2014). Developments 
such as this have caused foreign MNCs in China to re-evaluate and reinforce their anti-corruption 
practices.  
Both countries therefore offered equally fertile environment for fieldwork. I started my fieldwork in 
Denmark and approached companies from different sectors including manufacturing, pharmaceutical, 
retail, mining, logistics, tobacco, medical devices, and energy. Anti-corruption and compliance 
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departments are ‘global’ in the sense that they are centrally positioned in the company’s headquarters 
along with other strategic departments. Their usual title is ‘Group Compliance’ or ‘Group Business 
and Ethics’ departments, meaning that from their base in the headquarters they design, distribute, and 
control the company’s compliance operations around the globe. In this sense, fieldwork in Denmark 
offered an excellent opportunity to meet and interview experts who were actually pioneers regarding 
the establishment of compliance departments in Danish companies, and had much to offer in terms 
of lived experiences, successes and failures, challenges and future plans for further development. 
They were also an excellent initial source of data regarding the operation of a compliance department, 
its place in the hierarchy, and definitely its network and connection with the senior management and 
other corporate departments.  
While compliance departments in Denmark design, distribute, and control anti-corruption globally, 
the limited number of manufacturing or production sites accompanied by the country’s non-bribing 
culture restricts access to the actual implementation of corruption controls. For a compliance officer 
in Denmark, implementation means the roll out of measures and controls across the company’s 
subsidiaries where further elaboration and adaptation to local conditions and customs takes place. 
Even those compliance officers who were willing to travel to conduct training or onsite visits and 
evaluations were in effect restricted by the limited time and the large number of subsidiaries. To some 
extent, this is also the reason why most, if not all, have chosen a risk-based approach in curbing 
corruption; it gives them the opportunity to focus only where misbehavior is more likely to happen, 
and China, according to the CPI at least, is one of these areas of the world. I considered then that to 
acquire a complete view of the practice of anti-corruption, fieldwork in China was necessary. 
China is one of the markets and economies into which Denmark and Danish companies are very much 
interested in expanding due to its massive population and vast economy. As a result, around 300 
Danish companies3 including major Danish MNCs, have established a subsidiary or operations in 
China totaling 3,7 % of Denmark’s exports (World Bank, 2017). Although anti-corruption is a rather 
centralized function, due to cultural and practical matters most companies have established a 
compliance function in the Chinese subsidiary. I say compliance function and not department because 
as I learned during the process, compliance and its implementation in China has not been a full time 
                                                          
3 Information acquired from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Statistics Denmark 
23 
 
job with the exception of a couple of MNCs; this is to say, anti-corruption duties were side-loaded to 
the legal department or attached to the Vice President of the local subsidiary. This has resulted in 
some difficulties in approaching and interviewing compliance officers and anti-corruption experts 
working for Danish companies exclusively despite the contacts and confidence I had from Denmark. 
I decided then than I should be more open regarding my target group. After all, they all apply industry 
‘best practices’, they attend similar conferences, use the same consultancies, are subjects of the same 
legal framework, and therefore their behavior is to some extent under similar isomorphic pressures.  
I used LinkedIn to locate compliance officers, managers, and experts in Beijing. My assumption was 
that if they had an English profile and if they had worked for Western companies, there was a good 
chance that they would meet me for an interview and I was right. Several national Chinese compliance 
officers answered and accepted to meet me for an interview and in so doing offered also a different 
approach to anti-corruption. Along with the view that corruption is a bad thing and should stop for 
instance, some interviewees pointed out also that corruption is a form of social justice in the sense 
that the entrance of multinational companies in the Chinese market is unfair for local companies in 
terms of competition. ‘How can local breweries compete with Carlsberg other than by paying bribes 
to local bars and supermarkets to promote their local beer’, an interviewee rhetorically asked. 
Surprisingly, Chinese people were quite open in discussing corruption and anti-corruption in China, 
how it has changed in the last 20 years, how this has changed their work as compliance officers, what 
strategies they have been using to convince their colleagues about the merits of compliance, why and 
when they failed, and why they have succeeded. Many of the quotes used in papers #1 and #2 for 
example, regarding translations and the visibility of the problem of corruption, are thanks to these 
interviewees who had actual stories to tell from their time as compliance officers implementing anti-
corruption policies.  
I was happy to find out also that compliance and anti-corruption events were more often than not held 
by several Chinese authorities and organizations such as the Standardization Administration of China 
(SAC), and most importantly also translated into English. Thanks to one of my interviewees, I was 
added to the mailing list of the SAC and received invitations to and participated in anti-corruption 
events including the ISO Summit in Shenzhen. In this respect, China was an excellent choice for 
fieldwork. Its contribution was smaller in quantity than the fieldwork I did in Denmark but lacked 
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nothing in terms of quality. Most importantly, without it, I would have never had the opportunity to 
acquire a complete view and understanding of anti-corruption as it happens from its design in the 
headquarters to its implementation across the world. 
4. Studying anti-corruption  
In this section, I briefly review the anti-corruption literature with the objective to ‘set the scene’ for 
this research project. I build on Jancsics’ (2014)  recent review on corruption studies and I develop 
his typology to include anti-corruption as well. Jancsics takes distance from debates on how 
corruption should be defined and whether the definition should include the public and private sectors 
or the demand and supply sides for corruption. Instead he uses corruption as an umbrella concept 
based on four conceptual elements: first, corruption is an organizational informal/illegal and secret 
exchange of formally allocated resources; second, at least one corrupt party has some sort of 
affiliation with the organization where the exchange or illegal activity takes place; third, corruption 
requires at least two corrupt parties; and fourth, corruption is always an act deviating from social 
rules. With these conceptual elements in mind he proceeds and categorizes corruption studies within 
the three broad social sciences paradigms namely rational choice, structural, and relational (Table 1). 
For each approach he discusses several subcategories and corresponding literatures. 
For example, rational choice approaches include conceptualizations of corruption as ‘bad apples’, 
client-agent, and principal-agent dilemmas within the economics and political science literatures. 
Likewise, the structural approach includes social and material structures shaping behavior, while in 
the relational approach horizontal and vertical networks. Jancsics criticizes rational choice and 
structural approaches on corruption as substantialist and mechanical since they cannot depict the 
complexity of social reality and therefore corruption as well (Crossley, 2005). In contrast, he argues 
that the relational approach with its default focus on observing ‘real-life cases’ seems more promising 
considering that corruption takes place in actual human interactions.  
Having this framework as my point of departure I proceed along similar lines; I also use the term 
‘anti-corruption’ as an umbrella concept to cover a very broad area of study in which the same 
phenomenon appears under various names such as anti-bribery, corruption control, ending corruption, 
ethics etc. While it is not this dissertation’s purpose to compare anti-corruption with each and every 
25 
 
other similar term, I argue by the end of this literature review that due to the diverse and fragmented 
studies on anti-corruption, more focus and attention is required on the global anti-corruption discourse 
and its implementation in corporate settings. Moreover, for each conceptual approach on corruption 
I will briefly discuss and when possible and appropriate, revise and update Jancsic’s review. Further, 
I will review and add to the broadly understood anti-corruption literature highlighting major 
subcategories, as well as similarities and differences between various disciplines.  
Table 1: Major corruption approaches according to Jancsics (2014).  
In its very basic function and understanding, anti-corruption is meant to counter corrupt practices. In 
other words, anti-corruption’s starting point is to be a reaction to corruption. This is most evident in 
the rational and structural approaches but as I argue it fades away in the relational approach where 
anti-corruption is conceptualized as a network, assemblage, or industry that renders it a ‘one size fits 
all’ solution to a problem which is very complicated (Krastev, 2000). Such conceptualization raises 
a question regarding the objective of anti-corruption within a relational framework. If corruption is 
                                                          
4 The middle level of analysis oversimplifies the relational approach because it implies that the focus of the analysis is 
somewhere between the two extremes of micro and macro levels. Although this dissertation’s ontology rejects such 
dichotomies, I will not change or discuss it further at this point for reasons of convenience. Ontological considerations 
will be discussed in the following chapters. 
 Rational actor 
approach 
Structural 
approach 
Relational approach 
Level of analysis Micro Macro and middle Middle4 
Motivation/constraint 
to participate in 
corruption 
Maximize 
monetary rewards 
and minimize 
costs 
Forced by structural 
constraints 
Profit from the 
associations with others 
Exchange form Economic/market Driven by norms and 
material structural 
constraints 
Reciprocal, often non-
material 
Relationship form Impersonal, 
short-term 
Relationship 
between individual 
and collective 
entities 
Interpersonal, long-term 
Corruption from an 
organizational 
perspective 
Corruption is an 
exceptional 
problem within 
the organization: 
bad apple 
Corruption is 
systematic products 
of collective 
processes: bad barrel 
Corruption is an 
informal exchange 
network behind formal 
organizational 
structures 
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conceptualized as ‘an informal exchange network behind formal organizational structures’ (Table 1, 
3rd column and row), how then is a formal ‘anti-corruption’ program, like those companies are 
expected to introduce in their operation, ever able to be effective against corruption?   
Interestingly, this indication seems to be a generalized phenomenon; a finding of this review is that 
many of the passages on anti-corruption were found under various labels such as anti-bribery, 
corruption control, ending corruption, ethics, and fight against corruption or simply as remedies in 
studies on corruption. For example, in discussions on how corruption is normalized in organizations 
(Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005; Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Spicer, 2009), scholars offer suggestions 
for the de-normalization of corruption as well. Likewise, when reviewing the literature on economic 
psychology (Berninghaus et al., 2013; Rotondi & Stanca, 2015) I found that the results of their 
experiments offered ideas on how corruption could be curbed. This finding paves the way for two 
implications; first, that efforts to curb corruption were possible and in fact a matter of concern and 
study outside and parallel to the anti-corruption movement and discourse of the last two decades. 
Second, and following the first implication, that corruption and anti-corruption may be understood as 
complementary to each other rather than opposing concepts. 
I argue that taking Jancsic’s framework on corruption to review anti-corruption has both strengths 
and weaknesses. Its main strength is that it offers a quite rigid and simple structure to navigate through 
diverse research on such complex social issues as corruption and anti-corruption. Moreover, it allows 
the tracking of the phenomena of corruption and anti-corruption in relation to each other. By 
following, for example, how corruption has been conceptually developed in various academic 
disciplines we can also observe changes in its relationship with anti-corruption and vice versa. In so 
doing, the contrasting of corruption and anti-corruption and a critical examination of the latter when 
applied in corporations is enabled.  
An overall weakness of utilizing this particular framework to review anti-corruption, I admit, is that 
it oversimplifies anti-corruption by reducing its conceptual richness to three quite broad and generic 
categories or social science traditions, namely agency, structure, and relational. Jancsic’s relational 
approach, for example, refers strictly to corruption as the product of human relations where corruption 
and potentially anti-corruption are conceptualized as exchanges. In so doing, it leaves outside 
approaches where anti-corruption and corruption can be understood as socio-material practices, 
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networks, or assemblages of human and non-human elements to name but a few. For the purpose of 
this dissertation therefore, first, I use and discuss the theoretical approaches on corruption that I 
consider most fruitful for this thesis’ purpose without claiming that the following literature review 
can be seen as a full review of corruption and anti-corruption studies. Second, I take advantage of 
both the strengths and weaknesses of Jancsic’s framework; on the one hand, I utilize its simplicity to 
navigate through the richness of corruption and anti-corruption studies. On the other hand, I seek to 
contribute towards its identified weaknesses by exploring anti-corruption as a socio-material practice.  
4.1 Anti-corruption as a rational choice 
Rational choice models assume that actors act based on mere cost-benefit calculations without taking 
into consideration other factors such as context or past experience (Granovetter, 1985). Its logic is 
derived from liberal theories and neoclassical economics whereby the ultimate goal and path to social 
order rests on the utility maximization of each person separately (Foy, Schleifer, & Tiryakian., 2018). 
Society therefore is considered as no more than the sum of individuals, each of which seeks to 
maximize the utility of the choices that are available at any given time. As a result, social phenomena 
such as corruption happen exactly because some actors benefit from it. Rational choice approaches 
conceptualize corruption as any other benefit maximizing transaction between economic actors. If, 
for example, an actor calculates that profit from a corrupt practice exceeds the costs of doing so then 
this actor will proceed with the corrupt practice. Likewise, an actor will not engage with corruption 
if a cost-benefit calculation shows that the former exceeds the latter. It follows that rational choice 
studies take a micro-level of analysis exactly because corruption is considered a transaction between 
actors. The objective therefore of anti-corruption from a rational perspective is to prevent or disrupt 
a corrupt exchange between actors. 
One of the main rational approaches on corruption has been the agent-principal dilemma. In this case, 
corruption is caused when the agent who is supposed to serve the principal’s interests betrays his trust 
and decides to act according to his own interest and benefit (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Such 
corruption cases have been found in the relationship between governments and private actors or 
between private actors. With regards to the former, a common corrupt practice has been the case 
when public officials seek rents by taking advantage of state monopolies or when economic actors 
seek undue favors from public officials (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). With 
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regards to the latter, corrupt practices may include bribery of procurement officers of other companies 
or employees getting kickbacks for preferring certain suppliers (Argandoña, 2003, 2005; Goel, 
Budak, & Rajh, 2015). A major objective of anti-corruption policies therefore derives from the need 
of the principal to minimize the incentives or structural deficiencies creating opportunities for 
corruption to agents. 
Along similar lines, economic and political sciences research suggested the privatization of centrally 
organized economies as an early and major anti-corruption policy (Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 
2000; Tanzi, 1998). This policy was based on the argument that the involvement of governments in 
the market distorts its function and creates incentives for corrupt behavior both to public employees 
and private firms (Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000; Treisman, 2000; Tullock, 1996; Williams, 1999). 
However, the experience from Eastern European countries and China respectively showed that the 
liberalization of the economy may also blur the boundaries between public and private sectors and 
thus create opportunities for corruption as well (Batory, 2012; Deng, Zhnag, & Leverentz, 2010; 
Lovell, 2005). Scholars, for example, have shown that in the case of China, the privatization of a 
large number of state owned companies maintained if not increased corruption in the country (He, 
2000). 
Economists have suggested several other measures to eliminate corrupt behavior, focusing on 
disrupting the corrupt act through re-balancing the costs and benefits for the corruptible actor. Rose-
Ackerman (1975), for example, urged policy-makers to rethink how governments approach and 
organize the purchase of products from the private sector because according to her, corruption is 
related to how state mechanisms function. Likewise, others have suggested incentives and 
punishment measures that would render corrupt acts less beneficial (Ades & Di Tella, 2003; Bardhan, 
1997, 2006; Rose-Ackerman, 1986). These may include incentives for people to report corrupt cases 
(Abbink & Wu, 2017; Neha Tudu & Pathak, 2014), new and better enforced laws (Fisman & Miguel, 
2007), the improvement of competition in the market and between public officials (Gulsun Arikan, 
2004; Ryvkin & Serra, 2018), as well as an increase in the wages of public officials so they can resist 
bribery (Acemoglu & Verdier, 2000; Becker & Stigler, 1974).  
However, these measures have been challenged for their effectiveness and compatibility. Ades and 
Di Tella (1999), for example, found that increased wages for public officials reduce the effectiveness 
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of competition in curbing corruption. Similarly, from an economic psychology perspective, scholars 
utilizing experiments have tried to test some of the above policies (Abbink, 2000; Abbink, Irlenbusch, 
& Renner, 1999; Armantier & Boly, 2011; Barr & Serra, 2010; Berninghaus et al., 2013; Lambsdorff 
& Frank, 2010) with debatable results for the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures. Armantier 
and Boly (2011), for example, reproduced a corruption scenario in which graders were offered a bribe 
with a demand for better grades. They found that not only were higher bribes more efficient in 
achieving the goal but also that higher wages have at least an ambiguous effect in controlling 
corruption.  
Along similar rational lines, organizational scholars have researched the phenomenon of ‘bad apples’ 
in organizations as causal to corruption. Bad apples are individuals whose unethical behavior is 
attributed to personal quality issues such as cognitive development, idealism, job satisfaction, age, 
and gender to name but a few (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010; Treviño & Youngblood, 
1990). Researchers have shown that the problem of ‘bad apples’ can be spread out in the organization, 
causing further problems due to its ‘asymmetric and deleterious effect on others’ (Felps, Mitchell, & 
Byington, 2006, p. 176). It follows that anti-corruption measures seek to first isolate or protect the 
organization from such individuals and second, prevent their unethical behavior spreading out further 
to the organization (Andersson & Pearson, 1999; Felps et al., 2006; Misangyi et al., 2008). According 
to Felps et al. (2006) protecting the organization from such individuals requires either removing the 
deviant person, protecting the rest of the team from their influence, or motivating them to change.  
It follows that rational choices approaches to anti-corruption focus on how to prevent a corrupt from 
taking place by influencing the decision making process of individuals. There are two comments we 
can make here; first, rational choice anti-corruption requires a corrupt practice for it to happen. We 
need to know what the corrupt practice is before we apply any punishment or incentives against it. 
Second, knowing what the corrupt practice is makes things complicated as corrupt exchanges take 
place usually under privacy and secrecy. The use of experiments thus simulating various scenarios to 
test the behavior of people can offer only limited insights into the actual exchange. One of this limited 
insights concerns also the works of compliance officers who are tasked with ensuring compliance 
with anti-corruption laws and what are the means, strategies, and reasoning they employ to achieve 
their goal. 
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4.2 Anti-corruption as a social structure 
Structural corruption refers not to individual acts as in the rational choice paradigm, but to a social 
phenomenon institutionalized and embedded in social relations of power (Anders & Nuijten, 2007). 
What determines corrupt behavior here is not self-interest or utility maximization but rather the 
broader context the actor works and lives in. From an analytical perspective, therefore, structural 
approaches focus on corruption as it is happening in middle and macro levels of analysis such as 
groups of people, organizations, countries, and the international scene. It is important to highlight 
here that in many of the studies mentioned below, the analytical focus is not on anti-corruption 
measures and their application but rather revolves around all sorts of initiatives supporting anti-
corruption as the expected and appropriate behavior. This I suggest symbolizes the start of a transition 
from anti-corruption measures to anti-corruption as a discourse distant from corruption and the 
necessary organizational reactions to such a problem per se. The consequences of this transition will 
be further discussed in the next sub-chapter of this review since it has sparked a number of critical 
and relational works on anti-corruption and its relationship to the social problem of corruption. 
Jancsics  argues for two distinct kinds of structural corruption; normative and material. Normative 
structures refer to social norms as powerful and consistent behavior regulative rules (Feldman, 1984). 
Actors tend to conform to social norms since they appear as a form of ‘social wisdom’ which 
facilitates on the one hand the decision-making process of actors and on the other hand prevents them 
from thinking critically (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). Thus we have the well-studied phenomenon of 
‘bad apples’ produced by ‘bad barrels’ whereby otherwise ethical people engage in corrupt practices 
in their workplaces (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Treviño & Youngblood, 
1990). Other examples where the normative environment explains corruption range from national 
cultural and religious beliefs to organizational, group and family norms. Corruption in many East 
Asian countries, for example, is considered to be related to informal relations such as the traditions 
of ‘guanxi’ and ‘yongo’ in China and South Korea respectively (Berger et al., 2018; Horak & Klein, 
2016; Yang, 1994).  
The majority of works on corruption from a structural perspective belong to organization and 
management studies in which corruption and potential counter measures have been suggested with 
the aim of changing or replacing such norms. Scholars have shown how corrupt behavior becomes 
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normalized and institutionalized in organizations (Anand et al., 2005; Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Frei 
& Muethel, 2017; Zyglidopoulos, Fleming, & Rothenberg, 2008) and consequently how such a 
situation can be de-normalized (Anand et al.; Arellano, 2017; Lange, 2008). Regarding the prevention 
of corruption, business ethics scholars using survey research and case studies have found positive 
evidence for the impact of measures such as raising awareness among employees through regular 
training and communication (Hauser, 2018; Kaptein, 2015; Verma, Mohapatra, & Löwstedt, 2016), 
the nurturing of an ethical culture in the organization (Fichter, 2018; Paine, 1994; Schwartz, 2013), 
and the exemplar ethical behavior of corporate leadership (Miska & Mark, 2018; Pasricha, Singh, & 
Verma, 2017; Sims, 2000). With regards to reversing cases of rationalized corruption, scholars argue 
for specific strategies and generalized theoretical corruption-control models (Anand et al.; Lange, 
2008; Misangyi et al., 2008; Pfarrer, Decelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008). Anand et al., for example, 
suggest companies stop denying the problem, engage external actors, and employ preventive 
measures as soon as possible.  
Gradually it became a common understanding among scholars that as a multidimensional problem 
corruption requires also an multidimensional answer (Ashforth et al., 2008; Lange, 2008; 
Zyglidopoulos, 2016; Zyglidopoulos, Hirsch, de Holan, & Philips, 2017) to, among other things, take 
into consideration both behavior shaping norms and norm shaping behavior. Misangyi et al. (2008), 
for example, makes the case that institutional entrepreneurs are necessary to reverse corrupt 
institutional logics, and as della Porta recently put it (2017, p. 664), ‘Individuals belonging to different 
societies and organizations can be pushed towards corruption by the nature of their internalized 
values, and by social pressures’. This realization led to a wave of interdisciplinary studies seeking to 
merge sociological and economic approaches to the study of corruption and anti-corruption. Indeed, 
scholars of New Institutional Economics (NIE) and New Economic Sociology (NES) have tried to 
apply the above in studies of corruption and anti-corruption. NES scholars seem to converge and 
discuss on the importance of generalized trust as ‘a crucial factor in anti-corruption’ (Bjønskov & 
Paldam, 2005; Uslaner, 2005). These studies find that an increase in trust has significant impact on 
corrupt behavior. They are reserved, however, on whether an increase on anti-corruption has a similar 
impact on trust among actors. NIE scholars depart from the opportunism of actors and examine how 
this behavior shapes corruption as a phenomenon (della Porta, 2004; Lambsdorff & Teksoz, 2005; 
Pechlivanos, 2005). Pechlivanos’ (2005) findings for example challenge the well-known anti-
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corruption measure of transparency by showing that unrestricted information flows between parties 
may be equally helpful to opportunist actors intending to misbehave.  
Anti-corruption has also been studied as a norm along the lines of similar institutional reactions to 
other transnational crimes such as piracy, drug trafficking, slavery, terrorism, money-laundering and 
prostitution (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006; Getz, 2006; Jakobi, 2013a; McCoy & Heckel, 2001; 
Nadelmann, 1990). Global governance, international relations, and business scholars treat anti-
corruption as an autonomous regime regulating the behavior of public and private actors. This regime 
consists of governments, NGOs, and international organizations introducing regulations and rules 
covering virtually the whole public-private-society spectrum. A common area of concern in these 
studies is the role of ‘norm or moral entrepreneurs’ and ‘organizational platforms’ who mobilize 
political and popular support domestically and internationally (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; 
Nadelmann, 1990). Indeed, Jakobi (2013a), maintains that the US government and Transparency 
International played a significant role in establishing and diffusing anti-corruption internationally, 
while Rose (2015), argues that depending on the ‘organizational platform’s’ setup, the effect of anti-
corruption in national legislation differs from case to case. On the same matter of the effectiveness 
of anti-corruption and in line with Nadelmann’s conclusion on global prohibition regimes, Getz 
(2006) argues that the effectiveness of the anti-corruption regime is rather limited by the complexity 
of the phenomenon of corruption.  
Besides normative structures, material structures refer to ‘materially constrained levels and 
imperatives of the social system’ and they are to be understood as durable norms which have produced 
material constrains (Alexander & Smith, 1993, p. 160). For example, a national culture is greatly 
delimited by the country’s physical borders. This is to say, corruption happens when such factors as 
the structure of an organization, country or system and the ways these function can be perceived as 
facilitators of corrupt behavior. Again, as the experience from the ‘new democracies’ has shown in 
political and business studies, democratic institutions and economic growth, for instance, maintain if 
not feed corruption in the short-term (Jetter, Agudelo, & Hassan, 2015; Sung, 2003; Treisman, 2000). 
Likewise, while competition appears as negatively related to corruption on the national level, it has 
been positively related to corruption  on the organizational level (MacLean, 2001; Montinola & 
Jackman, 2002; Treisman, 2000). Scholars have found, for example, that under conditions of 
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competition, overly profit-minded managers and companies set unrealistic financial goals pushing 
their employees to engage in illegal activities (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 
2001). Similarly, survey research shows that corruption is more likely to happen within specific 
structural conditions such as company size, sector (Transparency International, 2011), and lack of 
regulation in certain areas of corporate activity. According to OECD’s Foreign Bribery Report (2014) 
for example, extractive and construction industries are more prone to corruption than manufacturing.  
With regards to the latter, much attention has been drawn to national, international and global anti-
corruption regulations. Legal scholars, for example, examine the effectiveness of old and new anti-
corruption legislation such as the FCPA and UK Bribery Act respectively (Brewster, 2017; Koehler, 
2009; Rose, 2012; Weismann, 2009; Yeoh, 2012). Likewise, business ethics scholars examine the 
role and effectiveness of international treaties on anti-corruption such as the OECD and UN 
Conventions (Apke, 2001; Argandoña, 2007; Darrough, 2010; Jongen, 2018; Moran, 1999; Pacini, 
Swingen, & Rogers, 2002; Salimbene, 1999). Findings show that rules and regulations are not so 
effective when isolated from a broader anti-corruption framework. On the matter of sector-wise 
corruption, business scholars have analyzed multi-stakeholder and private initiatives aiming at 
reducing corruption. Drawing on case studies such as the Maritime Anti-corruption Network 
(MACN), and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), scholars argue for the 
transformative influence of such initiatives both on companies and governments alike (Dávid-Barrett, 
2019; Rose, 2015a). Lastly and regarding national cultures and corruption, the focus has been more 
often than not to the techniques utilized to measure corruption. One of the most discussed indices 
within international relations (IR) and business studies is the Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) which ranks countries according to their perceived corruption. The success 
of the CPI  in alarming public and private actors on the risks and costs of corruption allowed Wang 
and Rosenau (2001, p. 40), to call Transparency International an ‘agent of change’ on a global scale. 
There have been, however, a number of scholars who remain skeptical regarding the broader effects 
of such measurements (De Maria, 2008; Gilman, 2018; Kimeu, 2014; Larmour, 2005). De Maria 
(2008), for example, argues that not only the CPI but also the whole anti-corruption movement is 
bound to serve Western economic and geo-political interests. 
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Structural approaches to anti-corruption focus on altering the social structures within which corrupt 
practices take place and not the behavior and decision making of people directly. They rest on the 
establishment of a normative environment which ideally would prevent people from misbehaving. I 
should mention here that we also witness the start of a transition from a structural approach to anti-
corruption in the form of corruption control measures to an anti-corruption norm and discourse. This 
becomes more evident in the review of anti-corruption studies especially in the international relations, 
global governance, and international political economy academic disciplines where anti-corruption is 
understood as a ‘global’ phenomenon or norm regulating the behavior of corporations. This means 
that at least for these studies the focus is more on how anti-corruption represents or reproduces the 
global economic system and society and less on its organizational application. This trend is evident 
and thus further discussed in the below section where anti-corruption as a relational phenomenon is 
presented.  
4.3 Anti-corruption as a relational phenomenon 
Jancsics argues for a third conceptualization of corruption as a relational phenomenon. Corruption is 
understood neither as an exchange relationship between two actors, nor as the outcome of structural 
pressures on actor behavior but rather as deriving from the associations of people with one another. 
In this sense, a relational model of corruption integrates elements from both the rational and structural 
approaches. From the rational approach, a relational understanding of corruption borrows the utility 
maximization element. Indeed, people form associations because they benefit from these associations 
although that benefit may not be monetary or immediate (Lawler & Hipp, 2010). From the structural 
approach, the relational model borrows the importance of the context where corruption is produced 
or sustained as part of a web of social relations (Shore & Haller, 2005). Corruption therefore takes an 
‘informal network’ form whereby its performance may be illegal but at the same time is obvious and 
necessary as a means to maintain social cohesion, stability, and order (Smith, 2007). In many cultures, 
building and maintaining long-term informal personal networks is necessary for fulfilling and 
achieving any goals and ambitions. In some cases, such as the Korean tradition of ‘yongo’, the ties 
constituting it are to a great extent predefined and given by birth so there is not much individual 
choice. Yongo and similar traditions like the Chinese ‘guanxi’ are considered necessary for doing 
business in South Korea and China respectively (Lin, 2004), yet are potentially sources of corruption 
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according to Western standards (Berger et al., 2018; Horak, Taube, Pac, & Manag, 2016; Yang, 
1994).  
Anthropologists have looked into corruption in local settings (Gupta, 1995, 2005; Haller & Shore, 
2005; Harrison, 2006; Torsello & Venard, 2016) and argue for the importance of taking into 
consideration the social context before applying the western concept of ‘corruption’. They show that 
local customs and traditions of gift giving and relationship building in various settings across the 
world little have in common with bribery as understood in the Western context. Yang for instance 
(1994, p. 108), argues that  ‘the art of ‘guanxi’ cannot be reduced to a modern western notion of 
corruption because the personalistic qualities of obligation, indebtedness, and reciprocity are just as 
important as transactions in material benefit’. Anthropologists have also looked into the anti-
corruption agenda questioning its practice and discourses (MacLennan, 2005; Sampson, 2015, 2017). 
Sampson (2010, p. 261), for example, argues for an anti-corruption ‘industry’, the discourse and 
practice of which enables it ‘to coexist along with the corruption it ostensibly is combating’. In a 
similar vein, others question the motivation and objectives of the anti-corruption agenda and call for 
more attention on who and why talks and engages with it (Gupta, 1995; Harrison, 2006). 
Along similar lines, an increasing number of scholars have sought to analyze the anti-corruption 
industry by critically examining its discourses and practices (Bukovansky, 2006; Everett , Neu, & 
Rahaman, 2006, 2007; Hansen, 2011, 2012; Hansen & Tang-Jensen, 2015; Hindess, 2005; Lord, 
2013; Slager, 2017). These studies build also on a relational understanding of corruption accompanied 
by an interest in how anti-corruption is organized beyond mere human associations to include also 
non-human entities and notions such as socio-technical and material governmental and private 
associations. Anti-corruption therefore appears as not only a response to corruption but also an 
autonomous, if not independent, assemblage of heterogeneous elements, the study of which allows 
for an understanding of the underlying assumptions of anti-corruption. Hansen and Tang-Jensen 
(2015) examine how legal experts in a Danish law-firm practice due-diligence on behalf of a corporate 
client. They find that in practice, the language and methods used on the micro-level by anti-corruption 
practitioners are to some extent aligned and reproduced with the values exhibited by the macro-level 
anti-corruption regime. In the same vein, Slager (2017), analyzes the discourses of accountants and 
shows how anti-corruption risk is constructed. She warns that an understanding of anti-corruption as 
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a risk comes at the expense of other alternative and more collective forms of fighting corruption such 
as business ethics and corporate integrity culture. 
Indeed, as it has been pointed out by Garland (2003), a risk governance approach differs from 
‘traditional forms of moral and judicial reasoning’ because it borrows and combines elements both 
from the compliance and business ethics approaches. Risk management neither seeks to blame and 
punish individuals as a compliance approach implies, nor does it expect each and every person to 
abide by the same ethical code as a business ethics approach prioritizes. Rather it rests on the premise 
that since individual actions can have an impact on many then the responsibility is shared and risks 
can be managed collectively (Garland, 2003). It follows that risk assessments can locate primary risks 
such as geographical and functional dangers, but can also initiate what Hardy and Maguire (2016) 
called a ‘riskification’ process or else a discursive practice by which organizational members are 
enrolled to the management of such risks. In this sense, anti-corruption risk seems more like an 
‘organized uncertainty’ (Power, 2007) since its discursive construction (Slager, 2017) resembles less 
danger and more an opportunity for value creation (Andersen, Garvey, & Roggi, 2014; Hansen, 
2011). 
Following the above developments, a conceptual transition can be discerned from a normative 
approach to corruption studies and the controls employed to eliminate it, to anti-corruption as a 
discourse. Corruption control implies that there is indeed an intentional and opportunistic deviance 
in organizational settings (Lange, 2008) and therefore there is a need to contain this phenomenon by 
employing certain measures. As we have seen above, such an understanding of corruption appeared 
in management and organization studies mostly within norm-based and structural approaches 
whereby organizations were understood as ‘bad barrels’ (Ashforth et al., 2008; Pinto, Leana, & Pil, 
2008). The term ‘anti-corruption’, in contrast, has risen as a term in anthropological, international 
political economy, and global governance studies in which anti-corruption has been understood as an 
anti-policy and discourse (Hansen, 2012; Jakobi, 2013a; Sampson, 2016). According to Walters 
(2008), an anti-policy is ‘a space of policies, measures, programmes… which derive whatever 
legitimacy they enjoy from the claim that their objective is to repress bad things’. In other words, 
anti-corruption is much broader than corruption control since measures are only a part of an anti-
corruption policy. Within this broader understanding of anti-corruption scholars have argued that 
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corruption and anti-corruption may not be as opposing to each other as one would expect but rather 
coexist in tandem (Sampson, 2010). Indeed, Hansen (2011) for example shows that anti-corruption 
does not only seek to repress corruption but also creates commercial opportunities for business, while 
others have questioned the capacity of anti-corruption to battle corruption (Krastev, 2000, 2004). 
To sum up, in this section anti-corruption studies have been briefly reviewed. Table 2 shows a 
summary of the dimensions revealed. To a great extent, anti-corruption has been embedded or has 
been part and parcel with corruption studies. This is most evident in the rational choice approach in 
which experiments simulate both prone to corruption situations and proposed solutions. There has 
also been an increasing number of studies, structural and relational, presenting anti-corruption as a 
norm and network in itself respectively. Structural approaches detach anti-corruption from the micro 
or individual level and consider it as a shared response. Under the relational approach, corruption is 
understood as an informal network of human and non-human elements embedded in social relations 
and thus is more or less inevitable. The focus, therefore, of anti-corruption is not on directly 
eliminating corruption but rather on how to cope with or manage it (Hansen, 2011; Sampson, 2010). 
In short, I argue first, that the anti-corruption literature remains fragmented despite efforts to bring 
together theoretical traditions (Ashforth et al., 2008; Lambsdorff et al., 2004), and second that the 
relational approach seems the most promising direction in advancing our understanding of the 
phenomenon of anti-corruption because of its ability to accommodate concepts not by prioritizing 
one over the other or integrating one in the other, but rather by relating them as components of the 
practice of anti-corruption.  
Taking departure from the above findings, there are three areas where I believe contributions can be 
made by this study. First, although scholars have realized the need for a multi-dimensional approach 
to corruption and its control (Ashforth et al., 2008; Lambsdorff et al., 2004; Zyglidopoulos, 2016; 
Zyglidopoulos et al., 2017), these efforts have remained mostly on theoretical and conceptual models 
and levels. As a result, anti-corruption literature and research remains fragmented and divided 
between theoretical concepts such as agency and structure rarely able to ‘commensurate with the 
scope and depth of the problem of corruption’ (Ashforth et al., p. 671). In the few cases in which such 
integration was attempted, ontological considerations have raised further confusion instead of 
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treatment. New institutionalism approaches, for example, consider ‘individuals, organizations, or 
alliances of such social actors’ alike as institutional entrepreneurs (Misangyi et al., 2008, p. 766). 
 
Moreover, as the above discussed relational approach to corruption promises, anti-corruption consists 
of a wide range of actors, organizations, indexes, events, connections, mentalities and rationalities, 
discourses, written and unwritten rules, texts, and knowledge also rarely addressed as organizational 
features and tensions of the anti-corruption assemblage verifying the fragmentation of anti-corruption 
studies (Hansen & Tang-Jensen, 2015).    
Evident of the above is the use of a level-wise ontology separating individuals, organizations, and the 
global area of activity from one another. As a result, the global anti-corruption norm and discourse 
(Bukovansky, 2006; Hansen, 2017) seem distant from norm-based approaches on organizational 
corruption (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Ashforth et al., 2008;  Zyglidopoulos et al., 2008) since the 
former fails to see the particularities of such a complex problem in the organizational context. In 
contrast, the global anti-corruption industry (Sampson, 2010) advances a ‘one size fits all’ (Krastev, 
2000) solution without, however, providing any guidance or indication as to how this solution should 
be implemented and applied in practice.   
Anti-corruption 
 Rational actor 
approach 
Structural approach Relational/practice 
approach 
Level of 
analysis 
Micro Macro and middle ‘Middle’ (flattened) 
Focus  Actor interaction and 
decision making 
Social and material 
structures/patterns 
that go beyond 
individual acts 
Anti-corruption practices 
(situated and recursive 
activity) 
Methods 
(indicative) 
Experiments, 
mathematical models 
Case studies, 
interviews 
Discourse analysis, 
praxiography, 
ethnomethodology 
Findings Incentives and 
punishments to 
prevent or disrupt 
corrupt exchanges 
between individuals 
Measures towards 
changing the social 
structures of 
corruption (corporate 
culture) 
The organization of anti-
corruption (risk 
management, industry, 
assemblage, network, 
practice, discourse) 
Table 2: Approaches to anti-corruption 
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Second, corruption has been a central problem in the global economic system for more than two 
decades yet we know little about anti-corruption and the private sector (Calderón, Luis, Lvarez-Arce, 
& Mayoral, 2009; Hansen, 2011; Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006). Since the mid-1990s 
when corruption was understood as an economic matter, private actors and in particular multinational 
companies have played a pivotal role in establishing anti-corruption as a default corporate operation. 
Corporate anti-corruption refers to the means by which compliance officers tackle corruption in 
organizations. It usually appears in the form of compliance programs underpinned by a reasoning as 
to why corruption is bad for business and society and is materialized through a series of mechanisms 
and procedures such as employee training, background checks, risk assessments, whistleblower 
hotlines, reporting, internal audits, and codes of conduct (Miller, 2014). Rarely, however, has it been 
questioned how such reasoning and mechanisms are rationalized and put into practice in 
organizations such as multinational companies, who does so, and what are the intended or unintended 
consequences?  
Third, although there has been an increasing interest in anti-corruption and its practice, relatively 
little is known about anti-corruption practitioners as the actual actors behind anti-corruption practice. 
On the one hand, rational choice approaches through experiments can only simulate at best corrupt 
transactions due to corruption’s secretive and peculiar nature. On the other hand, and despite the 
various calls for consideration of action in institutional theories, structure and norms are still 
prioritized over agency. As a result, even when action appears it is still considered under institutional 
and universal pressures, limiting its agency. This overly strong focus on the theoretical ‘struggle’ 
between agency and structure creates a lack of realistic appreciation and study of anti-corruption as 
it happens. I suggest that an empirical focus on what practitioners do offers an excellent opportunity 
for examining anti-corruption and its constitution in action. 
To address these drawbacks, I employ a social practice approach broadly construed and in so doing 
it reflects the elements listed under the ‘relational/practice approach’ heading (Table 2). As a social 
practice, anti-corruption is produced by the situated and recursive activity of compliance officers 
(Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011) who translate and integrate complex and abstract rules into everyday 
practice. Anti-corruption seeks not to eliminate corruption but rather to understand the management 
of such risks produced by corporate operation and discourses, and the organization of anti-corruption 
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as an assemblage of socio-material elements. This study thus belongs to the relational approach of 
corruption and anti-corruption studies since as we shall see in the next sections, practices are 
inherently relational (Latour, 2005).  
5. Research questions  
The research question and sub-questions guiding this dissertation thus are (Table 3):  
Main RQ How is anti-corruption practiced in multinational companies? 
Sub-question 1 How is anti-corruption integrated with business practices in multinational 
companies? 
Sub-question 2 How is anti-corruption thought of in multinational companies? 
 
Sub-question 3 How is anti-corruption practiced? 
Table 3: Main research question and sub-questions 
The first sub-question allows a look into how compliance officers translate and integrate anti-
corruption into business. It pertains to what practitioners do (and say) when they perform anti-
corruption and what strategies they use to turn abstract rules and regulations into practical advice and 
motivation for their colleagues. In so doing, the inquiry aims at an in-depth understanding of anti-
corruption as a matter of the sociopolitical role of corporations. More concretely, the paper argues 
that the sociopolitical role of corporations is not to be found only in public-private or private to private 
interactions but also in the relationship of the corporation with its own members. With the second 
sub-question, I seek to understand the deep-seated thoughts and assumptions compliance officers 
hold and make when practicing anti-corruption. How do they think about their own role and 
responsibility in promoting and ensuring anti-corruption? How do they think about their colleagues 
and what does that mean for anti-corruption? The paper reveals an inherent tension in the concept of 
anti-corruption caused and reinforced by the bodies of knowledge it has been built upon namely 
compliance, business ethics, and risk management. The third sub-question differs from the previous 
two in that I take a broader perspective on anti-corruption. I focus on practices of anti-corruption 
which more often than not remain unnoticed and I examine how such practices constitute anti-
corruption in practice through the produced intended and unintended consequences. In this sense, I 
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go even further than the previous sub-question by offering a view of anti-corruption beyond 
established norms, institutions, and interests.   
6. Theoretical framework-practices in the study of social phenomena 
The idiom ‘practice’ is used to cover a family of distinct theories and approaches in the study of 
human life and social order (Schatzki, Cetina, Savigny, 2001). Practice theories or practice-oriented 
approaches appeared in the 1970s in the works of, among others, Bourdieu (1977), Foucault (1982), 
Lyotard (1984), Giddens (1986), Taylor (1995), Latour (1987), and Garfinkel  (1967) where the focus 
was on the transformation of social phenomena such as meaning, knowledge, power, activity, 
institutions, science, social classes, and language (Schatzki, 2001). As Ortner maintained (1984, p. 
127):  
‘I will argue that a new key theoretical orientation is emerging, which may be labeled “practice” 
(or “action” or “praxis”). This is neither a theory nor a method in itself but rather, as I said, a 
symbol, in the name of which a variety of methods are being developed.’ 
Although each theorist conceptualizes and uses different terminology of what a practice is, they all 
seem to share the notion that human action and order are not the outcome of rational interests or 
norms but of practice (Reckwitz, 2002b). For Giddens, for example (1979, p. 5), social life is 
‘constituted in social practices’ where ‘what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons 
given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect’ (Foucault, 1991b, p. 75). In a 
similar vein, Latour  (2005; Law, 1992), see social order as a black box consisting of heterogeneous 
networks formed by interconnected actors acting on one another.  
This first wave of practice oriented studies led to the ‘practice turn in contemporary theory’ (Schatzki 
et al., 2001), which offered a more refined, elaborated and materialistic framework on practices 
through the works of scholars such as Schatzki (1996) and Reckwitz ( 2002) (Nicolini, 2012). From 
that point on, practice approaches gradually took off and created a ‘bandwagon’ (Corradi, Gherardi, 
& Verzelloni, 2010) of practice-based studies in areas of interest as diverse as marketing (Echeverri 
& Skålén, 2011), consumption (Shove & Pantzar, 2005; Welch & Warde, 2017), (Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2007), routines (Feldman & Pentland, 2003), institutions (Lounsbury, 2008), innovation 
(Pantzar & Shove, 2010), strategy (Golsorskhi, Rouleau, Seidl, & Vaara, 2010), organizational 
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learning (Nicolini, 2011), organizational change (Czarniawska & Sevón, 1996), decision-making 
(Cabantous, Gond, & Johnson-Cramer, 2010), technology (Orlikowski, 2000), and international 
relations (Adler & Pouliot, 2011a; Bueger & Gadinger, 2014). 
This new wave of practice theories differs in two ways from the previous one. First, some scholars 
insist more on the material aspect of practices. Earlier conceptualizations of practice were rather 
ideational in essence, probably due to at that time the emerging ‘interpretive turn’ (Rabinow & 
Sullivan, 1979). Since then, however, hardly anyone has argued against the importance and necessity 
of non-humans in social life and in practices in particular (Clarke, 2005). In this sense, practice 
theories share a lot with Actor-network theory although Schatzki (2002) remains skeptical regarding 
the attribution of agency to non-humans in practices since practice equals human activity. However, 
non-humans, according to Schatzki, can be the carriers of agency only as entities composing social 
orders along with people, artifacts, organisms, and things. In other words, non-human agency is a 
necessary part of the material arrangements within which practices happen.  For the purpose of this 
study, we meet non-humans in the form of meeting rooms, computers, buildings, telephones, 
documents, maps, slides, and projectors as well as other kinds of resources in all three papers.  
Second, according to Reckwitz (2002b), recent practice theories locate the site of the social in practice 
and not in minds, discourses, and interactions of humans as in mentalism, textualism, and 
intersubjectivism respectively. In the same vein, Schatzki (2002), criticizes Bourdieu’s concept of 
habitus because it does not distinguish between action and practice. If practice is the smallest unit of 
analysis, then it must precede action according to him. Likewise, Reckwitz (2002), considers 
Foucauldian discourses and discursive practices as ontologically different from socio-material 
practices. Bacchi (2014), however, shows that by discourse, Foucault meant knowledge and therefore 
enabled discourse to take material forms through documents and statements. Discursive practices, 
therefore, are not just linguistic practices but also materialistic rendering the distinction 
discursive/non-discursive practice as irrelevant. Non-humans therefore are understood in this study 
not just as things with symbolic meaning but as the setting or ‘material arrangement’ within which 
the practice of anti-corruption takes place (Schatzki, 2005, p. 472). 
By material arrangements, Schatzki (2002) suggests that social practices happen always within some 
sort of material setting. If teaching, for example, is a practice then desks, and chairs, and blackboard, 
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books, pencils, chalk are necessary. Likewise, anti-corruption as a practice takes place in different 
material settings. For instance, in the risk assessment process described in paper #1, a meeting room, 
a round table, PowerPoint slides, maps, documents, chairs, pencils, a projector or computers and 
tablets are definitely needed for the practice to be performed. Similarly, if the practice of anti-
corruption takes place in an international conference then a bigger building is needed and in it a 
conference center with many rooms so people can convene and discuss using the materials mentioned 
above. Things and non-humans therefore ‘localize’ (Latour, 2005) the practice by offering a 
materialistic and in some cases even naturalistic setting. 
Materials allowed me to locate the practice of anti-corruption in corporate or international settings 
but it would be a mistake to say that practices are ready-made meaningful objects to be simply 
recorded, captured, or even observed. They need to be re-constructed or interpreted (Bueger & 
Gadinger, 2014). According to Taylor (1979, p. 25), interpretation is a hermeneutical ‘attempt to 
make clear, to make sense of an object of study’, meaning that without the researcher’s analysis a 
practice does not make sense or lacks a comprehensible meaning. It would also be a mistake, however, 
to say that meaning rests exclusively with the mind of the researcher or observer who will attach it to 
the practice of anti-corruption. Practice is therefore located between the observer and the observed, 
the objective and the subjective, without, however, being either of the two. As Rabinow and Sullivan 
(1979, p. 5) commented on Taylor’s paper ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’ (1979), ‘The 
baseline realities for both the observer and the observed in the human sciences are practices, socially 
constituted actions’.  
My study of anti-corruption is informed by the above theoretical concept of practice. I started my 
endeavor on anti-corruption with later conceptualizations of practices as they tend to be more refined 
and elaborated as well as more materialistic (Nicolini, 2012). However, as I was developing my 
thought and concepts I ended up using earlier theoretical perspectives on practices such as 
Foucauldian governmentality and Actor-network theory (Dean, 2010; Foucault, 1995; Latour, 2005). 
This happened mostly because on the one hand my focus on anti-corruption was becoming more 
anchored in broader understandings of power and politics, and on the other less anchored in various 
components of practices such as discourses, knowledge, rules, and norms. Indeed, my focus was not 
anymore on anti-corruption as an object to be used by actors to produce outcomes such as profits or 
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ethics, but as an effect produced by its own practice. In this process, I found it interesting and useful 
therefore to understand how anti-corruption becomes integrated in corporations (paper #1), then how 
anti-corruption is thought of (paper #2), and only when I had an overall understanding of corporate 
anti-corruption was I able to focus on the international practice of anti-corruption (paper #3).  Below 
I discuss and elaborate on the key points of the practice approach namely practices as situated human 
activity, the rejection of dichotomies and dualities, relationality, and practical knowledge. I conclude 
this section by discussing the ontological choices and implications of this theoretical framework. 
6.1 Practices as situated human activity 
If one wants to study practices he or she needs to locate them in the lowest common denominator, 
socially constituted actions. Indeed, Feldman and Orlikowski (2011, p. 1241) argue that  despite the 
differences between various strands of practice theory, scholars do seem to agree ‘that situated actions 
are consequential in the production of social life’. Actions include both the ‘sayings’ and ‘doings’ of 
human beings in performing and participating in a practice (Schatzki, 2002). Doings refer to the 
everyday actions human beings do in performing their daily tasks, duties, and activities. Sayings 
belong to the category of ‘doings’ since ‘to say’ something requires the use of the mouth and tongue. 
However, ‘sayings’ should not be restricted to language since an action made with the use of the 
hand, for instance, may ‘say’ as much as a word spoken. When the practice of anti-corruption is 
performed, people use their body in certain ways such as when compliance officers open their mouths 
to talk and explain regulations, or when they move their hands to use the computer or point to the 
slide presentation, or even when they walk to move from one meeting to another. Therefore, within 
a practice theoretical framework and as it will also be further discussed below, it makes no sense to 
distinguish between discursive and non-discursive action (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014; Schatzki, 2002). 
Both bodily doings and sayings do not mean much as random actions. They need to be situated or to 
be performed within a certain and specific context. A situated practice means that it happens ‘within 
specifiable historic, discursive, and material situations’ (Nicolini & Monteiro, 2016, p. 15). 
Historically then, this study on the practice of anti-corruption belongs to the era of globalization; an 
era in which social, political, and economic conditions have been transformed due to the 
interconnectedness enabled by the rapid technological development which humanity has experienced 
during the late 20th and early 21st centuries (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999). For the 
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purpose of this dissertation, it is of interest that Western multinational companies were over the same 
period of time able to expand at an unprecedented pace and range challenging the very foundations 
and boundaries of the institution of the nation-state as this was established in the Westphalian Treaty 
of 1648 (Cutler, 2001). According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) (2018), by 2017 multinational companies accounted for half of global exports, almost one-
third of the world’s GDP and about one fourth of global employment. In this capacity, multinational 
companies were characterized as agents of change (Sell, 1999), as well as breeders of, and at the same 
time potential allies in the fight against, corruption (Calderón et al., 2009; Wrage & Wrage, 2005). 
This context characterizes also the discursive conditions within which corporations have been 
operating more or less known as global governance. Global governance theory maintains that 
authority has been reoriented towards multiple directions one of which is the private sector and 
multinational companies in particular (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992). This shift in mentality regarding 
the role of multinational companies was analyzed by scholars as an indication of private authority 
(Hall & Biersteker, 2002), business power (May, 2006), corporate responsibility and citizenship 
(Crane et al., 2008; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011), or just neoliberalism (Shaw, 2000). In all cases 
multinational companies have been subject to a growing expectation and sometimes ambition to 
complement or supplement governments in their role to provide for public goods and social growth 
(Bernhagen & Mitchell, 2010). This meant that along with their geographical and quantitative 
expansion, multinational companies witnessed also a qualitative extension of their responsibilities to 
integrate environmental and social objectives into their operation and strategic orientation.  
Materially, this study is situated in discourses understood as material ‘statements’ or monuments built 
or used by human beings. As I will show below (sub-chapter 6.5), at the core of this argument is an 
interpretation of discourse and therefore discursive practices as more than strict spoken language. In 
contrast with inter-subjectivism in which discourse plays the most important role since it assigns 
meaning to signs (Neumann, 2002), in practices, language has meaning as long as it intervenes and 
acts on the world along with the other elements of practice (Nicolini, 2012). Statements are material 
because they do not contain meaning themselves but offer a map of the ‘rules and transformations’ 
that made a practice possible and meaningful at a certain time and place (Foucault, 1995). In effect 
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this means that the material world within which compliance officers operate offers the rules making 
anti-corruption a meaningful practice.5 
6.2 Rejecting dualities and dichotomies 
The above is a fine example of another common characteristic of practice theory; the rejection of 
dualities and dichotomies such as agency and structure, micro and macro, economy and society, 
interests and norms, subjective and objective (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011). Actor-network theory 
for instance has been developed on the proposition that there is no ‘macro’ level but only actors and 
networks. The ‘macro’ level, according to Callon and Latour (2014) is no more than a social 
construction which has been considered as given or as a ‘black box’. ANT’s objective is to not only 
open these black boxes and observe them, but also to provide for a ‘toolbox’ with which scholars can 
deconstruct them by following the traces left by the translations and negotiations performed by actors 
during its construction (Latour, 2005). In so doing, ANT, offers a ‘flat’ ontology in which the ‘social’ 
does not consist of analytical levels but is rather a flattened network of local sites mediated by actors 
or ‘actants’ in ANT terminology. Likewise, Schatzki (2002) has also offered his own flattened view 
of social reality. In his account, ‘the site of the social’ is composed of nexuses of practices and 
material arrangements’ (Schatzki, 2005, p. 471). Quite close to ANT’s understanding of social reality, 
Schatzki (2005), as mentioned above, differentiates his ‘site ontology’ on the role of materials. In 
contrast with ANT and closer to this thesis’ ontological assumptions, Schatzki  (2002) maintains that 
while practices are strictly the outcome of human action, the social orders created by practices are 
arrangements of people, artifacts, organisms, and things through which social life aspires. Ontological 
considerations will be further discussed later in this chapter. 
Practice theory rejects the interest-norm dichotomy; social action and order are neither the outcome 
of individual interests nor the outcome of structural forces. To put this statement into perspective, 
and as we have seen in the literature review, anti-corruption has been analyzed mostly either as the 
outcome of norms and rules or the outcome of individualistic interests. Likewise, we have seen that 
the application of anti-corruption within corporations can be expected as ethical normative pressure 
or imposed compliance. However, as my fieldwork and analysis was developing I came across what 
Bourdieu (1977, p. 8) called ‘necessary improvisation’. This means that not only did no rules of any 
                                                          
5 See pp. 44-51 for elaborated discussion on the matter of materiality of discourse and relevant examples. 
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kind determine the actions of my research subjects, but also that these rules were being used as means 
for interpretation of certain situations. For instance, the diffusion of risk-based analysis of anti-
corruption promoted by the UK Bribery Act and other similar governmental and private regulations 
was not just a guideline on how to behave, but most importantly the means upon which compliance 
officers started building their anti-corruption strategy by translating anti-corruption into business 
practices (paper #1) and therefore form the identity of a trusted business advisor (paper #2). A 
practice-oriented approach therefore offered a ‘way out’ from the interest/norm dichotomy and 
allowed for a more nuanced way to conceptualize anti-corruption as enacted and reproduced through 
human action.  
Practice theory rejects the dualities between interests and norms, micro and macro, but only in so far 
these appear as dichotomies. That is to say, interests and norms can coexist but within practice and 
not as antithetical and opposing forces. Giddens’ (1986), theory of structuration, for example, is an 
attempt to transcend the duality and dichotomy between agency and structure as a mere representation 
produced and used for the sake of analytical convenience. Similarly, Bourdieu’s (2000, p. 138) 
concept of habitus aims at superseding the subjective-objective dichotomy:  
‘One of the major functions of the notion of habitus is to dispel two complementary fallacies 
each of which originates from the scholastic vision: on the one hand, mechanism, which holds 
that action is the mechanical effect of the constraint of external causes; and, on the other, 
finalism, which, with rational action theory, holds that the agent acts freely, consciously, and, 
as some of the utilitarians say, ‘with full understanding’, the action being the product of a 
calculation of chances and profits.’ 
6.3 The principle of relationality 
Instead of opposition between concepts, practice theorists insist on the relationality of phenomena 
and their constitution. Relationality here means that phenomena are not constituted by their members 
or other phenomena, but rather by the relationships between these members and phenomena 
(Bradbury & Bergmann Lichtenstein, 2000). That is to say, that the object of inquiry shifts from the 
entities of a phenomenon to their relationships and how these relationships establish practices or 
networks (Latour, 2005). I encountered this principle of practices while I was doing my fieldwork 
and in particular interviews and discussions with anti-corruption experts. I asked a compliance officer 
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once whether there was a conflict of interest between anti-corruption and profit. He answered that it 
would be a mistake to think of it in this way. Anti-corruption does not prevent profits but rather 
delimits the boundaries within which profit should be gained. Moreover, he continued to argue that 
if you see anti-corruption as value maker then it may even create a financial surplus. This off-the-
record comment was the spark that allowed me to start thinking about norms and interests in a 
relational relationship instead of an opposing and antithetical one.  
The principle of relationality is evident in practice theory by the components each theorist argues for 
as constitutive of practice. Schatzki (1996) argues for practical understandings, teleoaffective 
structures (unwritten rules), written rules, and general understandings as the links between the sayings 
and doings of humans. Similarly, Bourdieu (1990) argued for the relations between habitus, fields, 
and capital. ANT’s translations and mediators are the vehicles connecting sites and centers of 
calculation (Latour, 2005), and likewise Foucault (1991) wrote about governmentality to emphasize 
the relationality between government and rationality. Government, according to Foucault, has to do 
with the regulation of human action (Burchell, Gordon, & Miller, 1991). To govern is to shape and 
guide the action of people to the extent that people, including the governor, are considered as self-
governed. Rationality is a form of thinking about how government should function. It requires the 
employment of techniques and technologies, rules, administration, measurements and classifications, 
among other things, all of which make visible and manageable those to be governed. It follows then 
that understanding practices and how they bring social (dis)order and action requires a relational 
understanding of the elements involved and composing a specific practice.   
6.4 Practical knowledge 
Finally, knowledge, to perform a practice ‘embraces ways of understanding, knowing how, ways of 
wanting and of feeling that are linked to each other within a practice’ (Reckwitz, 2002b). Such 
knowledge is usually referred to as ‘background knowledge’ (Bogner et al., 2009a), practical 
understandings (Schatzki, 1996), ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu, 1990), practical consciousness (Giddens, 
1986), tacit knowledge (Collins, 2001), discourse (Foucault, 1995), etc. Schatzki (2002, p. 78) argues 
that practical understandings is what makes bodily and mental activities hang together in practice. 
Practical understandings mean that a human being has the knowledge of not only how to make 
specific bodily activities but also how to identify similar moves, and how to respond and prompt to 
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such bodily moves performed by others. For Bourdieu (1990), habitus, the dispositions that produce 
activities and shape but also are being shaped by the social field, is the type of knowledge which 
always determines and organizes practice and action. In the same vein, Giddens (1986) maintains that 
his concept of practical consciousness determines both practices and their constitutive actions. 
According to Collins (2001), practical understanding or tacit knowledge is the kind of knowledge that 
we all understand when we see it or better acquire it, but rarely if ever we can express it in a codified 
way so that others can replicate it. Even if the best practitioner shared what he knows, we cannot be 
certain that we would be able to do the same thing with the exact same results and method. Knowledge 
is dynamic and it changes and evolves with each actor acquiring it within the practice’s specific 
context. That is to say, it is produced based on the social context within which the practice is 
performed and it has a meaning only in that particular context and performer. Tacit knowledge is not 
about doing things in a right or wrong way; this should be a matter of experience after all. Rather, 
tacit knowledge is just about doing or performing a practice in a particular time and place.  
6.5 Further ontological considerations: the materiality of discourse and discursive practices 
The decisions regarding the theoretical framework did not come without challenges. From a practical 
perspective, the above ontological positions allowed the synthesis of the three papers into the present 
thesis. Likewise, and in terms of their theoretical foundations, the three papers are based on the 
overlapping aspects of approaches concerned with the study of practices. However, the same 
approaches differ conceptually in ontological terms regarding the role of the material world in the 
constitution of social phenomena (Table 4); Foucault and his followers studying governmentality 
draw on discourses and ‘what is said’ to uncover deep-seated assumptions (Bacchi, 2012; Bacchi & 
Bonham, 2014; Dean, 2010; Rose & Miller, 2010b). Latour’s (2005) ANT argues for a view of the 
‘social’ as socio-material networks and therefore of importance are the connections or translations 
enabling its construction. International practices (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b; Bueger & Gadinger, 2014) 
build on the works of Bourdieu and other more recent practice theorists arguing for practices as the 
‘smallest unit’ of analysis to study international phenomena. The issue therefore was how discourses, 
practices, and networks can ontologically be compatible with each other without reducing their 
conceptual and analytical value as such. Schatzki’s (2005, 2011) argument and understanding of non-
humans as necessary and constitutive of practices but agential only as entities composing social orders 
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along with people brought ANT and International Practices closer as these theories clearly argue for 
practices as socio-material instances. In contrast, Foucault’s concept of discourse needed further 
interpretation in this regard since more often than not discourse is identified with language. 
According to Reckwitz (2002b), practice theories are cultural theories but not all cultural theories are 
practice theories. Practice theories are cultural because they conceptualize human action as the 
outcome neither of interests (homo economicus) nor norms (homo sociologicus). Rather, cultural 
theories source human action and social order in ‘the symbolic structures of knowledge which enable 
and constrain the agents to interpret the world according to certain forms, and to behave in 
corresponding ways’ (Reckwitz, 2002b, pp. 245–246). 
 Actor-network Theory International Practices Governmentality 
Location of the 
‘social’ 
Socio-material 
networks 
Socio-material 
practices 
Discursive practices 
Role of material in 
constitution of 
practices 
Constitutive (agential) Constitutive (not 
agential) 
Constitutive (needs 
interpretation) 
Table 4: Materiality in the constitution of practices 
In addition, he argues that practice theories differ from other cultural theories in that they 
conceptualize the smallest unit of analysis, or else the ‘site of the social’ (Schatzki, 2002), in practices. 
In contrast, other cultural theories such as mentalism, textualism, and intersubjectivism conceptualize 
the social in the minds, discourses, and interactions of humans respectively. 
In Reckwitz’s (2002b) respect then, Foucault’s (1995), discursive practices do not fit into practice 
theories since they are a distinct kind of practices in which the smallest unit of analysis is 
discourse,strictly understood as language, and not practice. As this chapter is unfolded, I will show 
that this is not the case; according to recent interpretations of Foucault’s concept of discursive 
practices (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014), discourse, understood as knowledge, is about language as much 
it is about material practices rendering the discursive/non-discursive dichotomy irrelevant. Discursive 
practices are not a different kind of practices but rather the site in which knowledge, rules, and 
materials co-habit and reproduce themselves. In so doing, discourse is ontologically compatible with 
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practice theories and also contributes to the conceptualization of practices themselves by uncovering 
the implicit and deep-seated knowledge guiding the governance of anti-corruption.  
Foucault’s work has been associated and developed during the ‘linguistic turn’ in social sciences 
(Rorty, 1967; Van Maanen, 1995), a movement which claimed language and ‘what people say’ as a 
meaning inscribing device. According to this philosophical turn in social sciences, discourse does not 
have a strictly descriptive of ‘what is true’ function; rather it is used both to inscribe meaning to the 
world and also to read back this meaning (Carver, 2002). Discourse then is constitutive of the social 
world since it gives meaning to it. In this sense, the site of the social is not out there waiting to be 
found, but rather is constructed and co-constructed through the discourse used by human beings 
(Hook, 2001). It is people through their spoken, written, or even conceptual language who attach 
meaning to certain objects, phenomena, relationships, understandings, events, and so on. But 
discourse also constitutes the social world since it allows people to ‘receive’ back meanings as they 
have always been there. Risk, for instance, is a concept which has been constructed through discursive 
practices (Hardy & Maguire, 2016; Maguire & Hardy, 2013; Slager, 2017), and at the same time is 
received back as differently as a danger (Beck, 1992), uncertainty to be organized and managed 
(Hansen, 2011; Power, 2007), treatment (Hansen, 2011), and opportunity (Andersen et al., 2014).  
Foucault did in some cases use the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘discursive practices’ in the same way 
humans use language to inscribe meaning in and out of the world. In his own words, ‘what they say, 
that little fragment of discourse - speech or writing, it matters little’ (Foucault, 1991a, p. 71, emphasis 
in the original). However, several scholars argue that Foucault’s concept of discourse  means 
knowledge (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014; Cousins & Hussain, 1984; Hook, 2001). According to this line 
of interpretation, Foucault’s use of discourse as knowledge points to two distinct but interrelated 
meanings; discourse as ‘what is within the true’ (1995), and discursive practices as a set of practices 
which contain the rules shaping (1995) what is to be taken as true or knowledge. This distinction 
derives from Foucault’s definition of discourse as the difference between ‘what is said’ as opposed 
to ‘what can be said’:  
‘discourse is constituted by the difference between what one could say correctly at one period 
(under the rules of grammar and logic) and what is actually said’ (Foucault, 1991a, p. 63). 
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By ‘what is said’, Foucault (1991a), detaches discourse from a strict linguistic understanding since 
he distinguishes it from language in good grammatical order and logical thinking (Cousins & Hussain, 
1984). Therefore, for discourse to count as knowledge, neither (simply) a formulation of words in 
grammatically correct order, nor the outcome of a person’s thought suffices. A well-articulated and 
thought statement can as well be proven not to be ‘true’. Indeed, as Bacchi and Bonham (2014) note, 
Foucault’s focus was on ‘what people say’ and not on ‘what people say’. This is justified by 
Foucault’s interest in studying not the sovereignty of the subject, which does not exist, but the 
mechanisms through which an object is subjectified. Plenty are the cases from our personal 
experience in which we consider other people’s sayings as irrelevant to a particular discussion or 
when we dismiss them as simply not ‘true’. Likewise, there are cases where we conclude that 
someone’s words are logical but are the outcome of thinking under either stress or anger and therefore 
not valid for a certain situation. Discourse thus cannot be simply what is thought and comes out of 
people’s mouths. If ‘what is said’ is the outcome neither of grammatical rules nor logical thought, 
then there must be some mechanisms refining all the things that ‘can be said’ until only a small bit, 
the ‘true’, remains (Foucault, 1991a, 1995). In this sense, a discursive practice is not about how people 
use discourse but rather how the practice of discourse regulates what is to be said. Indeed, for Foucault 
(1995, p. 117) discursive practices are:  
‘a body of anonymous, historical rules, always determined in the time and space that have 
defined a given period, and for a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area, the 
conditions of operation of the enunciative function.’ 
Foucault and his students have conceptualized in different ways the nature and form of such 
mechanisms, as rules of formation (Foucault, 1995), problematizations (Bacchi, 2009, 2012), 
government analytics (Dean, 2010), rationalities and technologies (Rose & Miller, 2010), or even 
simply as discourses (McHoul & Wendy, 1993). Dean (2010) for instance, in his government 
analytics, writes about thoughts, technical means, visibility, and identities as the integral ‘discourses’ 
of ‘regimes of practices’. Therefore, the study of discursive practices can also be thought of as a study 
of practices of discourse (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014) in the sense that discourses (what is said) mean 
not only knowledge of the kind ‘what is true’, but also the mechanisms regulating what is to be 
counted as such (Cousins & Hussain, 1984):  
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‘If I have studied ‘practices’…it was in order to study this interplay between a ‘code’ which 
rules ways of doing things (how people are to be graded and examined, things and signs 
classified, individuals trained, etc.) and a production of true discourses which serve to found, 
justify and provide reasons and principles for these ways of doing things.’ (Foucault, 1991b, p. 
79) 
Most importantly, these mechanisms and rules are not external to the discourse they regulate but 
inherent to its own practice. Just like subjects are not sovereign and therefore their interests alone 
cannot shape their actions, the rules by which discourse is regulated cannot come from anywhere else 
but the practice itself (B. Brown & Cousins, 1980). This is why, according to Bacchi and Bonham, 
(2014)2014, Foucault (1991a, p. 71) insisted that discourses need to be studied as ‘a complex and 
differentiated practice subject to analyzable rules and transformations’ (emphasis added).  
To complete this position, Bacchi and Bonham (2014) argue furthermore that the distinction made 
between discursive and non-discursive or material practices is not a valid one. They do so by 
highlighting Foucault’s (1995) concept of ‘statements’ as material ‘monuments’ or events’, artefacts 
build by humans, and which require ‘archaeology’ if they are to be ‘unearthed’ and studied. 
Statements, like discourse, are not meant to be understood and handled as ‘speech acts’ because a 
statement is more than language (Cousins & Hussain, 1984). Rather, statements are material at their 
core; they do not contain meaning themselves but offer a map of the ‘rules and transformations’ that 
made a practice possible and meaningful in a certain time and place: 
‘The statement is always given through some material medium, even if that medium is 
concealed, even if it is doomed to vanish as soon as it appears.’ (Foucault, 1995, p. 112) 
The materiality of statements is conditioned by the practice itself (Young, 2001). Take as an example 
anti-corruption legislation and in particular the UK Bribery Act as one of the landmarks of the anti-
corruption regime. The UK Bribery Act and its accompanying guidelines can be seen as an example 
of a ‘statement’ made by the UK Government. Once introduced, the UK Bribery Act turned from 
words carefully arranged to an event or fact; it has been used by national and international public and 
private actors in the practice of anti-corruption to educate, guide, prosecute, inspire, and enforce 
certain behaviors and practices. The UK Bribery Act then acts as a function of the ‘institutional 
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apparatus’ of global anti-corruption and one can possibly think that it cannot exist outside this 
framework regardless of whether it was written, typed, or even said or remembered. A study on a 
statement then is not about where it is stored or how it was produced, but about how it has come to 
be as a material artefact securing ‘the status of “discourses” as knowledge’ (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014, 
p. 184; Foucault, 1995). By securing, it is meant that statements play a central and organizing role in 
‘activating’ other statements and their routines of relations (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014). To return to 
the above example, The UK Bribery Act activates other statements such as announcements, codes of 
conduct, Deferred Prosecution Agreements, categorizations of employees, risk assessments, 
corruption indexes, and training courses. It follows then than what can be called anti-corruption 
discourse is made up of such materialistic statements (Young, 2001) and hence their study requires 
an ‘archaeological’ inquiry; one that will focus not on these statements as materialistic facts, signs, 
events, or objects but on the relations between them (Foucault, 1995). 
The triangle of discourse as knowledge, practice, and materialistic statements causes Reckwitz’s 
(2002a) argument that Foucauldian approaches are not ontologically practice-based to collapse. By 
‘discourse’, Foucault meant not the language representing reality but the practice within which 
knowledge, rules, and materials co-habit and reproduce themselves, including language. In this sense, 
it is possible to think that discourse understood as language has neither priority over other elements 
or components of practice nor is it a special kind of practice; rather, discourse is meaningful only 
within a certain practice along with the rest of its components.  
6.6 A flattened ontology  
The ontological outcome from such an understanding and interpretation of practices is a flattened 
one. Flattened for two reasons; first, because as I showed above it makes no sense to distinguish 
between discursive and non-discursive practices and thus social reality is socio-material regardless 
of whether it is the human body or text we are interested in; and second, because it consists of 
associations (Latour, 2005) or arrangements (Schatzki, 2011) between human and non-human 
elements. As Schatzki (2005, p. 471) argues in his ontology, ‘the site of the social is composed of 
nexuses of practices and material arrangements’ (emphasis added). By material arrangements, he 
means the materialistic, biological or not, setup in which practices and these arrangements occur as a 
mesh. As he (2015, p. 14) explains: 
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‘Flatness is a paramount feature of social existence: all social phenomena are slices and features 
of the one plenum of linked practices and arrangements.’ 
Schatzki thus considers the material world as necessary constituent of social reality. In so doing, the 
examination of the practice of anti-corruption ‘between’ perceived levels of analysis is enabled since 
social reality ceases to be understood as layered between micro level inhibited by individuals and 
their actions and the macro level inhibited by organizations and institutions and the systemic pressure 
these exert on individuals. In contrast, the social consists of a nexus of socio-material networks and 
practices regardless of how ‘big’ and ‘social’ an institution or organization is considered to be. What 
is usually understood as global is no more than an abstraction, a socially constructed reality which by 
definition hangs above all actors as a separate level giving the impression that it is ‘larger’ than the 
local (Latour, 2005). What is more, the construction of the social is not about striking a balance of 
the interaction between the extremes of micro and macro or lower and higher levels (Bourdieu, 1990; 
Giddens, 1986), but to insist on staying only on one of the two (Latour, 2005). Regardless of the 
choice, it will soon be realized that what has been considered as ‘global’, ‘macro’, or ‘systemic’ is no 
more than any local site in which individuals act (Schatzki, 2015). Place, size, and scale are therefore 
constructed. Indeed, as Latour (2005, p. 179) argues: 
‘An organization is certainly not ‘bigger’ than those it organizes. Since Bill Gates is not 
physically larger than all his Microsoft employees, Microsoft itself, as a corporate body, cannot 
be a vast building in which individual agents reside. Instead, there is a certain type of movement 
going through all of them, a few of which begin and end in Mr Gates’s office. It’s because an 
organization is even less a society than the body politic that it’s made only of movements, which 
are woven by the constant circulation of documents, stories, accounts, goods, and passions. For 
an office to be traversed by longer, faster, and more intense connections is not the same thing 
as being wider.’  
The use of a flat ontology means that power is not understood in this dissertation as a capacity to 
control others in a vertical top-down relationship between higher and lower level actors. Nor does it 
mean that those considered as ‘higher’ level-wise are by definition more powerful than those who are 
lower level actors. Yet, this is not to say that all actors are the same or equal; some are more active 
than others depending on the associations they form between them. Power is thus considered as an 
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effect of a network of heterogeneous relations where ultimately no one really has control of this 
network of power relations (Foucault, 1982). Drawing on this conception of power, Latour (1986) 
argues that powerful actors are those who are in a position in the network of relations which allows 
them to shape the actions of others.  
To put the above use of power into this dissertation’s empirical perspective, a compliance department 
is not ‘global’ by virtue of its positioning within the administration or the company’s headquarters 
drawing authority from its ‘higher’ position in the corporate organogram. After all, the same applies 
for the CEO’s secretary. What makes compliance ‘powerful’ then is the very fact that it is directly 
connected with each and every department and aspect of the corporation. All employees and 
managers have access to and are expected to contact the compliance department should they find 
themselves in a situation concerning corruption. The department is placed thus in a position which 
allows them to control the actions of their colleagues by integrating anti-corruption principles into 
the default operation of their company. Indeed, as this study shows, anti-corruption is not simply 
exercised, diffused, or imposed but rather negotiated between the organization, its members, and the 
compliance function operated by compliance officers.  
There is no shortage of criticism of practice approaches and their use of the concept of power. Lukes 
(2005), for example, in his impressive analysis of the faces of power argues that the Foucauldian 
notion of power is ultra-radical to the extent that it makes no sense for scholars to use it since it 
reduces actors to mere dominated subjects. Likewise, organization and management scholars (Whittle 
& Spicer, 2008) have criticized Actor-network theory’s performative understanding of power and 
politics which derives from its naturalizing ontology and un-reflexive epistemology. Other scholars 
have noted a tendency for practice theories to not engage with power explicitly as a separate property 
(Barnes, 2001; Watson, 2017). As the same scholars argue, however, and I side with them for the 
purpose of this dissertation, ‘To engage in a practice is to exercise a power’ (Barnes, 2001, p. 28). 
This is because power is inevitably exercised as human action but not necessarily individually as 
one’s actor capacity but rather collectively. In the case of anti-corruption, one needs to think only 
how many factors have been invoked as necessary for establishing a culture of compliance; 
compliance officers, ethical leadership, regular training, whistleblowing, fair wages, due-diligence, 
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communication, codes of conduct, punishment and reward mechanisms etc. Similarly to practice then, 
the exercise of power is a collective action (Barnes, 2001).  
7. Methodology  
7.1 A praxiography inspired methodology 
I adopted an interpretive method inspired by ‘praxiography’ to conduct my fieldwork (Bogner et al., 
2009a; Bueger, 2014; Flick, 2009; Kvale, 1996; Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012b; Yanow & 
Schwartz-Shea, 2007). An interpretive methodology treats data not as given, or waiting out there to 
be found and therefore collected or ‘dug out’ (Kvale, 1996), but rather as things to be ‘accessed’, 
‘observed and made sense of, interpreted’ (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2007, p. xix). In other words, 
an interpretive methodology requires access to sources that might allow for data generation. Detailed 
accounts of the methodology and methods employed can be found in the dissertation’s attached 
papers. For the purpose of this thesis I will provide an overview of the methodology and methods 
employed starting with how and what sort of access I sought and was granted and how I generated 
my data. 
I was convinced that in order to understand anti-corruption an in-depth study was required. This 
conviction was the result of a pilot study I did by studying several Codes of Conduct publicly 
available on corporate websites. When one takes the time to read these codes of conduct and CSR 
reports notices how similar they are, but at the same time what attracted my attention was descriptive 
statements such as ‘we don’t tolerate corruption’, ‘this year we had x number more whistleblower 
cases’, or ‘we have trained 90% of our personnel in x number of countries’. What do these statements 
mean for anti-corruption? Is that anti-corruption? Is anti-corruption a matter of training or 
whistleblowing and if so how? Is this how companies practice anti-corruption? Who is responsible 
for anti-corruption? Who does anti-corruption? Is anti-corruption limited to reporting? An obvious 
way to deal with such complex questions and relations was to perform an in-depth study or as it is 
usually called a ‘case study’ (George & Bennett, 2005) where the researcher selects a specific 
institution, field, or individual in order to study and answer complex relationships (Flick, 2009) which 
may or may not lead to a certain outcome as a positivist approach would expect (King, Keohane, & 
Verba, 1994). 
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This was a short-lived plan for two reasons; first, by selecting an institution, individual, or field I was 
also taking ontological decisions I was not comfortable with. As mentioned in the previous section , 
I chose a flat ontology in which individuals, institutions, and fields are meaningful only in relation 
with one another and are not to be treated separately. On top of that, such an ontology insists that 
actors, no matter their attributed ‘size’ or level, consist of the same elements and therefore they can 
be subject to the same analytical approach (Schatzki, 2011). Furthermore, as I am interested in ‘what 
is said’ and thus leaving aside the subject who said something, I am likewise interested in ‘what 
happens’ and not where and by whom something happened. This interest in the ‘what’ is an interest 
in the practice of anti-corruption which renders the choice of a level-wise analytical focus irrelevant. 
Second, not all topics and areas of interest are fully accessible and open to in-depth investigation 
(Bueger, 2014), anti-corruption in the private sector being one of them. Indeed, when I approached a 
couple of major Danish MNCs and formally proposed to be granted access to their anti-corruption 
and compliance departments, they refused for reasons of sensitivity and unnecessary risk.  
I found the remedy for these issues in using a praxiographic methodology (Bueger, 2014; Nicolini & 
Monteiro, 2016; Pouliot, 2013). Praxiography utilizes the methods usually employed in qualitative 
and interpretive methodologies such as expert interviews, participant observation, and document 
analysis, but differs in that it focuses on the reconstruction of practices instead of the reconstruction, 
for example, of cultures as in the case of ethnography. In this sense, praxiography remains interpretive 
since the objective is the reconstruction of practical knowledge through the observation of human 
bodily movements, discourses, texts, or artefacts of various forms necessary for understanding the 
tacit or background knowledge inherent in practices (Bueger, 2014). Moreover, it is suggested that 
praxiography should remain flexible with regards to the choice of methods since methodological 
‘orthodoxy’ may hinder practice, which is after all a practice in itself and is therefore subject to 
improvement through training and experience (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, & Passeron, 1991; Bueger, 
2014; Pouliot, 2013).  
Using praxiography allowed me to study and reconstruct anti-corruption as a practice, or its 
components thereof. Although the study remained largely a study of the sayings and doings of people 
(Schatzki, 1996), its ‘telos’ became the practice of anti-corruption and not the subjects performing 
these sayings and doings. That is to say, what was in need of interpretation was neither what people 
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say, nor what they do or believe per se. Rather by examining how anti-corruption is practiced, I was 
looking for the deep-seated conceptions that made anti-corruption possible, the notions that made it 
acceptable, the actions that constitute it, and the organization of its components including humans 
and non-humans as expressed in discourses. None of these components or aspects of the practice of 
anti-corruption exist in vacuum although it may seem so when examined separately. In paper #2, for 
instance, my objective has been to reconstruct the practice of anti-corruption as governmentality by 
highlighting how visibility, self-responsibility, and a business mindset found in the discourses of 
compliance officers shapes the governance of anti-corruption in companies. In paper #1, the focus is 
again on anti-corruption as practice but this time I highlight how such a function is constructed 
through translations and negotiations between corporate actors. The detachment from analytical 
constructions such as individual, institution, and field offered a solution also to the issue of getting 
permission to access such constructions. It became possible to study anti-corruption not by getting 
access to a particular institution or by ‘shadowing’ (Czarniawska, 2007) an individual, but by 
‘accessing’ in any way it was feasible to do so sources where raw information on the practice of anti-
corruption was available.  
Freeing methodology from rigid analytical structures, however, did not mean that the selection of 
those sites or sources of primary data was an easy task. Having no clue how to go about this, I relied 
on textbook suggestions on following the practice of anti-corruption as ‘the doings’ and ‘sayings’ of 
anti-corruption experts. But who is an expert? According to some scholars, in academic research, 
who is an expert is to some extent decided by the researcher herself who assumes that a person holds 
special knowledge, or has expertise in the topic of interest (Meuser & Nagel, 2009). But as these 
scholars also point out, these assumptions made by the researcher may well be mistaken or biased. 
Indeed, my initial choice to approach CSR managers to discuss anti-corruption proved a misinformed 
one since they directed me to their colleagues in the business ethics departments responsible for anti-
corruption. There, I found compliance officers dedicated to the design and implementation of the 
anti-corruption policy of a company. Most of these officers and even managers were not educated in 
anti-corruption compliance let alone legal studies. They were placed there when such a need 
appeared, and they reacted differently depending on their background and own experiences. Most 
importantly, I concluded that despite the wealth of rules one finds in compliance and anti-corruption, 
in effect, things get their own trajectory once in motion, evident of the fact that practices are in 
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constant movement and ever-changing just like the world itself (Nicolini, 2012). I managed to get 
insights on what, when, why, and how anti-corruption is practiced or has been practiced in 
corporations. Depending on the interviewee, I gained access to descriptions and narratives on what 
further practices and actions are performed during the practice of anti-corruption, what challenges 
they face, what successes they had, failures, details on the means by which they do their job such as 
manual or automated checks. Moreover, they described their relationships with other departments in 
the company, their position in the hierarchy, their differences with the CSR department as well as 
information on how they themselves feel about corruption and ethics in general. 
Delimiting anti-corruption knowledge to corporate professionals was on the one hand an excellent 
point of departure, but on the other hand insufficient. Insufficient because as Gibbons and his 
colleagues argue (2010), since the 1960s, knowledge production has entered ‘mode 2’ following the 
traditional ‘mode 1’. In the latter, knowledge is generated autonomously within ‘a disciplinary, 
primarily cognitive, context’ (Gibbons et al., p. 1). That is to say, what defines knowledge is the 
normative environment of each discipline and accordingly an expert and the knowledge he or she 
holds are validated by its compliance to certain rules. The expert was only the one who was certified 
as such by virtue of his or her membership to a certain professional trade union or association. 
Historically, according to Gibbons et al., this has been an effort to control the expansion of scientific 
enquiries to fields of interest other than those which could adequately studied in the same manner as 
nature. In this sense, knowledge is understood as a product and therefore it can be monopolized by 
certain and exclusive social groups and authorities. In contrast, mode 2 of knowledge production is 
an outcome of modernity and the way societies have changed due to globalization. The gradual 
realization of the consequences of the industrial society as global problems, required solutions which 
undoubtedly required in turn interdisciplinary solutions (Gibbons et al., 2010). In mode 2, knowledge 
production is plural; what is legitimate, or what is to be considered as valid expert knowledge is not 
defined by autonomous rules and norms but by the broader communities with which a problem is 
concerned. Knowledge is produced not only in professional contexts but understood as a mixture of 
scientific expertise, public acceptance, other professional networks, political and economic interests 
(Meuser & Nagel, 2009).  
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Data sources Data use 
Interviews  30 anti-corruption experts in 
Denmark and China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reconstruct anti-corruption as a 
practice based on practices, 
discourses, written and unwritten 
rules, feelings, knowledge, material 
and non-human elements, networks, 
thoughts, action, know-how. 
Participation 
observation 
 ISO/TC Plenary- Anti-
Bribery Management 
International Best Practices 
Symposium  
 Seminar on anti-corruption 
and compliance with at the 
China National Institute of 
Standards  
 TRACE E-learning session 
on gifts and hospitality 
 United Nations Anti-
corruption E-Learning Tool 
 Compliance and Anti-
corruption Certification 
course 
Documents (Public) 
 Corporate codes of conduct, 
CSR/Sustainability reports, 
Policy documents, 
Legislation   
(Private) 
 PowerPoint slides, 
guidelines, internal 
documents shared in private 
sessions 
Table 5: Data sources and use of data in reconstructing the practice of anti-corruption 
The two modes of knowledge production are not opposite forces but supplementary to each other 
(Gibbons, 1994), and likewise the definition of who is an expert expands. An expert is not only the 
one who is considered as such by the researcher, but also the one who is accepted as such by his or 
her broader community, and ‘possesses the authority to construct reality’ (Hitzler, Honer, & Maeder, 
1994 cited in Meuser & Nagel, 2009). In this sense, expertise, expert knowledge, and subsequently 
the expert resemble to Foucault’s notion of power as the force shaping other actor’s actions (Bogner 
& Menz, 2009; Foucault, 1982). This is the reason why accessing only one of the two modes of expert 
knowledge was insufficient if I was to understand the practice of anti-corruption which has become 
an industry (Sampson, 2010) composed of not just corporations but also consultancies, law firms, 
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NGOs, governmental agencies, collective private and non-public organizations, all of them offering 
expertise in this area of activity. Naturally, my fieldwork had to extend to these areas as well.  
As a result, I expanded my fieldwork to further sources of data and the first round of interviews and 
meetings with anti-corruption and compliance officers paved the way for that quite well. Through a 
process of ‘snowballing’ I was able to locate and interview anti-corruption experts outside 
corporations such as lawyers, public servants, consultants, lobbyists, and NGO employees. Moreover, 
I attended events as an observer and participant depending on the situation, and from there I collected 
documents from a variety of sources on how anti-corruption should best be practiced (Table 5).  
7.2 Methods 
7.2.1 Interviews 
To compensate for the limited participant observation opportunities available (see below), I focused 
more on expert interviews with anti-corruption and compliance experts (Table 6). The extent to which 
fieldwork will consist of interviews, observations, or document-intensive methods remains with the 
researcher, and the peculiarities of each case (Pouliot, 2013). In my case, things were quite clear since 
there was no access to a compliance or anti-corruption department of an organization; I had to rely 
mostly on interviews and work my way through anti-corruption practice step by step. My plan was 
to get an outline of anti-corruption through the opportunities available at the time for participant 
observation and documents, and then to complement these by employing other and more available 
sources of data such as interviews with experts. Scholars have come up with techniques which help 
in understanding the practical knowledge of a practice if not capturing the practice itself (Bueger & 
Gadinger, 2015). Lueger and Froschauer (2009) for example argue that experts possess organizational 
experience and know-how that can be used in reconstructing practical expertise.  
My interviews were designed and intended to be qualitative, descriptive, and focused. Qualitative 
because my focus was on the lived experience of the interviewees as compliance officers (Brinkmann 
& Kvale, 2008). Descriptive because gradually I learned how to encourage the interviewee to deepen 
his or her descriptions regarding their experiences, actions, and thoughts. Focused, because the 
themes I wanted to discuss with the interviewees were specific and guided the whole interview. What 
is their role in the company and what do they think about anti-corruption? Is it an ethical or a business 
issue and why? What is the difference between ethics and compliance? What do they mean when they 
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say compliance and ethics? How do they practice it and what means and resources do they utilize in 
doing so? The more I could get them to talk about their own perspective on these topics the better for 
my work. Some of the information I presented above regarding the development of anti-corruption 
in Denmark is indeed part of these interviews.  
Date Lo
cat
ion 
Professional Title Assigned 
Interview 
No. 
Duration  Data collected 
Winter 
2016/17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DK 
 
Consultant A16 60 min  
 Global anti-
corruption discourse  
 
 Regulatory 
framework and the 
socio-political role of 
corporations. 
 
 Role of compliance 
and compliance 
officers in a company. 
 
 Detailed accounts of 
anti-corruption 
practices. 
 
 Personal experiences 
and opinions.  
 
 Professional life 
routines.  
 
 Successes and 
failures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consultant A18 32 min 
Head of Global Compliance A8 62 min 
Legal Advisor/Consultant A14 50 min 
Director, Group Compliance A11 55 min 
Compliance Officer A30 50 min 
Senior Compliance Director  A29 55 min 
Global Compliance Officer A9 30 min 
Spring/ 
Summer 
2017 
Consultant A7 54 min 
Senior Compliance Officer A2 44 min 
Director, Group Compliance A13 55 min 
Consultant A15 60 min 
Director, Group Ethics A10 45 min 
Consultant A6 67 min 
Compliance Officer A3 52 min 
Compliance Officer A4 66 min 
Compliance Counsel  A1 61 min 
Autumn 
2017 
 
Chief Compliance Officer A5 48 min 
Compliance Officer A20 56 min 
 
 
 
 
CN 
 
Legal Advisor/Consultant A21 52 min 
Consultant A12 81 min 
Legal Advisor/Consultant A19 30 min 
Corporate Counsel A23 70 min 
Consultant A17 55 min 
Compliance Director A22 86 min 
Compliance Officer A24 77 min 
Winter 
2017/ 18 
Corporate Senior Director  A25 72 min 
Consultant A26 53 min 
Consultant A28 53 min 
Compliance Director A27 54 min 
Total /Average 
min 
30/57 min 
 
Table 6: Interview sources 
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However, there were cases, especially in the very first interviews, where I found myself overwhelmed 
by the amount of new information to the extent that it became difficult to follow my interviewees 
during the interview. The open and semi-structured character of the interviews as I had designed them 
(Kvale, 1996) was stuck in the imbalance between my inexperience, limited knowledge of the subject, 
and theory-laden terminology, and the interviewee’s experience and pragmatic and practical 
vocabulary. It became obvious to me that there was a knowledge gap I needed to fill in if I was to 
improve my interviewing technique and data access (Trinczek, 2009). Indeed, this problem was fixed 
in the short-term through better preparation and in the long-term as I was building both my knowledge 
base and my craft of interviewing. Among the measures I employed to improve my interviewing 
experience was to loosen a little the interview guide. Instead of trying to control the interview, I 
started to listen to what my interviewees were saying and then prompt them to elaborate more on 
topics of my interest (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2007). Interviews became more conversational in 
style and the responses I received more descriptive meaning long and detailed descriptions of anti-
corruption practices employed by compliance officers. Indeed, expert interviews offer exclusive 
knowledge gained through the expert’s practical everyday experience (Bogner & Menz, 2009), 
allowing the interviewer to evaluate and re-construct the knowledge instead of asking for it 
(Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008).  
I started my interviews as an exploratory endeavor on a rather new area of inquiry since anti-
corruption has been practiced only during the last decades. Initially, my questions were theory-laden 
meaning that they revolved around conceptual issues seeking to contrast or confirm rather than enable 
and elaborate on the views of the interviewees. For example, when I naively asked interviewees’ 
opinions on the drivers of anti-corruption I got answers pretty much found in company’s Codes of 
Conduct and responsibility reports as well as in books and articles. The point was that on the one 
hand, there was no conceptual or practical gap for me to discover, at least an obvious one. On the 
other hand, such questions were leading me away from the narrowly understood at that time practical 
knowledge I was aiming to retrieve. As a result, the data I acquired through this phase was mostly 
descriptive and usually referred to the official anti-corruption policy of the corporation or 
organization. Depending on the interviewee, the discussion also often revolved around the 
development of anti-corruption during the last decade locally and internationally, the emergence of 
the profession of the compliance officer, matters of collective action, the role of governments and 
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international organizations. Although the accounts of these interviewees were nothing close to the 
‘practical’ knowledge I sought to understand in the first place, the contextual knowledge shared with 
me in this round contributed the most useful background. They were the base for the development of 
an improved interview guide, enhanced my confidence and contacts in the private sector, and helped 
refine my research questions. 
Armed with a more elaborate interview guide and knowledge on the topic of anti-corruption, I 
continued interviewing anti-corruption experts. There were only 4-5 open questions in my topic guide 
at this point, and while in the previous phase I received broad information around corporate anti-
corruption policies, it was time now to be more precise about these policies. I asked my interviewees 
to provide detailed descriptions of how they do what they do. If this was due-diligence, then I asked 
how do you do this, what criteria do you use, what do you do if you locate a risk? If the respondent 
was experienced in anti-corruption training, then I would insist on descriptions of either the e-learning 
software they used or a description of a class and face to face session. I also asked about the learning 
objectives and the process by which they define these, or about the reaction of their employees in 
these sessions. The interviews took an open and ‘conversational style’ (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008) 
in that I was more active in directing the interviewees’ responses by prompting them to elaborate on 
topics I was interested in (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2007). 
The outcome was detailed accounts of such practices which constitute the overall practice of anti-
corruption and allowed for a more systematic study (Bogner & Menz, 2009). I had access now to 
different ways of practicing anti-corruption, and so comparison, though not always on purpose, was 
possible. Once some preliminary findings were available, I put them to the test with the next 
interviewees. For example, these preliminary findings allowed me to sketch on a piece of paper how 
a compliance function works, who the primary actors engage, and how they are connected to each 
other. This enabled me to approach the following interviews differently. Instead of relying on more 
or less predefined open questions, I showed and explained to the interviewees my drawing and let 
them evaluate it based on their own experience. The results were more than satisfying, since it was 
easier for them to identify or contrast the drawing and its logic. In addition, it allowed me to ask for 
concrete examples whenever they seemed to be interested in a particular part of the drawing. Indeed, 
using participants of a practice to co-interpret and reenact a practice loosely captured by the accounts 
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of other interviewees or through participant observation, is a technique which is useful when actual 
participation in a practice is not possible (Bueger, 2014). This technique contributed the most in 
engaging the interviewees in further and more in-depth elaborations of their work. It provided a ‘grip’ 
upon which the interviewees, by adding up or rejecting my examples, contributed in my effort to 
acquire a more complete view of anti-corruption practices. 
Subsequently, it became possible for me to concentrate on seeking the subjective, maxims, principles, 
orientations and experiences which implicitly support expert and practical knowledge (Bogner & 
Menz, 2009). In order for this to happen, I asked my interviewees to describe anti-corruption as they 
were practicing it. My questions therefore revolved around daily activities and routines in performing 
not just the overall practice of anti-corruption but also practices within it such as due-diligence, risk 
assessments, training etc. The reaction to such questions was mixed. At best, my respondents would 
offer detailed accounts of what they do in their daily routine or use metaphors to emphasize significant 
aspects of their job. At worst, some interviewees remained attached to their corporate role and official 
position. In such cases answers were quite short and constant questioning was required to keep the 
interview ‘alive’.  
For this later phase of interviews, Nicolini’s (2009) double method of interviewing, although not 
utilized to the full, proved quite inspiring as to the data I needed to access. That is because before my 
endeavor with this method, not only I was not sure about the questions to ask in an interview, but I 
was also quite insecure about what data would be sufficiently rich to support my study. According to 
double method, the interviewee is asked to pretend that his or her double will take his or her place at 
work the next day. However, this double does not know anything about what the interviewee does 
and therefore needs extremely detailed guidelines and descriptions of the interviewee’s routine in 
order for this change not to be uncovered. In other words, the interview with the double method turns 
the interviewees into observers of their own practices. In so doing, according to Nicolini (2009, p. 
204), they are induced ‘to produce a highly idealized narrative description of the practice from a 
particular moral and normative angle’. These normative and moral angles, captured in instructions 
on how to do something, reveal the overall norms shaping a specific practice, and along with the 
descriptions of the doings and sayings offer a representation of the practice itself. I was not able to 
apply the method exactly as Nicolini suggests, but the few times I tried to apply it allowed me to 
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understand the level of detail and data I needed from my interviews. For example, when I asked one 
of my interviewees to explain to his double his daily professional routine, he explained in detail how 
he is performing due-diligence, what documents he uses, what databases he uses, how he was trained, 
how many hours per day he is doing that, how he communicates with other colleagues and companies, 
and how he assesses third parties. I decided that this was the level of detail I needed but due to the 
preparation that this type of interview required I also decided to access it through more traditional 
approaches such as open-ended questions. 
7.2.2 Participant observation 
The suggested method for a praxiography is participant observation since this allows for full exposure 
to the practice itself in real time (Bueger, 2014; Pouliot, 2013). Participant observation ‘is the 
systematic description of events, behaviors, and artifacts in the social setting chosen for study’ 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2016, p. 78), but as I mentioned above, in my case this option was impossible 
for reasons of sensitivity or lack of rapport and trust, as some scholars would arguably claim (Russell 
& Bernard, 2011). As a result, I turned towards other sites or sources where I could engage with the 
practice of anti-corruption directly (Table 7). I refer here to my participation in an executive Master 
Class on anti-corruption and corporate compliance which was organized by Danish business and 
professional private organizations. The course was one of the first to be organized in Denmark by 
local stakeholders and aimed to inform, educate, and certify corporate and any other people interested 
in the topic of anti-corruption and compliance. It was a paid service and within the six intensive days 
it lasted, participants were informed about current issues on anti-corruption and participated in actual 
case studies and simulations of due-diligence, risk-assessments, training, crisis management, 
investigations, and whistleblower hotlines.  
Czarniawska (2007) argues that the term ‘participant observation’ should be used only for cases in 
which the researcher becomes a part of the practice themselves. In contrast, for mere observation of 
practices, the term ‘fieldwork’ should suffice. I consider my participation in the above course to 
belong in the participant observation category because despite its short duration it got me learning 
(Lave & Wenger, 1991) if not what is to be an anti-corruption and compliance officer, how to perform 
some of the actions they perform. In the workshops where we simulated real scenarios, we also had 
to simulate roles such as the CEO, compliance officer, human resources officer, CSR manager of a 
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company which allowed us to get some hands-on work on how compliance and anti-corruption ‘feel’ 
in corporate settings. As Bevir and Rhodes point out (2003, p. 176), ‘The aim is to see the world 
through the eyes of the manager, top civil servant and politician.’ I had the chance then to experience 
directly the decision-making process and how, depending on the case it was changing, the guidelines 
needed to be followed, the means and resources needed to be utilized, and the channels of 
communication between the involved actors including authorities and lawyers. The course allowed 
me also to learn more about the private and subjective side of the compliance officers, an aspect 
which is quite important in understanding the background knowledge of a practice (Bogner et al., 
2009a).  
Participant Observation 
Data source Collected data  
 Compliance Master Class and 
certification. 
 ISO/TC Plenary- Anti-Bribery 
Management International Best Practices 
Symposium.  
 Seminar on anti-corruption and 
compliance at the China National 
Institute of Standards.  
 TRACE E-learning session on gifts and 
hospitality. 
 Anti-corruption’s guiding principles 
and best practices. 
 Main rules corporations seek to 
comply with. 
 Decision-making and 
communication channels. 
 Opinions and experiences of the 
participants as anti-corruption and 
compliance experts from private 
discussions. 
 Dialogues between participants. 
 Personal and collective feelings and 
emotions. 
 Random events and stories. 
 
Table 7: Overview of participant observation data sources and data collected 
Further fieldwork took place by attending events such as seminars, webinars, workshops and a 
summit on the new ISO standard 37001 Anti-bribery management systems. In the latter, I had the 
opportunity not only to observe deliberations and negotiations of national delegations on private anti-
corruption rule-setting, but also to informally discuss anti-corruption and compliance in the private 
sector with stakeholders. Seminars, webinars, and workshops were also a very good source of data, 
depending on the topic at hand. Webinars and seminars on specific practices and activities within the 
overall anti-corruption practice, for instance, shed light on aspects an outsider would never guess at, 
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such as intra-organizational competition and bureaucratic obstacles. Most importantly, however, 
through such events the importance of documentation and documents ‘as paradigmatic artifacts of 
modern knowledge practices’ such as anti-corruption (Riles, 2006, p. 2) became clear to me. It is 
really difficult to put into words the extent to which anti-corruption experts and instructors insist on 
the importance of documentation. Documentation is crucial from designing an anti-corruption 
function, to its implementation, and even in cases of failure, documents help in tracking down the 
errors.  
In every case in which I had to observe anti-corruption practices, my identity and purpose as a 
researcher was stated upfront to the other participants. During the compliance course, for instance, I 
introduced myself and my role to the other participants, while in other events I would state my 
objective directly to the person I was having a conversation with. Indeed, as Bernard points out (2006, 
p. 390), letting people know who you are and what is your purpose allows you to dive directly into 
the role of ‘an observer who wants to participate as much as possible’. In so doing, I noticed that 
reactions differ from person to person; some rather enjoyed being listened to and others seemed a bit 
reserved. Nevertheless, this strategy allowed me to almost freely write down comments about 
behaviors I considered interesting. For example, when the course started, we were asked to describe 
in one or two words what we would like to take from this course. Our answers were written on a 
whiteboard which I took a picture of and used later to initiate discussions with the other participants 
(Figure 1). 
I usually spent one to two hours after the event to write down my mental and short field notes 
(Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 2001) in greater detail. Most of the time, I tried to describe in detail the 
material setting; the people, their sayings, the objects, and actions that attracted my attention because 
it mattered in keeping the practice situated (Table 8). In this sense, my logs were very descriptive in 
a sensory manner (Emerson et al.). In other cases, I recalled discussions between participants in which 
I was present but decided to either not interfere or to not take out my notepad. An example of such a 
dialogue can be found in table 10 in the data analysis chapter. Other notes concerned data on anti-
corruption’s main regulatory framework and the impact such rules have from country to country. For 
example, the UK Bribery Act had an alarming impact on the Danish business environment whereas 
the same legislature had a rather insignificant influence in Finland.  
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Figure 1: Picture taken as a field note at the compliance course 
7.2.3 Documents 
Documents have been very important for this dissertation and study. In the previous chapter, we saw 
how documents support the argument that discourse is not simply a linguistic act since the example 
of documents as statements attributes a certain materiality on discourses. It is through this materiality 
that a document offers, that discourse can reach farther destinations and endure in time. Similarly, 
documents played a significant role in sketching the Actor-network of anti-corruption compliance 
which allowed the focus on the translations discussed in paper #1. Furthermore, international 
legislation sets the broader international framework (Riles, 1999) for anti-corruption and compliance, 
and likewise it is through documents that authority travels in such bureaucratic organizations such as 
MNCs in the form of the Code of Conduct, and it is through the use of documents that compliance 
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departments and officers crystalize their position as business advisors in modern corporations as we 
have seen in paper #2. 
 Notes 
#1 The course takes place in a historical building where the offices of the organizing 
authority are based. The class is a large room where people sit in groups of four per 
table. There were commercial and practical resources given to us such as pens, 
textbooks, and a book containing all slides from the presentations. We were 
welcomed by X, a lawyer working in the area of anti-corruption and compliance, 
and Y, an anti-corruption specialist and advisor. The idea for the course was initiated 
by X who communicated the idea to Y and then to the lawyer office […] The 
speakers and presenters of the course come mostly from the industry. Since 
compliance is a rather developing area of activity, industry leaders and experts can 
share their experience in setting up a compliance system…There are 20 participants 
in the course of various ages and backgrounds. I am the only person who comes 
from academia while there are two participants from NGOs who were granted free 
access. There are also a considerable number of lawyers mainly from the law firm 
organizing the course. The majority of participants belong to the industry and they 
come from various sectors. With regard to the presenters and speakers, the situation 
is quite similar. Most of the speakers come from companies with some sort of 
experience in developing anti-corruption systems. 
 
#2 With regards to the questions and answers session there was a lot of discussion about 
the personal element in corruption and how to deal with that. The answer was that 
in this case what is needed is education and training on anti-corruption and in the 
short-term, preventive measures are required. I would add that disciplinary 
measures are also necessary to counter corrupt behaviors. Z from Microsoft 
challenged the tone from the top approach by saying that the tone from the middle 
is also important since it is middle managers who sometimes push the lower levels 
of a company towards corruption by requesting unrealistic targets. The answer was 
that there is an increase in focus on training middle managers along with the other 
levels of the company because they too need to understand the risk of corruption. 
The tone from the top helps in this direction. 
 
Table 8: Examples of descriptive field notes taken in Copenhagen and Shenzhen respectively 
I found documents an excellent source of instructions on how to practice anti-corruption (Table 9). 
By documents I mean here not simply the publicly available codes of conduct or best practices 
publications but the how-to-manuals and handbooks I collected from participating in the anti-
corruption and compliance events mentioned above. These documents, usually created by anti-
corruption experts in the form of PowerPoint slides and comments, included information in the form 
of general principles, experiences, and more specified guidelines on how anti-corruption should and 
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had been established in selected organizations. Authorship was claimed by the corporate actors or 
individuals since some of them were either the founders of such a function in their corporation or 
they built their own company based on their experience in the private sector.  
Documents 
Data source Collected data 
Public 
 OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions 
Text. 
 Country reports on the implementation 
of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
(United Kingdom and Denmark). 
 UK Bribery Act including guidance 
document. 
 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 
 Sarbanes–Oxley Act. 
 The United Nations Convention against 
Corruption document. 
 Various Corporate codes of conduct 
and CSR/Sustainability results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Assumptions, dichotomies, categories 
and deep-seated presuppositions found 
in discourse shaping and being shaped 
by the anti-corruption regime.   
 
 Analysis of how public abstract global 
regulation is translated into local more 
precise corporate rules and what are the 
consequences of this translation. 
 
 
 Guidelines for practicing anti-
corruption. 
 
Private 
 6 volumes with slides and PowerPoint 
(PPT) presentations on personal 
experiences on setting up a compliance 
function in a corporation and what 
challenges this effort entailed. PPT 
presentation included information on 
the corporate practices of anti-
corruption training, risk assessment, 
governance, due-diligence, risk and 
crisis managements, and 
whistleblowing hotlines. 
Table 9: Overview of document data sources and data collected 
The instructions found in such documents referred to the steps one needs to take in given situations 
or to actual actions some of the presenters and lecturers took in dealing with an issue. For example, 
those who had established a compliance function in their company would describe in detail how they 
persuaded the senior management, how they sought help and advice from peers or external advisors, 
and what challenges and resistance they and their plans faced in the implementation phase. Others 
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with a long career in crisis management such as lawyers and consultants were able to instruct us 
thoroughly on the steps needed to be taken in the event of crisis. 
A first read of these instructions showed a great deal of repetition among practitioners which maybe 
shows their instructive value. They all seemed to have a uniform approach as to what to do to establish 
the function of anti-corruption which makes sense when we consider that legislators and other similar 
bodies have published guidelines. In this sense, this read allowed an examination of the deep-seated 
presuppositions hidden in public discourse. Indeed, a second read showed that behind titles such as 
‘how to build an effective due-diligence process’, or ‘Company’s X whistleblower hotline’, were 
representations and subjective understandings of individual experiences related to the author’s 
background, the company’s sector or the geographical area in which the company was operating 
(Bueger & Gadinger, 2015). I found two ways to extract these experiences; the first and more direct 
of the two was by listening carefully and jotting down (Strauss, 1987) their descriptions and 
narratives. The masterclass in which I participated in this sense was a great source of such information 
since the practical questions of the other participants led to thorough descriptions and ‘lessons’ on 
what should be done and what should be avoided. The second required me to seek access to ‘extra’ 
and ‘ego’ details through interviews with the participants or other experts. In this sense, documents 
offered not only a platform for further elaboration on my questions on practice, but also in 
combination with interviews and participant observation an opportunity to triangulate the data 
(Bryman, 2012).  
7.3 Data analysis 
For the analysis of the data, I utilized the ‘theory generating expert interview’ guidelines (Bogner et 
al., 2009b; Meuser & Nagel, 2009). This method prioritizes a thematic analysis of passages scattered 
in the transcripts with the aim of on the one hand maintaining the same context which allows for 
comparison, and on the other hand a focus on the principles guiding one’s practice (Bogner & Menz, 
2009). The broader context within which interviewees, my comments and observations, as well as 
guidelines found in documents, was corporations broadly understood as organizations. These 
organizations, however, should not be understood as abstract entities in time and space (Nicolini, 
2017). Rather, they are situated in the specific historical, discursive and material context of global 
governance in which corporations have been attributed extra authority and responsibility (Fuchs, 
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2007; Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992; Scherer et al., 2016). The focus and unit of analysis were the 
guiding principles of the practice of anti-corruption compliance in corporations. In so doing, I was 
aiming to not simply achieve an in-depth understanding of a single case study, but rather to do so 
without losing touch with the broader background and context. Only then was a comparison of 
passages and statements possible and consequently the reconstruction of the practice of anti-
corruption. Once the context and the focus were set, the interpretation of the data was the outcome of 
a six-step process as shown in Figure 2 (p.67).  
I treated all my data as discourses and therefore as subject to the same analysis method. If what 
matters is more the ‘what was said’, and less the person who said it, then interviews, field notes, and 
documents can be analyzed as ‘artifacts of knowledge’ (Riles, 2006). I arranged the passages of each 
text thematically and the themes derived quite reasonably by sticking to the opinion that was 
expressed each time by the interviewee or author of the text (Table 10, p.68). 
 
Figure 2: Theory generating expert interview data analysis (Bogner & Menz 2009) 
Next, I coded the thematized passages in vivo (King, 2012) or when that was not possible, 
descriptively trying to stay as close as possible to the original wording (Saldana, 2009). In each 
1) Trancription
2) Paraphrasing/thematizing
3) Coding/meaning 
condensation 4) Thematic 
comparison
5) Sociological conceptualization
6) Theoretical generalization
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passage, there were several different codes depending on the topics addressed and the whole process 
resulted in several rearrangements of the passages to existing or new themes. The next step was to 
start the comparison of the themes from each interview or text. The result was once again new or 
existing themes but this time each one included many more passages and quotes from several 
interview transcripts and texts. Most of the themes were re-checked and often revised to form broader 
or more specified categories depending on the text. In order not to lose conduct with the context, an 
iterative process between the original text and the specific quote or excerpt that was to be included in 
a category was required (Schmidt, 2006).  
Table 10: Example of thematic arrangement of interview, document, and participant observation 
passages 
Data source Self-responsibility theme 
Interviews ‘We know people who can take on that task and I think this is the same way also with 
the CSR ensuring that people are getting the right ways and the right working 
conditions and this is the responsibility of each employee that works within these 
areas of a company.’ 
Participant 
Observation  
It was lunch time and we headed towards the cafeteria to grab something to eat. There 
is a buffet waiting for us and while we waited for our turn, I started talking to X who is 
a compliance officer. I asked her whether she would be available for an interview on 
the matter of compliance but she kindly refused because it was only a couple of 
months since she had taken the position. We picked our food and sat down on a table. 
A couple of other participants joined us and initially the topic of discussion was me, my 
PhD and my forthcoming stay in China […]X asked at some point for some advice from 
the other two participants regarding compliance. She seemed quite nervous regarding 
the responsibilities deriving from such a position. She asked ‘how are we to ensure that 
everyone in the company stays compliant? There are thousands of employees in my 
company…’ The other two compliance officers agreed initially but explained that she 
has nothing to worry about because compliance is just another job like any position. 
They advised her that she needs to be sure that everything which is related to 
compliance is documented. ‘That is the way you can sleep well at night and feel 
confident that you did your job well’ one of them said, and the other followed up by 
saying ‘if everything you want people to do is documented and communicated then it 
is their responsibility to follow, not yours’.  
 
Document   ‘Expectations to managers and employees: 
1. Ask: It is better to ask advice than to risk the company’s reputation. Our 
employees are told to be curious and our managers to listen and respond. 
2. Engage in dialogue: An open and honest dialogue is essential for us to be a 
responsible business. Our employees are encouraged to use Corporate 
Business Ethics Compliance as a business partner. 
3. Speak up: We ask the employees to let us know − only if we know, we can act! 
We offer several channels, including a speak-up hotline 
76 
 
 
Once more or less final categories were formed, my analysis entered the phase of ‘sociological 
conceptualization’ (Bogner et al., 2009b). Here I studied and analyzed extensively each category. On 
the one hand, categories had to be maintained ‘faithful’ to the original data and able to withstand a 
‘critical commonsense understanding’ (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2008, p. 242). On the other hand, some 
basic links with the theory were attempted. In so doing, I used my concepts as links to test not their 
explanatory power but the extent to which these concepts could stay attached to both my empirics 
and theory. Indeed, as Schwartz-Shea and Yanow argue (2012), concepts stand somewhere between 
‘facts’ and ‘theory. Once I found a theoretical framework suitable for my data, the last phase of 
analysis began. Having as a starting point my basic concepts and a broad theoretical perspective, 
further relationships were traced and further conceptualization took place, highlighting even 
unnoticed areas of interest while in some cases new concepts emerged as well. For instance, the 
concept of translations in paper #1 inspired by ANT helped me to conceptualize interactions between 
compliance officers and employees not only as linguistic interpretations but also as movements of 
people and things. Likewise, the theoretical framework of governmentality and government analytics 
highlighted aspects of anti-corruption considered as ‘ethics’ to be rationalities of self-responsibility, 
a notion not necessarily similar. 
8.  Summaries of the papers 
In the attached papers, I elaborate on and analyze different aspects of anti-corruption as these were 
depicted in the main and secondary research questions. I started writing the papers after the 
completion of my fieldwork and as a result their arrangement in the thesis reflects not the 
development of my empirical work but rather how my own understanding and view of anti-corruption 
as a social practice(s) or aspects of it have been developing in the last three years.  
To put this into perspective, Latour’s (2005) approach to the study of social phenomena from an 
‘oligopticon’ and ‘panorama’ point of view is required (Table 11, 3rd row, p.70). In contrast with 
Foucault’s concept of the panopticon which enables the observer to see anything at any time, 
oligoptica, pertain to a point of view which enables the researcher to narrow down his or her focus to 
the extent that what is observed can be done so in great detail at the cost, however, of the big picture. 
Panoramas, on the other hand, are point of views which enable the researcher to see the full picture 
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of a practice but nothing beyond that. Having said that, panoramas do not show the whole truth but 
rather a representation of a practice as this would be depicted in a given moment on a 360 degrees 
painting. Indeed, when I started analyzing my data, the need to zoom in and know exactly and 
thoroughly what compliance officers do was at its zenith. In so doing, I was interested in studying 
and understanding how compliance officers establish a function of anti-corruption and what are the 
ways they do so with regards to their colleagues and the organization as a whole. Paper #1, for 
example, shows how compliance officers establish such a function and what strategies they use in 
order to do so. As my need for detail was gradually being satisfied, I started to be interested in the 
broader picture of anti-corruption practice. Zooming out and the use of panoramas, however, raises 
questions regarding the ‘optics’ and ‘audience’ this projection of the practice is addressed to. Indeed, 
papers #2 and #3 concern such questions. 
In paper #2, I was interested in finding out how anti-corruption is thought of by compliance officers. 
Note here that ‘thought’ is conceived as collective activity (Dean, 2009) shaping and shaped by the 
practice of anti-corruption. Paper #2, therefore, is concerned with what Foucault and his followers 
would call rationalities of government as the ‘forms of thought, knowledge, expertise, …employed 
in practices of governing’ (Dean, 2010, p. 42; Rose & Miller, 2010). Likewise, in paper #3, the 
panorama depicts an even larger image of anti-corruption, one that exceeds the physical corporate 
space highlighting sides of anti-corruption which have received less attention than others though 
equally important for its constitution as a social phenomenon (Pouliot & Thérien, 2017). Table 11 
offers a summary of the papers, their focus, findings, and contributions. 
8.1 Paper #1 - Translating corporate anti-corruption: How ethics are integrated into business 
The paper departs from two observations; first, anti-corruption is not a default function in 
organizations and therefore needs to be integrated. Second, while scholars have looked into corporate 
anti-corruption as a behavioral phenomenon, they have rarely inquired how anti-corruption is 
established as a function in corporations and who and by what means does so. In this paper, I build 
on Actor-network theory’s (ANT) concept of translations to understand how compliance officers 
establish an anti-corruption function in organizations. One form of translation is the enrollment of 
members to the network by translating and interpreting their interests through encouragement of 
participation, discussion, and deliberation (Callon, 1984). 
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 Paper 1 
Translating corporate 
anti-corruption: How 
ethics are integrated into 
business 
Paper 2 
Anti-corruption and its 
inherent tension: When 
rationalities of self-
responsibility meet 
business identities 
Paper 3  
Anti-corruption in 
practice 
Paper Research 
Question 
How is anti-corruption 
integrated with business 
practices in multinational 
companies? 
How is anti-corruption 
thought of in multinational 
companies? 
How is anti-
corruption practiced? 
Theoretical focus Actor-network theory 
(Latour, 1987, 2005) 
Governmentality and 
government analytics 
(Dean, 2010). 
International practices 
(Adler & Pouliot, 
2011b) 
Analytical 
approach/ 
Unit of analysis 
Oligopticon (Zoom in) / 
Translations 
Panorama (Zoom out) / 
Thoughts (Rationalities-
identities) 
Panorama (Zoom out) 
/  
Practices 
Empirical focus Compliance officers and 
their action on anti-
corruption in 
organizations. 
Compliance officers and 
their thoughts on anti-
corruption in organizations. 
Anti-corruption 
practices. 
Key findings Compliance officers use at 
least three 
strategies/translations 
(enrollment, 
problematization, 
interessement) to integrate 
anti-corruption into 
business practices. 
Tension between 
rationalities of self-
responsibility and identities 
of compliance officers as 
business advisors. 
The unintended 
consequences of anti-
corruption practices 
are as important and 
necessary for the 
constitution of anti-
corruption as the 
intended 
consequences. 
Paper contribution The political aspect of 
corporations is to be 
found not only in the 
relations between the 
company and its external 
stakeholders but also in 
the relationship between 
the company and its 
members. 
Anti-corruption is usually 
perceived as a unified set of 
controls with a single aim 
but this paper shows that 
not only it consists of 
different modes of thought 
but that these thoughts may 
point towards different 
orientations. 
The paper highlights 
the ‘social 
infrastructure’ of anti-
corruption which is 
usually obscured by 
institutional 
approaches and their 
tendency to 
overemphasize 
landmark events and 
actors. 
Table 11: Overall summary of the papers  
Another form of translation is ‘interessement’, a transaction between three actors; this takes 
placewhen the main actor attempts to attract a second actor by placing themselves between the second 
and a third actor (Callon et al., 1986). In addition, ‘problematization’, is another form of translation 
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whereby an actor attempts to attract actors to the network by establishing ‘an equivalence between 
two problems that requires those who wish to solve one to accept a proposed solution for the other’ 
(Callon et al., 1986, p. xvii).  
I found that compliance officers use these three strategies and in so doing: 1) business practices turn 
into risks through the practice of risk assessment; 2) risks bring forth expectations of responsibility 
in the form of anti-corruption; 3) anti-corruption is translated into compliance. Compared to 
corruption risks and anti-corruption, compliance is a much narrower and thus more manageable issue 
since it is restricted to the corporation and its own rules. The paper contributes empirically by 
providing practical insights into the workings of anti-corruption. In this sense it may be very helpful 
to practitioners and managers and the overall exchange and dissemination of best practices and 
strategies in diffusing anti-corruption as a default approach to business.  
From a theoretical perspective the paper makes two contributions regarding the sociopolitical role of 
corporations in globalization; first, by showing that anti-corruption, a policy of social importance, is 
translated to compliance, a corporate strategy, it emphasizes that responsibility moves from social to 
corporate objectives such as compliance with the ‘letter’ but not the ‘spirit’ of the law. According to 
scholars concerned with corporate behavior, MNCs have gained enormous economic and political 
power which allows them to compete with governments in terms of capabilities (Fuchs, 2007). 
Likewise, other scholars have emphasized the voluntary willingness of MNCs to take on or contribute 
to the solution of social issues caused by globalization  (Scherer et al., 2016). Yet the findings of this 
paper show that this might not be the case; MNCs either cannot or do not want to fight corruption as 
a broad social problem. In contrast, with the help of compliance officers, corporations ‘appropriate’ 
anti-corruption to their own will or capacity as compliance.  
Second, such findings substantiate the claim that corporations play a political role by showing that 
MNCs can be political in their own right and organization. This role is not exhausted or limited to 
inter-organizational relations but rather it develops and becomes established within organizations. 
The political element is to be found not in the reaction of corporations to external expectations (Getz, 
2006; Gond et al., 2011; Moon et al., 2006; Scherer, 2016). In this sense, corporate politics are 
‘smaller’ in scale, delimited in range, and potentially powerful through bonds (or translations) 
between corporate members. In this case, the relationship between business and politics takes the 
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asymmetrical but still well-matched form of ‘politics within businesses’, an area worthy of exploring 
in my opinion.  
8.2 Paper #2 - Anti-corruption and its inherent tension: When rationalities of self-responsibility 
meet business identities 
In the second paper, I seek to reconstruct the logic of anti-corruption as a regime of practices informed 
and shaped by explicit bodies of knowledge such as compliance, business ethics, and risk 
management. I do so by examining how anti-corruption is rationalized, why, and what that means for 
anti-corruption as a concept. In this sense, paper #2 resembles paper #1 because it is also concerned 
with the role of a particular group of people and how they perform their professional tasks, but it 
differs in that it focuses on the element of thought in practicing anti-corruption. I build on 
governmentality and government analytics (Dean, 2010) studies because they allow the 
conceptualization of the practice of anti-corruption as a regime of practices comprised of fields of 
government, identities, technologies and rationalities of government (Table 3). Since corruption 
controls remain fairly unchanged, then the examination of anti-corruption requires an inquiry on the 
rationalities and identities shaping and shaped by its practice. It becomes possible then to evaluate 
anti-corruption not by considering it a priori a matter of business ethics, compliance, and risk 
management but by examining the deep-seated and guiding assumptions and logics as these are 
expressed in the discourses of compliance officers.  
The paper contributes to anti-corruption literature by examining and problematizing the concept of 
anti-corruption for its robustness. Usually perceived as a unified set of controls with a single aim, this 
paper shows that not only does anti-corruption consist of different modes of thought but that these 
thoughts may point towards different orientations. In particular, anti-corruption as informed by 
compliance and business ethics programs prioritizes self-responsibility as the reactive and proactive 
objective that will lead to the elimination of the problem of organizational corruption, whereas risk 
management and its focus on collective responsibility seeks to rather collectively manage and 
organize anti-corruption instead of eradicating corruption. This tension in anti-corruption, I suggest, 
reflects our inconclusive knowledge with regard to the causes of corruption, as well as corruption’s 
peculiar nature. 
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8.3 Paper #3 - Anti-corruption in practice 
The third paper takes a broader view on the practice of anti-corruption by compliance officers. It is 
based on the observation that a large part of anti-corruption studies build on or take departure from a 
norm-based regime approach to anti-corruption. In so doing, these studies discuss either its 
development or the landmark events and achievements that have paved the way for anti-corruption 
to attain a global reach such as the FCPA and the UK Bribery Act, the OECD and UN Conventions, 
as well as the achievements by non-governmental organizations such as Transparency International. 
As a result, the paper argues that the ‘social infrastructure’ of anti-corruption is ignored. By social 
infrastructure is meant the myriad of everyday practices that constitute world politics (Adler & 
Pouliot, 2011a; Doty, 1996) and as such anti-corruption as well. 
To address this lack of focus, the paper discusses four practices regularly, but not exclusively, 
performed in anti-corruption namely, conferencing, certifying expertise, monitoring progress, public-
private partnering. I draw on International Practices theory (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b; Bueger & 
Gadinger, 2015), and suggest that besides norms and rules anti-corruption consists also of typical and 
often unwritten practices meant as ‘socially organized and meaningful patterns of activities that tend 
to recur over time’ (Pouliot & Thérien, 2017, p. 163). The object of analysis in this paper is thus these 
regular and subtle activities and ways in which anti-corruption is practiced in international and 
national contexts and which are usually obscured by the brightness of major events and landmarks of 
anti-corruption. By studying these practices, their intended as well as unintended consequences can 
be unearthed, offering empirical material that can enrich the study of anti-corruption. 
The paper’s contribution to anti-corruption studies is twofold; first, such practices are constitutive of 
anti-corruption since their intended and unintended consequences go hand in hand instead of 
opposing each other. Conferencing, for example, sets the platform for the creation of a common 
identity and at the same time gives space for elitism to emerge by excluding some rather focal groups 
in fighting corruption in organizations. Likewise, the professionalization of anti-corruption experts 
through the practice of certifying expertise is accompanied by the cultivation of their self-interest 
without having the possibility to ever be certain to what extent that is. On top of that, the isomorphism 
and uniformity of anti-corruption regulations spread out through the practice of monitoring 
implementation creates opportunities of resistance for those who were left outside or unsatisfied. Last 
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but not least, public-private partnerships allow the cooperation and matching of public and private 
actors in the fight against corruption (Corry, 2011; Etzioni, 1973) but they also bring forth a blurring 
of the boundaries between them and their roles in governance. In so doing the paper challenges the 
role of ‘moral’ and ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in the anti-corruption regime by offering a different view 
on the organization of anti-corruption based on the competent performances and action on 
practitioners within a socially organized context. Second, it enriches its empirical pool. This is to say 
that besides a small number of important and landmark events and the ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ 
surrounding them, scholars can as well as direct their attention to a virtually infinite number of 
everyday actions which constitute the practice of anti-corruption.  
9. Findings and conclusions 
More and more corporations employ corruption controls and policies in their operation yet we know 
little about anti-corruption in the private sector. This study asked the question how is anti-corruption 
practiced in multinational companies and sought to answer this by employing a social practice-based 
approach. The advantage offered by a practice-based approach is that this stretches the importance of 
human activity hence the empirical focus on anti-corruption and compliance experts. The main 
argument is that the practice of anti-corruption is more than the establishment of corruption control 
mechanisms and policies. These should be seen as elements or components of the socially constructed 
practice of anti-corruption along with the recursive activity of compliance officers who constantly 
negotiate with other members of the organization the integral workings of anti-corruption. To that 
end, the study sought to understand how anti-corruption is translated into business in corporations, 
how is it thought of by compliance officers, and how it takes place in practices beyond the narrow 
boundaries of the corporation.  
I found that anti-corruption is constantly negotiated and constituted between organizational members 
as opposed to simply imposed in a top-bottom manner. It is organized through translations aiming at 
matching diverting interests into its cause and it is governed through technologies and rationalities of 
self-responsibility. Central to this practice is the activity of compliance officers who have evolved 
into business advisors. In the following section, I present and discuss the theoretical and empirical 
contributions of the above findings and discuss them in relation to the dissertation’s papers, as well 
as extant theory and practice (Tables 12 and 13).  Implications for practitioners are also discussed. 
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9.1 Theoretical contributions 
The major contribution I make with this thesis in anti-corruption studies is the use of a practice-
oriented theoretical framework which allows the integration of contradictory yet substantial views on 
corruption and anti-corruption. As mentioned above scholars have, for example, recognized the need 
for consideration of the interplay between agency and structure in the study of corruption and 
suggested a variety of conceptual ways to overcome this dichotomy (Ashforth et al., 2008; 
Lambsdorff et al., 2004). In this study I offer a novel view on how such a ‘marriage’ can be achieved; 
I argue that by conceptualizing anti-corruption as practice, agency and structure are situated within 
the practice of anti-corruption as necessary components of it but not as exclusive determinants of 
action as traditional sociological theories would suggest (Caldwell, 2012; Schatzki, 2010). Indeed, as 
it has been arguably claimed, an explicit focus on practice approaches aims in developing ‘closer 
connections between what goes on deep inside organizations and broader phenomena outside’ 
(Whittington, 2006, p. 617). 
My contribution thus to anti-corruption studies is the bridging of the conceptual gap between 
normative approaches to corruption control and the global anti-corruption discourse. As I highlighted 
in the literature review, there has been a transition from an understanding of anti-corruption as a 
normative duty to battle corruption to a more relational approach which prioritizes the organization, 
proliferation, and broader implications rather than effectiveness of anti-corruption programs. In this 
study I bring together these two streams of research in anti-corruption studies by focusing  on the one 
hand on compliance officers acting to establish anti-corruption as a corporate function, and on the 
other hand, by situating this action in the broader socio-material context in which compliance officers 
act as professionals. In so doing, I challenge both the ‘one size fits all’ solution to corruption promoted 
by the global anti-corruption discourse, and also the premise that corruption is matter of individual 
choices by examining how compliance officers actually implement anti-corruption in an 
organizational context. 
The contribution of this study therefore consists of the exploration and examination of how the 
abstract discourse on anti-corruption and its organizational implementation come to terms or collide. 
Approaching anti-corruption as a translation (paper #1), for example, differs strongly from 
institutional and norm-based approaches presenting the organization as a ‘bad barrel’ (Kish-Gephart 
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et al., 2010; Pinto et al., 2008) because it challenges anti-corruption as a strict outcome of universal 
isomorphic pressures and diffusion (Getz, 2006; Jakobi, 2013b; McCoy & Heckel, 2001). Anti-
corruption is thus not understood as a top-down process but as a negotiation between corporate 
members who are situated and thus relatively free to choose how to curb corrupt behaviors. In doing 
so, however, questions are raised as well: if anti-corruption is a matter of translation, how can we be 
certain that all parties make the same translation and abide with the rules in similar ways? This 
becomes even more evident in paper #2 where I show that tensions rise from thinking about anti-
corruption both as self-responsibility and a business matter. In this sense, this study is aligned with 
studies questioning and examining similar tensions and their implications caused by individualistic 
interests in anti-corruption and compliance discourse and practice (Bukovansky, 2006; Sampson, 
2016; Slager, 2017; Tsingou, 2018). 
Another contribution I make with this thesis to anti-corruption studies is that I bring back agency into 
the anti-corruption equation. In contrast with norm-based approaches which consider corruption and 
anti-corruption as a matter of isomorphic pressure of socio-material structures on individuals, I 
advance that anti-corruption is something people in corporations do. I do so by taking advantage of 
the proliferation and maturation of the profession of compliance officer to bring forth the action 
involved in establishing an anti-corruption compliance function in an organization. However, agency 
is not understood here as in traditional rational choice theory in which action is determined strictly 
by what is inside people’s heads and is described as a cost-benefit calculation (Caldwell, 2012). 
Against this causal relationship between intentions and action, practice approaches maintain that 
action is carried out within the performative doings of practice (Schatzki, 2010). In other words, 
agency and action are situated within the specific conditions of the practice of anti-corruption as it is 
happening and not prior to that. Action in anti-corruption is therefore not the outcome of a person’s 
mind but the property of the practice itself as it is happening. The focus on situated agency allows 
anti-corruption to be examined not only as a ‘global’ problem but also as a corporate and professional 
challenge and opportunity. In so doing, I tie this thesis with the growing body of literature questioning 
not only the origins and motivation of anti-corruption in the private sector but also its organization 
and desired and undesired outcomes (Everett et al., 2007; Hansen, 2011; Harrison, 2006; Sampson, 
2015; Slager, 2017).  
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The consequence of such a positioning is that it provides a roadmap for theoretical generalization on 
how and when action is undertaken and enabled in similar situations. By ‘generalization’ here I mean 
not universal variation but the explanation of situated dynamics (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011). 
While cases may differ with regards to their context, the relationships and the dynamics developed 
within a single context may be useful in partly understanding similar cases. Taking, for example, one 
of this study’s findings that anti-corruption is constantly negotiated through translations may be used 
to understand other contexts or organizational functions especially in the wide area of corporate 
compliance which covers anti-corruption and also money-laundering, data protection, human rights, 
and environmental protection to name but a few. None of these areas is identical with one another, 
yet understanding compliance as a dynamic construction rather than imposed phenomenon may help 
in understanding their establishment, success, or even failure. 
In this sense, I also make a contribution to the business and society literature (Moon et al., 2005, 
2006; Scherer et al., 2016) by substantiating and extending the claim for the political role of 
corporations to include in-house relationships. Much of the extant literature on CSR and global 
governance is concerned with the socio-political role of corporations in the era of globalization by 
examining the system of global governance and its impact on corporate behavior and vice versa.6 
In contrast, in this thesis I situated the focus of inquiry in a corporate and organizational context 
where anti-corruption is understood as the result and not cause of action. It follows that the socio-
political aspect of corporations refers not to just corporate behavior and positioning within the triangle 
business-state-society, but as paper #1 shows, also to the strategies employed to allow the diverging 
organizational interests to align and support the establishment of anti-corruption as a default corporate 
function. As a result, the social aspect of corporations refers more to private-to-private relationships 
within the organization, and the ‘politics within businesses’ to how such relationships construct anti-
corruption as a corporate function. Indeed, as paper #2 shows, anti-corruption in companies is shaped 
and at the same time shaping the various bodies of knowledge upon which compliance officers apply 
anti-corruption.     
 
                                                          
6 For an exception see (Bondy, Moon, & Matten, 2012). 
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Finally, I make a contribution to discussions pertaining to the normalization and de-normalization of 
corruption in organizations (Anand et al., 2005; Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Spicer, 2009;  
Zyglidopoulos et al., 2008). While scholars have analyzed how corruption becomes normalized and 
embedded in an organization, the process by which corruption can be de-normalized from the 
organizational culture remains relatively unexplored. I contribute towards this direction by showing 
how anti-corruption is normalized and rationalized as a default business function through the 
establishment of compliance departments and officers who rationalize themselves as business 
advisors and attempt to justify compliance to anti-corruption rules by translating business practices 
to corruption risks. Similarly, in paper #3 I show how such normalization of anti-corruption takes 
 
 
Literature review 
findings 
Anti-corruption 
literature fragmented 
and therefore need for 
integrative 
models/approaches 
Little focus on anti-
corruption in the 
private sector and in 
particular in 
multinational 
companies 
Lack of focus on 
practitioners and in 
particular compliance 
officers 
 
Main RQ 
 
How is anti-corruption practiced in MNCs? 
 
Paper RQs 
How is anti-corruption 
integrated with 
business practices in 
MNCs? 
How is anti-
corruption thought 
in MNCs? 
How is anti-corruption 
practiced? 
 
Theoretical findings 
Translations of anti-
corruption  
to business operation 
Rationalities and 
identities of 
compliance  
officers 
Intended and 
unintended 
consequences of anti-
corruption practice 
 
 
 
 
 
Theoretical 
contributions 
Anti-corruption as practice: 
 
 Beyond the agency/structure dichotomy on anti-corruption (Thesis) 
 
 Bridging corruption control and anti-corruption discourse (Thesis) 
 
 Resurface (situated) agency (Paper #1) 
 
 Sociopolitical role of corporations as in-house function (Papers #1 
& 2) 
 
 Normalization of anti-corruption (Papers #2 & #3) 
Table 12: Theoretical contribution and thesis development 
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place through usually unnoticed practices and their intended and unintended consequences. In 
contrast, however, with the de-normalization of corruption which indeed sought to answer cases of 
organizational corruption, anti-corruption does not require an incident or case of corruption prior to 
its establishment in any company. Its practice is legitimized by a global discourse emphasizing the 
risks and harms caused by corruption in abstract political and economic terms.  
The contribution of this study therefore consists of the exploration and examination of how the 
abstract discourse on anti-corruption and its organizational implementation come to terms or collide. 
Such tensions are discussed in paper #2 while an overall argument I make is that corruption control 
may not always be anti-corruption’s sole objective. Paper #1, for example, shows that anti-corruption 
may be targeting compliance with the ‘letter’ of the law and not necessarily the ‘spirit’ when applied 
in an organizational context. Likewise, paper #3 shows how the practice of anti-corruption brings 
along intended and unintended consequences with both of them being equally important for its 
constitution. In this sense, my work is aligned with several scholars who have questioned anti-
corruption and its ultimate achievements and motivation (Bukovansky, 2006; Hansen, 2011; 
Sampson, 2010). 
9.2 Empirical contributions 
There are three empirical contribution I make with this study (Table 12). First, I show that anti-
corruption becomes more and more integrated into corporations and in so doing, I contrast earlier 
recommendations for outsourcing such functions to third parties (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). As a 
result, I offer insights from the establishment and development of compliance departments in 
corporations and anti-corruption as a corporate profession. More particular, I examined how anti-
corruption is established in corporations, who are the main stakeholders and by what means they seek 
to achieve their objective. I showed that the establishment of anti-corruption as a corporate function 
is not a matter of imposition, good will, or exemplar behavior but requires a wide range of ‘allies’, 
supportive mechanisms, strategies and motivation to be assembled. In addition, I also explored and 
critically examined the drivers and interests of compliance officers when performing their duties. I 
found that as professionals, compliance officers do have a sense of self-responsibility but also a self-
interest in strengthening their position within the company but also in securing the viability of their 
profession. My work thus sides with an increasing number of scholars who are looking into the role 
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of similar professions such as accountants (Everett et al., 2007; Slager, 2017), anti-money laundering 
professionals (Tsingou, 2018), and lawyers (Hansen & Tang-Jensen, 2015) questioning their 
engagement and motivation in the practice of compliance and anti-corruption. 
 
Second, my approach to anti-corruption revealed that anti-corruption and the way it is established in 
corporations enables communication between various layers of the organization. Scholars in 
organization and management studies have argued that corruption often is caused by a lack of 
communication between organizational layers of a corporation resulting in setting unrealistic sales 
and financial goals (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Ashforth et al., 2008; Brief et al., 2001). Indeed, my 
own fieldwork and conduct with compliance officers led me also to realize that compliance should 
be a concern of the top, middle, and lower layers of an organization alike. For any corporate strategy 
or goal to be achieved communication between these layers is required. Compliance plays such a 
role; it gathers information from the organizational operation, locates the risks, communicates those 
to top management, gets the mandate to make changes, and finally it communicates these changes 
across the organization and to whoever poses or faces corruption risk. Anti-corruption thus requires 
both on the excellent knowledge of an organization’s daily operations so to be able to locate and 
mitigate the exact corruption risks, and on its access and ability to influence the company’s strategic 
objectives so as to secure the endurance of a culture of compliance in the long term. In this sense, my 
work is aligned with  scholars and practitioners seeking to understand how anti-corruption enables 
and facilitates corporate governance by diffusing ‘an organizational culture of compliance’ (Key, 
1999; McGovern, 2016; Paine, 1994; Schwartz, 2013; Thomson Reuters, 2016; Verhezen, 2010). 
Third, my engagement with corporate compliance and anti-corruption offered another empirical 
contribution; the importance of human capital. International and national guidance on anti-corruption 
and its implementation on organizations advances a risk-based ‘one size fits all’ solution whereby 
Empirical 
contributions 
a. Anti-corruption as a corporate profession and the establishment of 
compliance departments in the corporation 
b. Anti-corruption as enabler of communication  
c. Human capital as crucial element of anti-corruption 
 
Table 13: Empirical contributions 
89 
 
corruption is to be curbed if a number of corruption control mechanisms such as risk assessment, 
training, due-diligence, and whistle-blower hotlines will be established. My study on anti-corruption, 
while it does not doubt the importance and necessity of corruption control mechanisms and controls, 
advances that anti-corruption is also a matter of people. How essential is the contribution of people 
in anti-corruption becomes evident in the recent example of money laundering in Danske Bank is 
evident of the importance of the above contribution. Danske Bank had been warned about the risk of 
money laundering from its Estonian branch in 2007 and ignored it repeatedly (Batchelor, 2018). This 
shows that controls were in place and worked as they should yet no one acted on this information. 
The extent to which this failure to act rests on poorly trained personnel, lack of compliance officers, 
or indifferent leadership remains to be seen. What is important, I argue, is to realize that human capital 
is vital in the establishment of a robust anti-corruption and compliance function.  
9.3 Implications for practitioners 
9.3.1 Business- other private actors 
Business and other private actors may benefit from the current study in the following ways; first, my 
research on anti-corruption offers insights on current techniques and strategies compliance officers 
utilize to achieve their objective. This, on the one hand, offers inspiration to companies in the process 
of internationalization of their operation by sketching not only the expectations they need to fulfil in 
global settings but also the human and material resources such an endeavor requires. Likewise, 
companies and practitioners may find strategies on anti-corruption discussed in this study as guidance 
for establishing other compliance areas such as data protection, human rights, environmental 
protection, piracy and human trafficking. On the other hand, and to more experienced practitioners 
and companies, the current study shows also the limits of compliance and anti-corruption practices. 
It creates thus incentives for further improvement of current practices or improvisation for new ones. 
Indeed, companies with mature compliance systems explore their options with regards to utilizing 
technology to achieve similar or even better results. 
 Second, managers may find this study useful in understanding the work of compliance officers and 
what are the merits and pitfalls of their approach. As discussed in the empirical contributions section, 
it is not always the case that people within an organization are aware of the work of their colleagues 
even more so in global companies which employ thousands in various locations around the world. A 
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reader of the current dissertation may acquire a broader view of what compliance in general and anti-
corruption in particular entails and how he or she can take advantage of the merits but also avoid or 
mitigate the pitfalls. Third, for institutional actors in the private sector such as business collective 
organizations, this study helps them to re-examine their policies and recommendations against the 
practices and reasoning anti-corruption is applied in practice. In doing so, this study mitigates to some 
extent the ‘one size fits all’ solution to anti-corruption by providing a more grounded and practical 
base for the review and revision of the recommended policies on anti-corruption. More concretely, 
this study may serve as feedback regarding the way anti-corruption is practiced based on broad 
international regulations by putting these to the test against a variety of factors such as cultural 
barriers, corporate strategy or the professional interests of compliance officers. 
9.3.2 Policy makers and regulators 
To policy makers such as governmental authorities and international organizations this study shows 
how compliance officers implement their regulations and guidance. By definition then the study can 
serve as a platform for improvements and further optimization by taking into consideration not just 
broad expectations and trends but also practicalities and details on how anti-corruption is practiced 
in MNCs. The study shows for example which areas and aspects of anti-corruption corporations are 
more likely to be implemented, how, and why. Understanding the difference between anti-corruption 
and compliance and what benefits and problems each concept serves and aims to address may be 
helpful in providing more detailed guidance and regulation. In other words and as mentioned above, 
the current study may again serve as feedback and in so doing rebalance the expectation that 
corporations can be solely responsible for anti-corruption.  
Following the above, policy makers and practitioners will find this study interesting for its approach 
to public-private relationships as not necessarily contradictory but also as supplementary in practice. 
This derives from the focus of this study on compliance officers who merge public and private rules 
and transform them to everyday guidance for their colleagues. Having this as a starting point, 
regulators and policy makers, may be benefited from this study in two ways; first, based on the 
practical insights offered in this study from the work of compliance officers, regulators, may realize 
the merits of a more practice-centered approach when designing regulations. As mentioned above, 
humans matter in corruption and anti-corruption is something people in corporations do. In doing so 
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the practical gap between abstract rules and their implementation may be lessened. Second, this study 
enables policy makers to realize the extent to which anti-corruption in practice fulfils its intended 
objective and what the unintended consequences of such a policy maybe. The way compliance 
officers for example narrow down anti-corruption to mere compliance in everyday corporate 
operation can be a resource for regulators and public authorities concerned with the performance and 
improvement of extant regulations.  
Overall, this study can enhance the ability of relevant actors to see anti-corruption beyond a top-
bottom approach where corporations are seen as both responsible for corruption and as a result also 
as sole responsible for curbing it. In this sense, this study offers an excellent resource for practitioners 
to understand the several ways anti-corruption can be practiced and the intended and unintended 
consequences produced by such implementation.      
9.4 Limitations and future research 
Taking my departure from the importance of human capital in compliance, this study’s major 
limitation was the limited access to sites in which such human activity may be observed extensively. 
As mentioned in the methodology section, the suggested method for practice-based studies is 
participant observation or ethnography which allows the researcher to experience the practice by 
learning and living it (Bueger & Gadinger, 2014). For the reasons I have explained above, only limited 
participant observation was possible and this affected this study in three ways: first, the practice of 
anti-corruption was ‘captured’ only indirectly and it therefore may be vulnerable to subjective 
idealizations or simplifications; second, although there were indications and some leads on how 
people resist change in the way they do business, limited access rendered further research impossible 
at that particular time at least; third, the resulted reliance on interviews and indirect descriptions of 
anti-corruption practices caused a limited engagement with the materiality of the practice of anti-
corruption. Future studies should therefore focus on the material aspect of anti-corruption. What do 
non-human elements bring into anti-corruption? How do they limit but also enable its practice? What 
is the role of technology in addressing corruption globally and what about digital corruption?  
Another limitation of this study comes from its focus on the enactment or performance of practices 
but not on their interconnectivity which is an understudied area (Hui, 2017). Although some 
theoretical indications on how practices create a mesh (Schatzki, 2005) or network (Latour, 2005) 
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has been provided, in effect, this study barely touches this topic. How do compliance practices, of 
which anti-corruption is only one aspect, connect with each other to create the broader practice of 
business ethics or sustainability, and moreover how do such practices mesh (or not) with traditional 
financial business practices to form what is considered the modern corporation and its broadened 
interest in social issues? Insights into practice interconnectivity may provide analytical depth on 
complicated and debated issues such as the sociopolitical role of corporations. With regards to the 
latter, this study showed how corporations play a political role not only in relation to other similar 
organizations but also in relation to their members. The constant negotiation of anti-corruption is a 
political act that takes place between organizational members. A study and comparison of the 
different sociopolitical roles in which corporations seem to engage from a practice perspective may 
offer a meaningful understanding of their overall role in the era of globalization. 
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Appendixes 
 
Appendix 1- Development of interview protocols 
Topic: Corporate anti-corruption and compliance in global governance from a practice based 
approach: Focus on experts rather than the company. 
Anonymity: Yes 
Confidentiality agreement: Yes 
Recorded: Yes 
Withdrawal: At any time before, during, or after the interview. 
Round 1: 
1) Can you describe or define anti-corruption in your own words? 
2) Do you see corporate anti-corruption as part of the broader CSR agenda?  
3) Who or what are the main drivers behind the recent turn towards compliance in the private 
sector? 
4) Based on your experience, can you describe to me how Danish companies feel 
about/responded to the need to implement anti-corruption?  
5) Who or what would you say are the main actors shaping the anti-corruption agenda? 
6) Can you talk to me about private to private or private to public cooperation against corruption? 
7) How do companies control compliance abroad and in particular China? Established 
department there? 
8) What are the obstacles when implementing anti-corruption/compliance measures in China? 
a. Third party management 
b. Training 
9) By what standards CoCs are being designed and drafted? 
10) What is the objective the company tries to accomplish through the COC? 
11) What capacities do you want to strengthen to your employees with training? 
a. In house or external private consultancies? 
12) What capacities do you expect to find out when you perform due diligence? 
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Round 2:  
 
1) How would you describe corporate anti-corruption? 
a. Ethical-legal 
2) What are the drivers behind the recent turn of Danish companies towards anti-corruption? 
3) In your experience, how did Danish companies respond to the need to develop anti-
corruption? 
a. Current status-different sectors. 
4) Can you talk to me about the relationship between anti-corruption and CSR? 
a. Danish context, Chinese context, American context. 
5) Can you tell me about private to private and private to public cooperation on anti-
corruption? 
a. Danish context, abroad. 
6) In your experience, how do companies manage anti-corruption abroad and in particular 
China? 
a. Establish departments there? From headquarters?  
b. Use of law firms and consultancies.  
c. Challenges? 
7) By what standards CoCs are being designed and drafted? 
a. Ethical, legal, competitiveness, isomorphism. 
8) Can you talk to me about the training of employees on anti-corruption? 
a. Ethical, legal, operational, culturally based, in-house or external actors? Ask for a 
description of the training program. An example maybe? 
9) Can you talk to me about performing due diligence on third parties? 
a. Ethical, legal, operational, culturally based, in-house or external actors? Ask for a 
description of due diligence. An example maybe? 
10) Question on FCPA and UK Bribery act compared to national legislation. How these two 
interplay, why companies choose to draft the CoC based on FCPA and Bribery act? How do 
they see national legislation? 
11) Anything else you would like to add? 
 
Round 3: 
Question 1: What does corporate compliance/anti-corruption mean for you? 
 Why do you think anti-corruption/compliance has attracted so much attention lately? 
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Question 2: Can you describe to me the organization of your department and your main tasks and 
responsibilities as a compliance officer? 
Grand Question 3: (Interview to the double method-Focus on practice.)  
 
a. Follow up questions when the interviewee starts talking about an activity of interest. 
For example: You said you check your daily tasks. What tasks are these? 
Looking for practical info on activities such as risk assessment, training, due-
diligence, code of conduct. 
b. Prompting to elaborate on these tasks/activities. 
Possible prompts:  
a. What tools do you use when performing activity X? 
b. By what standards do you design activity X? 
c. Who gets involved in designing/performing activity X? 
d. What do you aim to accomplish with activity X? 
e. Why do you think activity X is important? 
f. Where do you get inspiration when performing activity X? 
g. How do you deal with cultural differences when performing activity X? 
h. Given the large size of any MNC, how do you choose who is to be 
trained/checked/monitored? 
 
Grand question 4: Can you describe to me the role of the compliance department within any 
company? 
Possible prompts: 
a. What qualities are necessary for compliance officers to perform their tasks? 
b. What connections are necessary to fulfill the objective? 
c. To whom the department is accountable? 
d. What in your opinion is the optimal positioning of the compliance department 
within a company in order to be effective? 
e. What challenges are likely to be faced when performing compliance activities? 
Question 5: How do you think compliance changes a company internally and externally? 
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Possible prompts:  
a. Intra-organizationally. What was going on before? 
b. In relation to governments. What was going on before? 
c. In relation to other companies. What was going on before? 
 
Question 6 (Cooling off): How do you think corporate compliance/anti-corruption will look like in 
ten years’ time? 
Anything else you would like to add? 
 
Before you go:  
a. Any contacts especially in China 
b. Any documents to look into (anonymously)  
c. Any chance to look into what software or tools they are using (anonymously)? 
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Appendix 2: Example of thematic analysis of interview 
Natural Unit Central Theme Comments 
1. Well as we just briefly talked 
about, the anti-corruption effort 
is closely linked or has been for 
many years closely linked to the 
CSR area because I think it was 
eeh kick started eeh..that link to 
CSR was kick started by the UN 
Global Compact eem and was 
also one of the kind of the first 
areas that companies took upon 
them to be compliant with the 
anti-corruption…and basically, 
for the companies it’s about 
doing clean business. And 
nobody really in Denmark and in 
large part of the world especially 
in the western world, eee nobody 
accepts corruption. It’s 
something that we see as an evil. 
Anti-corruption closely 
linked to CSR and 
Danish/Western culture. 
It is about doing clean 
business. 
Anti-corruption 
governance 
 
A mostly western concept 
that turned into global 
through the involvement 
of the UN. For some 
reason companies have to 
do clean business… 
2. But at the same time corporations 
are looking into globalization and 
want to become multinational 
companies operating in remote 
areas of the world from their 
headquarters is and they have to 
realize that there is a different 
culture. That there is a different 
way of thinking about corruption 
because if it was only in 
Denmark eeeh practically I guess 
no companies in Denmark would 
have an anti-corruption 
compliance program because it is 
so much closely built into the 
Danish culture. But due to the 
fact that we are an export country 
then we need to live in an export 
world. We have to be aware of 
that and we have to take that 
responsibility as a global 
company. 
Global companies have 
to take the responsibility 
that they have to be out 
there to areas where 
other cultures apply. 
Corporate behavior 
 
If you want to be global 
you also take certain 
responsibilities such as 
deal with different 
cultures. If it is not 
possible to change them 
then you must protect 
your own interest. This 
whole AC movement then 
brings a framework that 
more or less serves 
western interests. 
Responsibility to whom? 
To yourself? To your own 
principles? To your own 
interests? Or to a global 
interest and development? 
3. Well this is interesting because 
eem my perspective to anti-
A systematic way to 
promote rules and if 
Maybe it is not the rules 
that are new but the 
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corruption is very much 
from..what I would call the hard 
side of compliance is where you 
describe some policies, your 
rules and policies, you 
communicate these in a 
systematic way and you train 
your people so that they read and 
understand and they kind of 
accept to live by the rules, and 
then you follow up on the rules 
and if people violate the rules 
you take the consequences of 
that. That has very much to do 
about the behavior and the 
culture of your employees and 
organization that you are 
working in. 
people don’t do so there 
is price to be paid. 
systematic enforcement. 
As the subject says, there 
were always rules on 
corruption, what is then 
new is that western actors 
suddenly were activated 
on that matter. Why is 
that? What caused that 
change? What makes 
actors be interested in a 
matter that was always 
there? The west is known 
for the systematic way of 
approaching issues and 
challenges, and therefore 
what is being enforced 
here is the western way of 
doing things. Not 
necessarily corruption 
which has always been 
there but rather a specific 
way of dealing with 
corruption. That goes 
back to risk and how the 
west handles and utilizes 
risk as a means to achieve 
goals. 
 
Theme maybe? 
4. But this approach is in my view 
somewhat new because if we 
look back in history the approach 
to anti-corruption and other 
responsibility areas was more 
kind of like ‘embrace our every 
responsibility, we accept that the 
organization has a responsibility. 
If you go back into the original 
thinking of shareholder 
management for example in the 
U.S eeem you will not find a 
kind of any responsibility in this 
direction because we only had 
one responsibility towards the 
shareholders. But as stakeholder 
Anti-corruption became a 
corporate responsibility 
as stakeholder 
management took over 
from shareholder. 
Anti-corruption 
governance 
 
Why stakeholders care 
about corruption? Why 
such expectations from 
companies? And why 
companies took that 
responsibility. If we look 
above then it might be a 
way of establishing a 
certain way of doing 
things and very 
compatible with western 
standards. 
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management and stakeholder 
relationship was kind of…has 
been adopted over the years and 
more predominantly in Europe 
than in the U.S. eem we have 
take a stand on a lot of different 
areas, corruption being one of 
them. So I think that..when I say 
it comes out of that agenda is 
because organization kind of 
adopted various corporate 
responsibility areas overtime and 
anti-corruption was one of them. 
5. Yes I agree with you it is a bit 
different when we talk about 
anti-corruption because it is more 
eemmm we see that is something 
that we need to embed in the 
business processes a lot 
more…it’s all about people. 
Anti-corruption is all about 
people. Although I would argue 
that the same goes with 
environment to some extent 
because if we talk about surplus 
material from the production or 
waste water, we can have a 
policy and we can have some 
instructions and guidelines 
saying that this has to be 
deposited to cleaning and 
whatever but if people don’t 
follow those rules they can be 
polluting the local river, they can 
be polluting the ground where we 
are operating. So it still comes 
down to people. This organism of 
the company is still a bunch of 
people getting together and their 
behavior collectively is the 
behavior of the company. 
Anti-corruption is all 
about the people. This is 
its main difference from 
other CSR areas. 
Continuing…thus this is 
about changing individual 
behavior or actor 
behavior. First standard 
rules change and then 
norms. It might be the 
other way in western 
areas like norms shape 
laws but in non-western 
areas hard regulation 
works better.  
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Appendix 3: Field notes example 
1 ) Hand notes - Compliance training 
session 
Central theme Comments 
Right after the main instructor took the 
floor and gave a short presentation of 
the past, current, and upcoming 
regulations, public, voluntary, and 
intergovernmental, that shape and are 
expected to shape the field of 
compliance. She moves much more 
than her colleagues and other 
presenters and seems excited to be 
doing this. She mentioned that the new 
project Fight against facilitation 
payments (FAFPI) is finally underway. 
Fafpi is an idea firstly articulated by 
(…) of (…) and refers to a public-
private initiative to counter facilitation 
payments. In particular, fafpi will be a 
forum for companies to share 
knowledge and experience, and a data-
base developed by public and private 
actors and in which all sorts of actors 
will be able to input information about 
the amounts, places, and people they 
have paid facilitation payments to. It 
aims to the gathering of data about 
places and people who are likely to 
request facilitation payments. The 
objective is to not only allow 
companies to know which places are 
the most corrupt prone but also to 
allow the government to use that data 
to lobby foreign governments to do 
something about that issue. 
 
Anti-corruption regulatory 
framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FAFPI-Public-private 
initiative 
Maybe it shouldn’t be a 
surprise but from where I 
stand now, anti-corruption 
seems to be a super-
important aim for 
corporations. This is 
probably confirmed by the 
amount of regulations out 
there which seems 
overwhelming. 
 
Nevertheless, I find the 
FAFPI initiative in line 
with the above comment 
and most importantly a 
very good way to counter 
facilitation payments. I 
find it also very interesting 
to see in practice how 
governments are drawn 
into the solution. Two 
more comments here, first 
the passage confirms the 
argumentation of the 
blurred boundaries 
between public and private 
actors. Second, and to 
some extent opposing the 
first comment, blurred 
boundaries don’t mean 
replacing public with 
private authorities. Rather 
it seems to me that 
partnerships are more 
realistic phenomenon  
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2) Hand written notes from 
participation in the 
ISO 37001 Anti-bribery 
Management system Summit, 
Shenzhen November 13th 2017 
Central theme Comments 
With regards to the Questions and 
Answers session there was a lot of 
discussion about the personal 
element in corruption and how to 
deal with that. The answer was 
that in this case what is needed is 
education and training on anti-
corruption and in the short-term 
preventive measures are required. 
I would add to that disciplinary 
measures are also necessary to 
counter corrupt behaviors. The 
compliance director of one of the 
largest IT companies challenged 
the tone from the top approach by 
saying that the tone from the 
middle is also more important 
since it is middle managers who 
sometimes push the lower levels 
of a company towards corruption 
by requesting unrealistic targets. 
The answer was that there is an 
increase in focus on training 
middle managers along with the 
other levels of the company 
because they too need to 
understand the risk of corruption. 
The tone from the top helps in this 
direction. 
 
Corruption as a personal 
choice and counter 
measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tone from the middle 
managers important 
I am not surprised…how else 
can one curb corruption in an 
organization. Since corruption 
has to do with human behavior 
then training and disciplinary 
measures should suffice. On 
the other hand however, is that 
the only thing we can do to 
curb corruption? Laws and 
measures have always been 
present and failed most of the 
time. After all these years of 
discussion and preparation for 
the new ISO 37001 the best 
they can offer is what has been 
already known? What is the 
point on having an ISO 37001 
certification then? 
 
Excellent point raised here. Is 
the tone from the top enough? 
In a discussion I had with a 
compliance officer he 
mentioned something similar 
regarding corruption and anti-
corruption in China. However 
it relates with the above 
comment. Training is the only 
thing we can do? And if so 
who is to train managers. Who 
has such knowledge and 
expertise to train managers? 
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Paper 1: Translating corporate anti-corruption: How ethics are integrated into business 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines how anti-corruption is integrated into ethics in multinational companies (MNC) 
and by what means. Inspired by Actor-network theory, I utilize the concept of translation to follow 
and understand the work of anti-corruption and compliance experts in corporations. I found that 
compliance and anti-corruption experts make use of three strategies by which they integrate ethics 
into business practices. The first strategy is enrollment of other actors in the overall project of anti-
corruption by the alignment of diverse interests. The second, interessement, refers to the interference 
of compliance and anti-corruption professionals with standard business practices in an effort to re-
direct them towards anti-corruption. And the third, problematization, refers to the overall translation 
of corruption risks into compliance. Seen from a distance, these three strategies shed light on a process 
by which 1) business practices turn into risks; 2) risks bring forth expectations of responsibility in the 
form of anti-corruption; 3) anti-corruption is translated once again into compliance; a much narrower 
and thus more manageable problem than corruption itself since it is restricted to the corporation and 
its own rules. Such findings imply that the sociopolitical role of corporations is not just to be found 
in the external behavioral observation of multinational companies but also in their internal operation.  
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1. Introduction 
The engagement of the private sector and in particular of multinational companies (MNC) in issues 
such as corruption has drawn significant attention globally during the last decades. Corruption in 
organizations has been associated with bribery, the act of ‘offering, paying or receiving a bribe 
through an officer, employee, subsidiary, intermediary or any third party (individual or corporate) 
acting on the commercial organization’s behalf’ (Kenyon, 2013, p. 6). Indeed, the vast amount of 
transactions MNCs they perform daily, their expansion worldwide, their economic power and 
influence can be as advantageous as disadvantageous in the matter of corruption (Heineman, 2009; 
Wrage & Wrage, 2005).  
The traditional view of the relationship between MNCs and corruption sees the former as breeders of 
corruption. As a result strict governmental regulation is being favored as the leash that will control 
the seemingly uncontrollable corporate tendency towards corruption (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006; 
Cragg & Woof, 2002; Gabel et al., 2009; Getz, 2006; Lord, 2013; Mark, 2012; Nadelmann, 1990; 
Weismann, 2009; Yeoh, 2012). Another emergent line of thought highlights a ‘bright’ side of MNCs 
as socio-political actors (Crane et al., 2008) and potentially allies against corruption (Calderón et al., 
2009; Wrage & Wrage, 2005); taking departure from studies on the rising corporate power and private 
authority (Fuchs, 2007; Hall & Biersteker, 2002), MNCs have been studied for their self-regulation 
initiatives (Gond et al., 2011; Haufler, 2001, 2010), provision of public goods (Bernhagen & Mitchell, 
2010; Scherer, 2016), and active engagement in multi-stakeholder initiatives (Grosser, 2016; 
Lundsgaarde, 2017; Moog et al., 2015).   
The above studies share one characteristic; they approach and analyze MNCs from a macro position 
rarely investigating the inner workings and establishment of anti-corruption within corporations. In 
this study, I take as my point of departure the increased focus on corporate anti-corruption practices 
(Hansen & Tang-Jensen, 2015; Sampson, 2015; Slager, 2017),  but I also go a step further by 
examining how anti-corruption is integrated with business in multinational companies.  
Anti-corruption is not a built-in department or function in organizations since it is not a necessary 
part of the production process. It has to be artificially imposed as a function within business practices. 
According to this paper’s findings, this happens in several moments along the practice of anti-
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corruption through strategies of translation. The background whereby these strategies unfold is the 
process of risk assessment; a procedure which aims to uncover where and how people within an 
organization are more likely to misbehave. That is not to say, however, that these strategies take place 
exclusively during the risk assessment process or consecutively as presented in this paper. Rather 
they should be seen as a representation of the rationale driving the actions of compliance officers and 
how they integrate ethics into business practices. Ultimately, a process by which business practices 
turn into risks and from there to anti-corruption and compliance emerges. In other words, an ‘anti’ 
policy such as anti-corruption aiming to repress ‘bad things’ (Walters, 2008, p. 267) turns to 
compliance aiming to influence and control people and behaviors (Parker & Lehmann Nielsen, 2009) 
within the corporate space. This finding support this paper’s argument that evidence of the political 
aspect of corporations can be found within their operation and function. 
In corporate common parlance, the terms ‘anti-bribery’ and ‘anti-corruption’ are rarely used except 
for corporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting. At the same time, anti-corruption is referred to as 
compliance. Corporate compliance is the department concerned with the adherence of the 
organization and its members to relevant legislation (Oded, 2013). In that sense, a compliance 
department is not exclusively occupied with anti-corruption laws but also with human rights, anti-
money laundering, trafficking, data protection, terrorism, sanction control and many other issues 
depending on the company’s operation. The responsibilities of the compliance department or officer 
have been largely defined by the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (2002), a US legislation aimed at 
enhancing corporate responsibility and financial disclosures, and combating corporate and accounting 
fraud (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2002). In short, the responsibilities of a compliance 
department are to establish those internal procedures that will ‘prevent, detect and respond to 
unethical and/or unlawful behavior’ (Gottschalk, 2011, p. 64).  
The objective of this article is to explore corporate anti-corruption in the making; who organizes it 
and how it spreads across the organization. I draw on Actor-network theory (ANT) and in particular 
its embedded sociology of translations (Callon et al., 1986; Latour, 1988, 2005) where the object of 
analysis is the anti-corruption expert and his or her doings in their ‘natural habitat’, the corporation. 
A significant advance offered by ANT is that it allows the disasembly, instead of observation, of anti-
corruption as a ‘black box’ (Latour, 1999). Black box is a mechanism which is considered so efficient 
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that only inputs and outputs are of interest, at the expense of its inner organization. By opening it, 
concepts such as business practices, corruption risks, anti-corruption, and compliance are understood 
as malleable concepts subject to translations and therefore with different meaning (Power, 2007; 
Slager, 2017). Depending on points of view and actor interests they can be translated for any use 
actors deem important ‘for their own or somebody else’s use’ (Czarniawska & Joerges, 1996, p. 23). 
In this sense, anti-corruption compliance can be seen as a result or effect of inner workings and not 
the cause of further events and actions or outcome of external pressures (Czarniawska & Hernes, 
2005).  
The study’s contribution is twofold: first, by utilizing ANT’s concept of translation it offers insights 
on corporate anti-corruption and how changes emerge and change the relationship between the 
corporation and its members (Czarniawska & Sevon, 1996). Second, this study contributes to 
discussions pertaining to the sociopolitical role of corporations by allowing them to be seen as such 
in a delimited but more autonomous role in relation to the global environment or governments. The 
paper develops as follows: In the next part, I review the literature on global anti-corruption, 
highlighting a lack of focus on how corporations control corruption in-house. Part 3 discusses ANT 
and elaborates on its concept of translation. Part 4 is dedicated to the methodology employed. In part 
5, I start the analysis by presenting the practice of risk assessment to set the scene for the presentation 
and analysis of the following three strategies by which ethics are being translated into business. In 
part 6, I discuss the findings in light of theories on the role of corporations as sociopolitical actors, 
suggest future research directions, and conclude with the paper’s limitations. 
2. Anti-corruption in MNCs 
Much of the scholarly attention and discussion on anti-corruption revolves around the role and 
interplay of public and private actors in dealing with those social issues globalization and the 
expansion of MNCs globally helped deteriorate. An indicative study showing exactly how such 
relationships may, even metaphorically, form, comes from Crane et al, (2008) where the authors 
argued for three metaphorical conceptions of corporate citizenship. In the first metaphor and 
corporations are conceptualized as citizens. Here corporations are considered as members of pluralist 
communities subject to certain obligations and entitled to rights just like any other member. In this 
sense, corporations are obliged to comply with regulations but at the same time play an instittutional 
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role in rule-setting by participating or influencing the decision making process. In the second 
metaphor, corporations are conceived as if their were governments and therefore responsible for the 
provision of public goods and services. In this case, corporations, are not just subject of rules or 
entitled to rights but in fact, corporations do shape and inform how such rights and duties apply to 
citizens. Finally, in their third metaphor of corporate citizenship, Crane et al (2008, p. 10), suggest 
that ‘corporate activity itself can shape opportunities for corporations’ stakeholders to act as if they 
were citizens in relation to the corporation’. In other words, corporations are conceptualized here as 
‘arenas’ whereby stakeholders may act as citizens in defining their status and entitlements (Crane et 
al., 2008).  The focus thus is not on society per se but rather on these societal spaces corporate activity 
create whereby stakeholders interact with one another. This I argue is an important and interesting 
view on the sociopolitical role of corporations since it allows it to be extented beyond private-public 
relations and to a more organizational perspective of corporate citizenship and the relationships 
formed within corporate activity. To put the above framework into perspective I briefly discuss below 
the role of MNCs in anti-corruption. I start with corporations as subjects to regulations, and I continue 
with corporations as the main actors undertaking initiates to tackle corruption or other similarly 
ethical in nature issues. Furthermore, I discuss how anti-corruption as a matter of ethics is understood 
within corporations and how it has been organized.  
On the one hand, anti-corruption is approached as a global regulatory framework prohibiting corrupt 
behaviors with governments, intergovernmental, and non-governmental organizations playing the 
role of the regulator (Jakobi, 2013; Nadelmann, 1990) while companies are considered as breeders of 
corruption (Wrage & Wrage, 2005), and therefore subject to regulative pressures. Global prohibition 
regimes theory is such an example whereby anti-corruption appears as a regime prohibiting ‘the 
involvement of state and non-state actors in particular activities’ (Getz, 2006, p. 256). In her study of 
international anti-corruption norms for example, Rose (2015), examines the instruments by which 
anti-corruption is enforced to states and assesses their impact. Similarly, other scholars argue for the 
business case of corporate compliance in the anti-corruption regime (Nichols, 2012), while others 
warn for the consequences of non-compliance (Yeoh, 2012). A large number of business and legal 
scholars, however, have cast doubt on the effectiveness of such a regime in ensuring compliance with 
anti-corruption in the corporate sector (Brewster, 2017; Getz, 2006; Jorge & Basch, 2013; Koehler, 
2009; Weismann, 2009; Weismann, Buscaglia, & Peterson, 2014). Weisman (2009; Weismann et al., 
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2014) for instance attributes this failure to control corruption in the very failure of the American 
inspired self-regulatory model of corporate governance which has collapsed. Others point out that the 
ineffectiveness of the anti-corruption regime does not necessarily rest on its own structure but rather 
in corruption’s peculiar nature (Getz, 2006; Nadelmann, 1990). 
On the other hand, other scholars approach MNCs as potential allies in the fight against corruption 
(Calderón et al., 2009; Heineman, 2009; Wrage & Wrage, 2005) and highlight the role of corporations 
in fighting corruption along with other social problems. Drawing on the growing power and 
capabilities of MNCs in globalization (Fuchs, 2007; Hall & Biersteker, 2002), scholars have argued 
for the socio-political role of the corporation which extends their obligations beyond mere economic 
profits (Detomasi, 2014; Moon et al., 2005; Scherer et al., 2014, 2016). According to this view, 
corporations are not merely subject to global regulations and norms but also lead such initiatives 
(Cutler, 2002), and voluntarily take various roles which in the past were considered strictly 
governmental (Scherer et al., 2016). The Maritime Anti-corruption Network  (MACN) for example 
is such a private organization founded by dedicated maritime companies to free the maritime industry 
from corruption and benefit society at large. Currently, MACN hosts more than 100 maritime 
companies with significant contributions in fighting facilitation payments, rule setting, and 
establishment of greviance mechanisms in strategic locations around the world (Maritime Anti-
Corruption Network, 2019). Another example comes from Heineman (2009) who suggests an 
institutional role for MNCs in the fight agaisnt corruption. More particularly, Heineman argues that 
besides the economic development MNCs offer to host countries, corporations can and should be 
engaged not only to institution and governance capacity building  but also to the application of such 
anti-corruption rules in practice. This, Heineman argues (2009), is crucial for MNCs since the rule of 
law and the subsequent respect of property rights, contract enforcement along with legal and 
regulatory predictablity are essential for business to thrive. 
Following the above, organizations including MNCs are expected to introduce and implement 
corruption control programs (Parker & Lehmann Nielsen, 2009; Weller, 2017). Indeed, management 
scholars concerned with the normalization of corruption in organizations (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; 
Spicer, 2009) argue that reversing such situations requires the establishment of ethics training, 
inculcated and institutionalized ethical principles, accountability, and transparent practices (Anand et 
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al., 2005). From an organizational perspective, scholars have sought also to examine how such 
programs control corruption and corrupt practices in organizations. Along similar lines, others 
maintain that to end corruption in an organization, the work of ‘social actors’ such as institutional 
entrepreneurs is required to introduce anti-corruption logics and practices (Misangyi et al., 2008) 
allowing for the organization to restore its legitimacy with stakeholders (Pfarrer et al., 2008). 
Likewise, scholars of global governance and international relations have referred to ‘norm’ (McCoy 
& Heckel, 2001) or ‘transnational moral entrepreneurs’ (Nadelmann, 1990), and their role in 
influencing public and political support with regards to the rise and establishment of global 
prohibition regimes such as anti-corruption. What is common in this studies is that they conceptualize 
corruption and anti-corruption as opposing norms without, however, going into detail about how that 
would take place in practice and who would be responsible for it. 
Taking a business ethics view, others analyze corruption control measures individually so to examine 
their effectiveness (Arthur et al., 2003; Kaptein, 2015; Kaptein & Schwartz, 2007; Miceli & Near, 
2002). Codes of ethics, for example, have been examined as to whether they influence employee 
behavior with the majority of scholars agreeing that when combined with other appropriate control 
measures, codes of ethics may potentially be a good starting point for compliance (Adelstein & Clegg, 
2016; Harvey, 2000; Kaptein & Schwartz, 2007; Stevens, 2008; Webley & Werner, 2008). Stevens 
(2008), for example, argues that when combined with a culture of integrity and proper 
communication, codes of ethics do influence employee behavior. Likewise, scholars have looked into 
anti-corruption and ethics training to examine the extent to which it impacts the establishment of 
ethical culture in organizations. While anti-corruption training is generally considered as effective 
and positively correlated with employee ethical decision-making and corruption prevention (Hauser, 
2018; Ruiz et al., 2015; Verma et al., 2016), empirical work seems to offer contradictory findings 
(Jonson et al., 2016; Treviño et al., 2014). Waples et al (2009), in his meta-analysis of 25 studies of 
business ethics instructional programs, for example, found that their effect was minimal. Likewise, 
Jonson et al (2016), examined how 142 match pairs  responded to a semester long business ethics 
course and found that its impact on ethical dilemmas was rather limited.  
As the review shows, our knowledge and understanding of the evolution of anti-corruption in MNCs 
has progressed well during the last decades. However, an account of anti-corruption as a corporate 
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function is yet to be fully explored. Towards this direction, an increasing number of scholars have 
focused on the practice of anti-corruption (Hansen & Tang-Jensen, 2015; Osrecki, 2015; Sampson, 
2016; Slager, 2017). Slager (2017), for instance, looks into the discourses of accountants to analyze 
anti-corruption. She maintains that the use of the concept of risk in constructing anti-corruption brings 
forth a central tension between discourses of corruption prevention and detection, ultimately 
crowding out ethics and collective initiatives. Similarly, Hansen and Tang-Jensen (2015), studied the 
practice of anti-corruption due-diligence performed by a law-firm on behalf of a company and found 
that practically anti-corruption practice in an organization seems to some extent to be aligned with 
the global anti-corruption regulatory regime. In this paper I seek to contribute to the above stream of 
research by setting the analytical focus on anti-corruption as it is practiced in MNCs by compliance 
officers. To that end, I employ the concept of translations from Actor-network to understand how 
anti-corruption is integrated into business practice and operation. In so doing, I examine not only the 
discourses of compliance officers or the classificatory system by which anti-corruption is assessed 
and imposed, but the actual means by which compliance officers interfere with the organizational and 
professional routine of their colleagues.  
3. Actor-network and translations 
Translations in social sciences have been associated with the interpretive and linguistic turns that took 
place in the last quarter of the 20th century (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). The interpretive turn 
came as a reaction to a ‘natural’ model of social behavior and its being ‘denuded of the human traits 
of researchers and researched’ (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2007, p. xii). Knowledge is something 
meaningful to people in a social situation and is produced both by participants and observers in their 
effort to understand/interpret what they experience (Rabinow & Sullivan, 1979). As a response to the 
above understanding of reality as completely socially constructed, Latour and his colleagues 
introduced Actor-network theory (ANT) and its concern with how actors construct and transform 
both knowledge and society (Callon et al., 1986). ANT’s underlying premise is that there is only one 
world which can be translated in many different ways (Czarniawska & Sevon, 1996). What is 
experienced as the ‘social’ or a fact, is no more than group formation (network) between actors 
(Latour, 1984, 2005) who are connected with constructed connections understood as translations 
(Callon, 1984). Latour (1987) suggests an extended understanding and interpretation of the term 
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‘translation’ that goes beyond mere linguistic use. As he points out (Latour, 1987, p. 117), ‘In addition 
to its linguistic meaning (relating versions in one language to versions in another one) it has also a 
geometric meaning (moving from one place to another)’. Translations therefore are linguistic and 
non-linguistic actions showing displacement of meanings and actors. This allows anti-corruption to 
be understood as a dynamic function constantly negotiated between organizational members instead 
of an imposed rule.  
One form of translation employed by compliance officers is the enrollment of members to the network 
by translating and interpreting their interests through encouragement of participation, discussion, and 
deliberation (Callon, 1984). It is an effort to attract and distribute roles to as many as possible allies 
to a certain project, in this case anti-corruption. Another form of translation is ‘interessement’, a 
transaction between three actors; it takes place when the main actor attempts to attract a second actor 
by placing itself between the second and a third actor (Callon et al., 1986). More geometrical in nature 
than enrollment, ‘interessement’ serves as the ‘lock in’ mechanism by which actors are rationally 
interested in a project or network (Latour, 2005). In addition, ‘problematization’, is another form of 
translation whereby an actor attempts to attract other actors to the network by establishing ‘an 
equivalence between two problems that requires those who wish to solve one to accept a proposed 
solution for the other’ (Callon et al., 1986). In other words, problematization defines the problem and 
solution to be addressed and offered respectively by a network.  
Translations such as enrollment, problematization, and interessement are necessary for understanding 
group formations as the ‘material’ of which social reality consists (Callon, 1984). While qualitative-
ethnographic approaches require an a priori and arbitrary choice of ‘level of analysis’, ANT takes as 
its point of departure the formation of a socio-material construction regardless of whether this 
construction will ultimately survive, thrive, or simply dismantle (Latour, 2005). In so doing, it allows 
a connection between the micro and what is considered as macro worlds to be built (Czarniawska & 
Sevon, 1996) . The translations therefore performed by compliance and anti-corruption experts are 
not just linguistic interpretations but assign different meaning to business practices which are 
understood as corruption risks, anti-corruption, and compliance. Framing a business practice, for 
instance, as risky creates expectations for responsibility (anti-corruption) (Power, 2007). As we shall 
see below, however, anti-corruption also gets translated into compliance and thus is attributed with a 
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different meaning or else that of protecting the company from legal risks rather than corrupt practices. 
Taken together, these three strategies allow us to trace how standard business practices are being 
translated into corruption risks and from there to be re-defined as compliance, an issue much narrower 
and therefore more manageable than corruption itself.  
While this paper is inspired by ANT in several ways, two points need to be made regarding its concept 
of translation, and the purpose of this paper. First, this paper restricts its interest in the concept of 
translation (Whittle et al., 2010) and therefore does not deploy ANT’s full spectrum of 
epistemological foundations which have been the subject of criticism (Whittle & Spicer, 2008). 
Second, even within the concept of translation, the focus of this paper is on human actors, as opposed 
to non-humans, and as such it prioritizes human agency compared to traditional uses of ANT whereby 
agency is also attributed symmetrically to both humans and non-humans (Hardy et al., 2001). The 
limitations of such an approach are briefly discussed in the conclusion section. 
4. Methodology 
The empirical data for this study were collected mainly through 20 semi-structured interviews with 
anti-corruption and compliance experts in Copenhagen, Denmark, and Beijing, China during 2018 
(Table 2). Data were also collected from participating in a conference, a seminar, a couple of e-
learning sessions which resulted in hundreds of pages of notes and PowerPoint slides from 
presentations on best practices (Table 1). 16 out of 20 interviews were taped and transcribed by the 
author, while for the rest, handwritten notes were taken. 11 of the interviewees were occupied as 
compliance officers in western MNCs at the time of the interview. The remaining nine were occupied 
in NGOs, private consultancies, law firms, or collective business organizations. The comparability of 
the extracted data was ensured by the common background and field of expertise of the interviewees 
in corporate anti-corruption/compliance (Meuser & Nagel, 2009). 
The selection of interviewees was based on publicly-available CVs on LinkedIn. I searched for people 
with long experience in anti-corruption who, through the process of ‘snowballing’, led me to more 
compliance experts (Ritchie et al., 2003). All of them were serving at the time or had served for 
several years as anti-corruption experts or compliance officers in corporations. Their duties included 
the establishment and development of a compliance system, advising companies on their compliance 
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policy, performing risk assessments, performing investigations and in some cases development of 
their own anti-corruption strategy or method. None of the interviewees, however, were trained as 
compliance or anti-corruption experts. Some were engineers, others lawyers, political scientists, 
economists, IT people, secretaries, people with a background in sales and even zoologists by training. 
Data source 
Interviews  20 anti-corruption experts in Denmark and China 
Participation in e-learning 
courses, conferences, and 
workshops 
 ISO/TC Plenary- Anti-Bribery Management International Best Practices 
Symposium  
 China National Institute of Standards Seminar 
 TRACE E-learning session on gifts and hospitality 
 United Nations Anti-corruption E-Learning Tool 
Documents (Public) 
 Corporate codes of conduct, CSR/Sustainability reports, Policy 
documents, Legislation   
(Private) 
 PowerPoint slides, guidelines, internal documents shared in 
private sessions 
Table 1: Data sources 
The reasons for this may fluctuate from a lack in relevant education, to the urgent need for such a 
function (see paragraph below), or even to the personal interest of these people on the matter of 
corruption. Their expertise and expert knowledge come from practicing anti-corruption and 
compliance, regardless of their professional title. Indeed, recent developments in the sociology of 
knowledge literature highlight how knowledge and expertise should not be strictly identified with 
professional positions (Meuser & Nagel, 2009).The interviews and data collection were organized 
around three overall themes: 1) the role of anti-corruption and compliance department or officer in 
companies; 2) detailed information on practices performed by anti-corruption experts; and 3) daily 
professional activities and routine. In the texts produced by transcriptions, field notes, and PowerPoint 
slides, I searched for two things. First, I was interested in finding out which actors are engaged in 
compliance and by what rules they engage with it; the compliance department or officer and the senior 
management as well for sure. Likewise, sales and marketing staff since corruption often occurs right 
at the company’s boundaries with external stakeholders. Furthermore, there are departments playing 
a double role; these assist compliance and are also checked for their integrity like the finance and 
legal departments. What are the rules under which they operate? Surely, international and national 
legislation and also corporate policy and culture.  
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Table 2: Overview of interviewees 
After repeated reads of the data, the overall practice of compliance emerged. Within that practice, 
other smaller-in-scale practices emerged including risk assessment, training, and due diligence. I 
focused on the practice of risk assessment and in particular on the negotiations, consultations, and 
conflict between organizational members taking place during its process. Once relationships and 
contradictions became clear, I applied the ANT theoretical framework in order to overcome ‘loose 
ends and unconnected findings’ (Meuser & Nagel, 2009, p. 10). For instance, the translation of 
business practices to corruption risks, and the translation of corruption itself to compliance seemed 
as two ends not necessarily related to each other, unless they are understood as a network built by a 
particular actor, the compliance department or officer.   
 
 
 Place Professional title Assigned 
Interview No. 
Duration 
1 Copenhagen/Denmark Consultant A7 54 min 
2 Compliance Officer A4 66 min 
3 Consultant A6 67 min 
4 Compliance Officer A3 52 min 
5 Compliance Officer/ Technical Advisor A20 56 min 
6 Senior Compliance Officer A2 44 min  
7 Compliance Officer A4 50 min  
8 Senior Compliance Director  A29 55 min  
9  Head of Global Compliance  A8 62 min 
10 Chief Compliance Officer A5 48 min 
11 Lawyer A14 50 min 
12 Compliance Counsel  A1 61 min 
13 Beijing/China Consultant A12 81 min 
14 Senior Director & General Counsel A25 72 min 
15 Compliance Director A22 86 min 
16 Compliance officer A23 70 min 
17 Lawyer A19 55 min 
18 Consultant A26 53 min 
19 Consultant A28 53 min 
20 Regional Compliance Director A27 54 min 
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5. Analysis 
5.1 The practice of bribery risk assessment 
Risk assessment is an estimation of these areas of business activity, including geographic areas, where 
a high probability of corruption exists. The scope of a risk assessment process is to expose the bribery 
risk of business practices in those areas of activity where corruption is more likely to occur. In other 
words, the objective of risk assessment is to shed light on business practices and in so doing render 
corruption risks visible. Towards that objective, the practice of risk assessment and task of a 
compliance officer or department is to gather ‘sufficient, relevant information about the 
organization’s business activities and relationships to enable it to determine how those features 
expose it to bribery risk’ (Kenyon, 2013, p. 6).  
‘…basically we start the whole process with a risk assessment. We need to find out where are 
the biggest risks in this area and we take different perspectives on risk. One is the geographical 
perspective and in that respect China comes in quite high on the list because China is probably 
one of the areas where kind of cultural aspect is influencing this. We also take a functional 
perspective on corruption risk where we look at they way we do procurement, how do we sell, 
do we need permits or licenses from the government and so on.’ (Interview A7) 
The information a compliance officer seeks while performing a risk assessment is both geographical 
and functional. Geographical information is about the areas of the world where the organization 
operates. MNCs operation usually spans over tens of countries around the globe and each country has 
its own institutional framework, culture, and developmental level all of which have been associated 
with levels of corruption (Holmes, 2015). Information is being extracted by publicly available 
corruption indexes and maps such as T.I’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the Global 
Corruption Barometer (GCB), as well as World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators on 
corruption control. Since 1995 for example, CPI measures the extent to which a country’s public 
sector is perceived as corrupt by business people, experts, and analysts (Transparency International, 
2016). Likewise, the GCB, measures the extent to which citizens perceive their country’s public 
sector as corrupt (Global Corruption Barometer, 2017). Both in the CPI and GCB maps, countries 
perceived as corrupt are painted in bright red color whereas less corrupt countries as yellow. It follows 
then that in this rather simple process a compliance department produces its own map simply by 
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pinpointing the locations and operations of the organization around the globe with those resting on 
red color perceived as highly risky. For example, and given that perceived corruption is rather high 
in East Asia region, a company with operations there faces equally high bribery risks.  
Operating in areas of the world where there is high bribery risk does not necessarily mean that an 
organization faces such risk wholesale. Nor does it mean that all employees or organizational 
members will share the same understanding of the local conditions. To counter generalizations of 
either kind, a compliance officer employs a more thorough scan of the organization’s operation. The 
logic is quite straightforward; since as indicated, bribery requires a giver and a receiver to be 
completed, it is likely to take place exactly where the organization comes into contact with third 
parties. The focus thus is directed gradually from perceptions to more specific business practices that 
may host or be prone to such behaviors. One such example comes from the standard business practice 
of sales where hospitality and entertainment expenses include corporate funding for accommodation, 
gifts, and travelling expense. As a compliance officer explains, documentation and thorough control 
of the use of such funds is crucial in understanding corruption risks: 
‘We look for example in transactions like a bill for wine or meal for two people. If it is too 
high or issued from an abnormal place then regardless if it has been approved by the business 
and finance managers we will investigate more on the justification and necessity of such a 
payment.’ (Interview 22) 
Assessing the broad functional bribery risk exposure requires compliance officers to utilize 
quantitative tools such as questionnaires which are being distributed across the organization, internal 
audit reports, entertainment and hospitality practices, and past investigations all of them providing a 
broad view on where the organization may be more vulnerable to misconduct. Others helpful sources 
providing an overall view of the functional risk can be found in third-party or industry focused studies 
conducted by institutional actors such as the OECD, the International Chamber of Commerce, 
business collective organizations, private consultancies, and even governments. An indication 
moreover of the broader functional risk can be derived also from enforcement trends and past 
corruption scandals. The fairly recent case of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) pharmaceutical company in 
China for instance revealed the extent to which pharmaceutical companies face similar risks.  
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‘Basically because it’s the pharma industry’s own fault. Pharma industry used to engage in 
all kinds of behavior where you wouldn’t necessarily be sure that you weren’t unduly 
influencing HCPs (healthcare professionals) (…) So the way the business was described once 
way back you could bring gifts of various sizes to doctors, you could invite doctors to 
conferences or meetings that were abroad or at what could be perceived as precarious hotels 
providing accommodation.’ (Interview A2) 
Assessing functional bribery risk in a more targeted manner requires an in-depth understanding of an 
organization’s operations. A compliance officer performing risk assessment is interested in 
understanding the business model of the organization. Some indicative areas of inquiry are, how does 
the organization come to contact with its customers, suppliers, and in general stakeholders? Does the 
company use sales agents or it has own salesman or retail stores? Who is responsible for procurements 
and how does the company make deals? Does the company work with governmental officials? Does 
it sell products to governments? Are employees aware of the company policies and relevant 
regulation? Do they know who to contact or is there anyone handling these cases? Typically, answers 
to such questions require interviewing the relevant people within the organization.  
‘In most cases (of risk assessment), I want to talk to people. If I go to a country I want to talk 
and meet the country manager. I want to understand essentially the configuration of the people 
there(…)I gather employees. I ask them casual questions to test of their awareness of our 
policies. Our policies in terms of traveling and entertainment. "Do you know our policy in 
terms of business courtesy? Do you know what kind of things you can do or you should not 
do or what kind of things you have to get prior approval before you can do it?’ (Interview 
A25) 
The compliance officer chooses who is to be interviewed. Virtually any member of the organization 
can offer valuable information on the matter of bribery risk. General or not managers, for example, 
provide information on the local conditions and point the direction towards the challenges their 
organization or team faces regarding bribery. The legal department provides information on the local 
regulatory environment and enforcement trends. Human resources provide information about the 
composition and details of the workforce. Employees of any kind moreover, can provide information 
on the conditions they face in the field and also about the local culture. To use again the 
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aforementioned example of GSK, a pharmaceutical company is based a lot in the interaction with 
healthcare professionals and doctors and therefore healthcare sales agents need to be interviewed as 
to how they promote products and what are the local expectations and demands for their job. 
Likewise, a logistics company crosses borders and customs regularly. In this case, truck drivers will 
provide information of the conditions they face when crossing borders.  
‘So for example one of the things we do is when we do a bribery risk assessment we try to get 
these people in a room and have a discussion about what actually happened’ (Interview A6) 
Interviews or talks with employees are usually unstructured and consist of casual questions on 
everyday professional activities. They aim to descriptions rather than events. The interviewee is 
required to describe daily activities and provide information (if) on challenges related to bribery. The 
officer does not seek to point the finger at anyone but rather to understand the business practices of 
the company at its most basic level. An invitation for an interview by a compliance officer is not an 
investigation on wrongdoing but rather about the conditions that could potentially lead to such 
wrongdoings and the overall goal is to locate and if possible prevent them from happening. Interviews 
are conducted face to face in meeting rooms or offices, but also through other technological mediums 
such as video or phone-calls. 
Bribery risk assessment is not only about data gathering. Data does not mean much in itself but is 
compared with extant international and local legislation and enforcement trends. International 
legislation, or to be more precise legislation with extra-territorial authority is a method governments 
have been introducing increasingly the last two decades. Extra-territorial authority means that 
legislation is applicable regardless of the geographic area where the offense was committed as long 
as the accused has some sort of affiliation with the country in which the legislation was introduced. 
Two of the most commonly referred such legislation and landmarks on the fight against corruption 
are the U.S Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, and U.K Bribery Act (UKBA) of 2010. 
Whether the FCPA or the UKBA or any other legislation will be followed depends on the 
organization’s main business operation and geographic expansion. As a common practice, the rule of 
strictest law is applied. That is to say, while international, national, and local legislation needs to be 
taken into consideration, in the case of incompatibility or conflict between them the risk will be 
defined by the strictest law.  
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‘What we do is we start with what are the expectations to a company like ours. And that is 
well defined. It’s national legislation at the moment, the UK Bribery Act, the FCPA which 
are extra-territorial so you need to comply with those everywhere in the world. Then of course 
we include any local legislation that is expected. Even if the local standards are stricter than 
for example the FCPA then we hold ourselves towards those local standards. But we also have 
our own internal procedures. So we say this is the way that we do business. And if those 
internal requirements are stricter that the local requirements then we adhere to the strictest 
ones.’ (Inteview A2) 
5.2 Strategy 1- enrolling actors in anti-corruption  
The first strategy refers to the translation of enrolment compliance officers attempt to enroll actors in 
their cause namely anti-corruption. This is because on the one hand anti-corruption need to be 
communicated across the organization since it concerns all layers of the corporation. On the other 
hand, compliance and anti-corruption, as non-default corporate operations, cannot succeed if they are 
cutoff from the organizational operation and routine. Enrolment therefore has both quantitative and 
qualitative characteristics.  
Enrolment starts with the practice of bribery risk assessment since the latter is one of the first actions 
an anti-corruption and compliance policy requires according to national and international regulations. 
As such it falls within the responsibilities of compliance officers. Risk assessment is the process by 
which compliance officers locate where and when it is more likely an employee to misbehave or in 
this case take or give a bribe (Kenyon, 2013). This is not to say, however, that compliance officers 
can achieve their objective singlehandedly. In contrast, the process of bribery risk assessment and an 
anti-corruption function require broader relationships and alliances to be established at an 
organizational level.  
For a compliance officer enrolling colleagues in compliance and anti-corruption is primarily a matter 
of organizational order:  
‘What is really important is that you keep order in the company so the people know what they 
should do and what is the boundary. So that’s really important for the company.’ (Interview 
12) 
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Indeed, as Callon and Law argue (1982, p. 622), ‘The theory of enrolment is concerned with the ways 
in which provisional order is proposed, and sometimes achieved’ . Order in this sense means to 
distribute roles so that every associate to the cause of anti-corruption knows what to do. As an 
experienced compliance and anti-corruption expert explains below: 
‘For example I had a business meeting yesterday and I said to the compliance officer ‘I advise 
you to get some new allies, talk to the HR person, talk to the IT person’, and this person was 
coming out of legal so no reason to talk to the legal people. And then also involve the business. 
Because you need to have that kind of cross functional dialogue…it’s all about the people and 
we need to convince them. I have to convince you that this is the right thing to do and if I 
cannot convince you, you can pretend that you are convinced but then when you get under 
pressure you will fall back to your default.’ (Interview A7) 
First, roles are attributed to the relevant corporate bodies and actors to take on action depending on 
the perceived risk. The IT, HR, financial, and audit departments are enrolled early on in the process 
of risk assessment as supportive to the compliance function. IT and HR departments, for instance, are 
enrolled not as departments managing the organization’s IT infrastructure or the workforce but rather 
as facilitators of compliance’s function to locate people relevant to risk assessment. Similarly, the 
financial and audit departments are enrolled as information providers on risky transactions and on 
maintaining books and records according to relevant anti-corruption legislation. The importance of 
enrolling relevant actors, such as the HR department, to the process of risk assessment becomes 
evident in the next quote: 
‘That’s really hard mostly because some factories are in places so remote without internet 
connection. We still try to get it up but the effort we put into it has been reduced because HR 
data is not the best for us. We do not have a list of the employees around. We spent a lot of 
time just to gather information and make sure that we have updated data on the employees; 
who they are, what’s their name, what is their e-mail.’ (Interview A4)  
Second, the ‘business’ is also enrolled to the anti-corruption function not because of the support it 
offers to compliance but because of the bribery risk it might represent. From being the spearhead of 
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an organization, the sales department, for example, takes the role of the main liable and responsible 
department for misbehavior.  
‘The sales department in companies is normally my first focus because they are the frontline 
and the ones bringing in contracts. So I try to help them understand the difference between 
giving gifts and sales’ (Interview 22) 
Enrollment of the ‘business’ refers here not just to the enlistment of relevant actors to the resources 
available to compliance officers but also to the process by which actors realize their role in anti-
corruption and how their decisions may lead to non-ethical behavior. This process requires shedding 
light on business practices and in so doing rendering corruption risks visible (Hansen, 2011). The 
next quote offers an indicative example of how such a translation and enrollment takes place in an 
organizational context. The example refers to a manager who is in the process of risk assessment 
wanting to gain the trust of his employees in order to make corruption risks visible in a specific area 
of the company’s operation: 
‘. . . he (the manager) had all his people in the room to talk about things and he sat there saying 
‘if you don’t tell what really happens how we are supposed help you fix this? So they really 
told everything and then you see the people get relieved because they’ve been working in an 
environment where the code of conduct says one thing and the manager says something else.’ 
(Interview A6) 
The interest of the interviewees initially was not to talk about the conditions they faced when 
performing their duties as employees. One may assume that this was because there is an assumption 
or even practice out there that MNCs and managers care only for profits without paying attention to 
ethics and the methods through which these profits are generated (Taylor, 2015). The compliance 
officer then needs to settle this misunderstanding by clarifying the relationship between the two parts 
and explicitly express that the corporation and the employees want the same thing; they share an 
interest. Indeed, Latour (1987, pp. 108–109), called this translation ‘I want what you want’, claiming 
that this is the first step towards enrolling actors in a project. 
Making corruption risks visible and framing a business practice as risky brings forth notions and 
expectations of actor responsibility and indeed self-responsibility (Power, 2007). That is to say that 
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bribery risk, from being an issue the compliance or anti-corruption department needs to deal with, 
becomes a problem in which many organizational actors need to be enrolled and activated if it is to 
be mitigated. In fact, the closer an organizational unit is to business practices, the more responsibility 
seems to be expected from that unit: 
‘So instead of us (compliance department) sitting and being the ones that really push the 
process, it needs to be our colleagues and partners pushing because they are the first line of 
action and defense.’ (Interview A3) 
Likewise, in the below quote, a compliance officer verifies that such notions of responsibility come 
up quite early in the process of risk assessment and enrollment: 
‘And I think some people feel the same way. They have done nothing wrong in their entire life and 
they are like ohh it’s compliance…I wonder…no I better not say.’ (Interview A4) 
To sum up, enrolment as a translation has two distinct but related functions. First, enrolment refers 
to the enlistment of those corporate bodies and actors as resources to the anti-corruption function. In 
this sense, what is translated is the role of such actors and bodies as resources necessary for the 
achievement of anti-corruption or compliance function. Corporate actors become the ‘vehicles’ by 
which anti-corruption is mediated across the organization (Latour, 2005). Second, enrolment refers 
to the process by which these ‘vehicles’ realize anti-corruption as their own responsibility. This is 
achieved through making corruption risks visible and in particular in the realization on behalf of these 
actors that these risks pertain to their own actions and ways of doing business. In so doing, anti-
corruption becomes each and every actor’s ethical responsibility. 
5.3 Strategy 2- interfering with business  
Strategy 2 refers to the process by which compliance officers interfere with established and 
potentially risky ways of doing business by translating business practices to an ethically acceptable 
and less risky form. An indicative business practice in which misconduct is likely to take place is the 
area of ‘entertainment expenses’ (Cai et al., 2011). These costs occur as part of the socialization 
process between business partners interested in doing business with each other and include money 
spent for gift-giving, lodging, transportation, meals, or other events. Their purpose is to facilitate the 
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conduct of business between new partners. However, these activities may be considered as bribery 
since not only in certain settings they are expected or even requested but also the amounts of money 
spent may be excessive or aimed at gaining an improper advantage over competitors.  
‘Sometimes the sales people find the excuse that they have to pay for entertainment because 
otherwise they will lose the business. They seem to think the company’s benefits but actually 
this practice is a risk for the company.’ (Interview 22) 
In order to stop and prevent such practices compliance officer are required to gain a thorough 
understanding of the business practice at hand is needed. Understanding business practices allows the 
compliance officer to ‘hear’ more than what is said or in other words to decrypt what his colleagues 
actually say to him during risk assessment interviews. In the below quote a compliance officer gives 
an example of how he translates the feedback he gets when interviewing colleagues from the sales 
department. Note that the interviewee used the concept of translation without any reference from my 
side to it:  
‘Bribery is forbidden. Of course, who would bribe? I would never bribe but take care of my customer? 
Of course I would. Take care of by paying a kickback, by giving a good gift, by taking my customer 
to a spa and giving him two bottles of expensive wine. Those are all taking care of the customer and 
have nothing to do with bribery … That’s what I mean by saying that you got to translate the concept 
of bribery or corruption into everyday behavior that people, especially sales people, marketing people 
can relate to … you can try to influence but based on the merits of our goods and services and not by 
offering goodies. That’s how you translate.’ (Interview A25)  
It is the compliance officer who translates here what his colleagues mean by ‘taking care of’ 
customers and point out that if this means any kind of bribery then such behavior poses a corruption 
risk for the company. In our example, the interviewer first reveals and then discards the common 
practice of ‘taking care of customers’ that his colleague from the sales department has been using. 
Then he offers a new translation of how business should be conducted according to anti-corruption 
rules. As mentioned earlier, neither compliance nor anti-corruption are default processes or functions 
in a production line; they need to interfere with standard procedures and practices if they are to have 
an effect. Interference takes place in different forms and depend on the situation at hand:  
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‘Do you really want to handle that type of situation (bribery risk)? You can spend more time 
to dig out the real value of your services or product. Otherwise, it means that sales do not fully 
understand the needs of the customer. As a good sales department you need to really help your 
customer through the product you sell and not by putting yourself to a precarious and 
dangerous situation because you offered a bribe.’ (Interview A22) 
Sometimes, as the above quote shows, the interference takes the form of a clarification of what a 
proper practice of sales entails as opposed to established practices that may be prone to corruption 
risks. Compliance officers do so by reminding on the one hand how the practice of sales is about and 
the potential consequences on personal and collective level misconduct may lead to. In other cases, 
more organizational forms of interference and translation are preferred so to make sure that all 
employees abide by the rules: 
‘The management team has approved an internal gift shop and put it in the policy … instead 
of you buying something by yourself for the business partner or for the officials, you buy a 
gift from this gift-shop. You order it and your manager knows and approves it. Both from 
procedural-wise and substantial-wise points of view, I think the risk of corruption is 
significantly decreased.’ (Interview A23) 
What is actually translated here is the established way of doing business with customers by 
introducing a new system which requires employees to play by the anti-corruption rules applied by 
and to the company. In other words, by introducing new systems and logics of self-responsibility and 
liability, compliance officers put themselves between their colleagues at the sales department and the 
ways they might have been used to do business with the customers in an effort to interest the former 
in altering his or her business practices. Indeed, interesting an actor B requires actor A to weaken the 
links between B and other actors (Callon, 1984). 
It is the offer of a new translation and alternative which actually realizes the interference with 
established ways of doing business. Otherwise, anti-corruption and compliance would simply remain 
at the level of recommendations and suggestions. To interfere thus means also to offer a new and 
improved way of doing business and to convince others that this is what is expected. Indeed, as 
another interview highlights, employees lack options and not a sense of responsibility: 
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‘They (employees) probably do know what is right and wrong but maybe not in every detail 
and maybe they don't have ways to handle it. We are trying to not just illustrate a bad situation, 
what you can do and get out of it … call your manager, do not accept it, try to find an 
explanation to why you do not accept it.’ (Interview A20) 
Even when no wrongdoing has been done, individuals start to question their own actions based on 
the compliance framework even if that framework is not clear to him or her:  
‘If I invite someone for a meeting they can be like oh someone from compliance is inviting 
me to a meeting … what have I done and I’m like ‘you haven’t done anything’. That’s part of 
the job.’ (Interview A3) 
Although feeling ‘nervous’ does point to a process of early self-assessment which requires the subject 
to be interested and re-evaluate his or her own business practices it should not be necessarily 
attributed to a convergence of interests alone. As Law argues (1986), interessement or interesting an 
actor may happen through the convergence of interests but also through a variety of means both 
physical and psychological. We cannot therefore exclude that other factors may be crucial to the 
success of compliance officers in their objective to establish anti-corruption in business practices. 
To sum up, it is a part of the compliance officer profession to get between their colleagues and the 
ways they do business. Interessement involves attracting one entity by interfering between that entity 
and a third (Law, 1986, p. 71). Indeed, we have seen above how this interference may take place in 
individual or organizational level. Individually compliance officers listen carefully how their 
colleagues perform their business and if necessary they discard them as risky. At the same time they 
offer a new of way of performing these practices in an ethically and commercial acceptable way. In 
the organizational level, compliance officers, interfere with standard business practices by 
introducing new systems which limit the discretion of employees in their interaction with business 
partners. These systems are built and designed so as to follow national, international, and corporate 
rules regarding anti-corruption and how the company should make conduct. 
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5.4 Strategy 3 –narrowing down anti-corruption to compliance  
Strategy 3 concerns the equation and translation of a major problem to a more manageable one for 
which a solution is more likely to be found. According to compliance officers, bribery risk cannot be 
adequately managed. This is because either as a personal choice and behavior or as a broader 
phenomenon, corruption is a challenging problem due to its peculiar nature. Indeed, as scholars have 
argued, the nature of corruption as a social problem makes it unlikely that measures will be effective 
enough to eliminate it (Getz, 2006; Nadelmann, 1990). The below quote comes from a compliance 
officer who shares such a view about corruption. In order not to self-discriminate, he used the 
metaphor of polluted air to simulate how he explained the issue at stake to his or her senior 
management during a risk assessment process:  
‘I cannot promise anyone that we will be error-free in our operations. What I can demonstrate 
is, first of all, let’s all agree that the air quality is terrible. Do we all agree or not? If you agree, 
then let’s say, what do we need to do to make sure we have healthy air? Well, you can have 
windows and doors, all those things. That’s like your framework. That’s like your system 
controls. You can make sure that on a bad day, in most cases, you make all your employees 
aware that we have masks downstairs in the reception area that we encourage you to use. On 
some days maybe we will require that you come and get a mask. On any day, you can go get 
a mask. I'll make sure that we have an air purifier in the office. In other words, the safest way 
to mitigate the risk of polluted air is to get out of here. Don’t do business here. That's the 
safest. If you decide to stay here and do business, I want to make sure your doors and windows 
are well insulated, that you have masks, that you have air purifier. Beyond that, I can’t do any 
more.” (A25) 
In this long quote, three points are of interest to us and these three points form the translation of 
problematization. The first point is that there is a major problem of corruption or air pollution as the 
interviewee put it. In this sense, this first point is similar with translation 1 in that it brings forth a 
problem or risk. The second point is the realization and communication that not much can be done to 
mitigate such a problem. Pollution or corruption requires much more than the will and efforts of a 
single company no matter how large it is. Therefore, a solution by interference to the business practice 
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itself may not be completely efficient. As a result, the third point refers to the suggested solution or 
translation of anti-corruption in the form of compliance with certain rules and procedures.  
Compliance officers draw a clear line between what can be realistically done on behalf of his 
company and what is not possible. With regards to the latter, he is quite clear in arguing for corruption 
as an institutional problem which is unlikely to be countered or avoided by a single company. There 
is no measure which will ensure a risk-free operation. As another compliance officer put the same 
issue regarding the company’s exposure to risks: 
‘We have risks in all areas. We have programmatic risks of accidentally doing harm with the 
programs that we run. We have safety risks and legal or compliance risks because we work in 
countries where law and order is not very transparent and can change quite rapidly. Then 
financial risks because we operate in many currencies with many different banking systems 
with large amounts of funds so a lot of risks there too’. (Interview A5) 
Regarding the point on what is possible to be done to mitigate such risks including corruption, 
compliance officers suggests a number of tools which aim to reduce but not eliminate the company’s 
exposure to the risk.  
‘I always talk with the senior management team and explain that I cannot change everyone. I 
cannot stop the sales from doing something bad. What I can do is to make the sales people 
think before they try to bribe by training and talking to them about our code of conduct’ 
(Interview 22) 
Thus, there are two kinds of challenges MNCs face; first, there is the risk of corruption the company 
has to face in its operation. As we seen above these risks relate to institutional or individual factors 
on which a company may have limited influence. Second, there is also the risk of punishment because 
of violation of anti-corruption legislation. The two risks overlap to a great extent but it is the latter 
challenge that compliance officers offer a solution to if the company is to address the first challenge 
as well.  
‘Anti-corruption usually referred as compliance. This can been seen from different angles. 
Compliance can be many things but usually compliance is seen as standing on two pillars. 
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One pillar being ethics and another pillar being regulations. Anti-corruption is just a set of 
measurements and a set of controls to actually make sure the company is staying compliant. 
Both legally and ethically compliant.’ (Interview A8) 
Compliance also presents a risk since no one can guarantee it 100%, but in contrast with corruption 
risk it offers some advantages. First, there are already incentives out there and a prescribed toolset 
and recipe by authorities and other institutional actors for enhancing corporate compliance (ISO, 
2014; Ministry of Justice, 2011; U.S. DOJ & U.S. SEC, 2012; UNDOC, 2013). According to such 
guidance, a robust compliance system requires the senior management’s commitment, risk 
assessment, training and communication, due diligence, and monitoring and review of the whole 
function. Second, while curbing corruption requires the willingness and cooperation of a variety of 
institutional actors let alone political, compliance requires only the willingness of a company. Third, 
anti-corruption compliance has been shown to be a business case with which companies can benefit 
both in terms of reputation and competiveness (Biskup, 2014; Gottschalk, 2011; Nichols, 2012). In 
other words, compliance risk is much narrower a problem than corruption because it is confined 
within the organization, supported by institutional actors, and is more manageable than corruption 
risk.  
Gabel et al. (2009) points out, that while legislation such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 stresses 
the importance of legal compliance and ethics in an organization’s operation, the latter is rarely, if 
ever, taken into consideration by authorities when judging corporate cases of misbehavior. Other 
scholars have also concluded that legislation has failed to inspire or even impose a minimum respect 
on the ‘spirit of the law’ (Cragg & Woof, 2002; Weismann, 2009).  This lack of emphasis on the 
ethical management of corruption leaves no other choice to compliance officers but to focus on its 
legal management, namely compliance with rules and regulations that at least prevent criminal 
liabilities. Indeed, as the following interviewee stated, compliance resembles a skill and therefore 
something that can be diffused in the organization through training: 
‘Compliance is basically a skill to ensure that you are in compliance with whatever kind of 
legislation, internal procedures, external expectations, and norms that are put in you as a 
company. So the skill of ensuring that you are in compliance with all that is the compliance 
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element and if you are not familiar with it, we are going to teach you what it means.’ 
(Interview A2) 
In contrast, as the next quote shows, anti-corruption used to be thought as a broad corporate 
responsibility based more or less on normative and voluntary initiatives left to the judgment of each 
company and actor: 
‘Before 2010, anti-corruption was part of the CSR agenda. We had to behave and we should 
not pay bribes and stuff like that. It was kind of as if we should not bully each other, we should 
not harass, we should not pollute. Later it became imperative because we could be fined, or 
lose our license to operate in the UK. So business managers saw that there was a consequence 
or possibility of consequence when not being responsible.’ (Interview A7) 
Translating corruption risk to mere compliance is not just a practical solution or a necessity imposed 
from external forces. It also shapes the relationship between the company and its members. Indeed, 
when compliance officers talk compliance, they mean the employees’ compliance with the 
company’s rules, policies, and regulations and not with external regulation:  
‘We have the rules and we have the preaching of those rules. We always talk about our code 
of conduct rules as rules within the company. So if you breach something and if you 
potentially could be fired for something is because you breached the code of conduct and not 
the FCPA’. (Interview A3) 
A relevant example for the above position is the Code of Conduct (CoC), compliance’s master 
codebook. A tailored CoC contains the ethical principles, values, corporate rules and policies, and 
consequences in case of breach, of an organization (Consultive Committee of Accountancy Bodies, 
2014). Adherence to the CoC means acceptance of corporate compliance; the point here is that 
compliance derives from the author and issuer of the CoC, in other words the compliance department 
and senior management respectively delimiting thus anti-corruption to corporate boundaries. 
‘We have a small handbook, the code of business; it says that we can no longer go to a strip-clubs 
as long as we work for this company. You can do it privately but you cannot take customers or 
suppliers. We will not be associated with that (…) is it legally required? No this has been decided 
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by the management (…) it is not really illegal per se but it’s something we will not be associated 
with.’ (Interview A4) 
6. Conclusion and discussion 
In this study, I argued for closer and more focused attention on corporate anti-corruption as an 
organizational function and not just a norm. In order to do so, I employed an approach inspired by 
Actor-network theory and in particular its inherent sociology of translations. An ANT approach takes 
departure not in anti-corruption itself but in the translations between actors leading (or not) to such a 
construction. As a result, internal workings and organizing come to the fore, allowing an appreciation 
of the political role of corporations with regards to their members. The findings include three 
strategies compliance and anti-corruption experts use to integrate anti-corruption into business 
practices. The first strategy refers to the enrollment of relevant actors to anti-corruption by making 
visible their business practices and therefore responsibility. The second strategy refers to the 
interference of anti-corruption with these practices, and in the third strategy, anti-corruption and 
responsibility are narrowed down to corporate compliance, a risk that is much narrower and more 
manageable.  
Such findings have implications for our understanding of the political role of corporations; first, they 
substantiate the claim that corporations play a political role by showing that MNCs can be political 
in their own right and organization. This role is not exhausted or limited to inter-organizational 
relations but rather it develops and gets established within organizations. Although each and every 
translation utilized in corporate anti-corruption has its each own meaning and importance, for this 
paper of importance is rather what these strategies do as a whole and with regards to the sociopolitical 
role of corporations. Anti-corruption, an aspect of the sociopolitical role of MNCs, can be understood 
as the result and not the cause of further actions. If anti-corruption is the end result, then the 
sociopolitical role of corporations can be an internal function and in this sense its dynamics may shed 
light in similar cases pertaining to the social role of corporations such as data protection, 
sustainability, and human rights (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011).  
As a result, the political element is to be found not in the reaction of corporations to external 
expectations (Getz, 2006; Gond et al., 2011; Moon et al., 2006; Scherer et al., 2016), but to the 
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expectation of the company towards its members to act in a certain and compliant way. Such 
expectation comes close to Crane, Matten and Moon’s (2008) work on corporate citizenship and in 
particular in their metaphor of ‘stakeholders as citizens’. In their words (Moon et al., 2006, p. 90), 
‘corporate citizenship … envisages circumstances whereby corporate activity itself can shape 
opportunities for corporations’ stakeholders to act as if they were citizens in relation to the 
corporation’. Indeed, establishing a compliance function in a company is shaping opportunities for 
employees to act as if they were citizens, since what is expected is compliance with corporate rules. 
This paper’s claim, however, differs in that it is interested in the construction of these ‘citizenship 
arenas’ (Whelan & Moon, 2017) and not their effect once constructed, and in addition, it situates 
these arenas within the corporation since it refers to the establishment of a compliance relationship 
between the corporation and its own members. In this sense, corporate politics are ‘smaller’ in scale, 
delimited in range, yet equally powerful through bonds (or translations) between corporate members. 
In this case, the relationship between business and politics takes the asymmetrical but still well-
matched form of ‘politics within businesses’, an area worthy of exploration in my opinion.  
Second, by showing that anti-corruption, a policy aiming at addressing a social problem, is translated 
to compliance, a corporate strategy and objective, emphasizes that responsibility moves from social 
to corporate objectives such as compliance with the ‘letter’ but not the ‘spirit’ of the law. According 
to scholars concerned with corporate behavior, MNCs have gained enormous economic and political 
power which allows them to compete with governments in terms of capabilities (Fuchs, 2007). 
Likewise, other scholars have emphasized the voluntary willingness of MNCs to take on or contribute 
to the solution of social issues caused by globalization  (Scherer et al., 2016). Yet the findings of this 
paper show that this might not be the case; MNCs either cannot or do not want to fight corruption as 
a broad social problem. In contrast, with the help of compliance officers, corporations ‘appropriate’ 
anti-corruption to their own will or capacity as compliance. 
On the limitations of this study, at least two further points are worth mentioning. First, and as others 
have also discussed, an increased focus on human agency causes a collapse of ANT’s social and 
natural world (Whittle & Spicer, 2008). As a result, an ANT informed reader will definitely have 
reasonable questions and objections. However, my intention was not to contribute to ANT studies but 
rather to approach the topic of anti-corruption through a different lens. I hope that for the time being 
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such an attempt will compensate for such limitations. Second, this study was based on the views of 
particular actors with particular mentalities (Miller & Rose, 2008; Rose & Miller, 2010). As a result, 
one might criticize it as one-sided or biased. To some extent, I also agree with such criticisms, yet 
this study should be read and understood as an ongoing study on anti-corruption and not as a definite 
answer to a specific question. Future studies should shed light to other human and non-human aspects 
of anti-corruption. For example, what is the role of materials and technology in general in the 
establishment of a corruption function and how do they influence its effectiveness and reach? 
Likewise, although compliance officers and top-management are certainly focal in the establishment 
of anti-corruption in companies, what about those who are being called to practice anti-corruption in 
their daily professional routine?  
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Paper 2: Anti-corruption and its inherent tension: When rationalities of self-responsibility 
meet business identities  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
While anti-corruption and its proliferation in multinational companies has been attracting the 
attention of academics for more than two decades, little attention has been paid to the practitioners 
who actually realize such a function and in particular to how anti-corruption is thought of by 
compliance officers in corporations. In this paper, I seek to challenge the traditional understandings 
of anti-corruption as compliance, business ethics, and risk management, and by building on 
governmentality studies and interview data collected from compliance officers, I seek to reconstruct 
the strategy or logic of anti-corruption. I found that anti-corruption entails rationalities of self-
responsibility promoted by compliance officers who consider themselves as business advisors. The 
combination of the latter two elements of anti-corruption implies a blurry orientation in which one 
element contradicts the other. In particular, the rationality of self-responsibility sides well with the 
consideration of anti-corruption as compliance and business ethics because it seeks to eliminate 
(ideally) corruption proactively and reactively. It contradicts, however, risk management since the 
latter is based on collective responsibility. In contrast, the practice of anti-corruption by compliance 
officers who consider themselves as business advisors is closer to the risk management program since 
its goal is to collectively manage and organize anti-corruption instead of eliminating it through 
judicial and ethical incentives advanced by the compliance and business ethics programs respectively. 
I suggest that this tension is caused by the inconclusiveness of practice and research regarding the 
causes of corruption.  
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1. Introduction 
Anti-corruption has been consolidated as one of the major challenges in globalization, attracting the 
attention and resources of both public and private actors alike (Hansen & Stachowicz-Stanusch, 2013; 
Hauser, 2018; Lambsdorff, 2009). As a result, corruption control measures have been introduced by 
authorities and increasingly implemented in multinational companies (MNC) with the objective of 
steering clear from corrupt practices deemed responsible for social and corporate costs (Jorge & 
Basch, 2013).  
Taking a departure from the above developments, scholars have employed a variety of reasonings as 
to how corruption should be curbed in organizations. Some, for instance, approach the employment 
of anti-corruption measures from a compliance perspective (Adelstein & Clegg, 2016; Bondy et al., 
2008; Gottschalk, 2011; Kaptein & Schwartz, 2007). These studies examine anti-corruption as a 
matter of rule imposition and analyze the effectiveness of Codes of Ethics and Codes of Conduct as 
a solution to the phenomenon of organizational corruption (Erwin, 2011; Kaptein, 2015). Others 
argue, however, that formal and authoritative structures provide insufficient corruption control and 
advance a principle-based perspective (Lambsdorff, 2009; Paine, 1994). For example, some studies 
show how the ethically exemplar behavior of corporate leadership contributes to the establishment of 
a culture of integrity as treatment of the disease of corruption (Amernic & Craig, 2013; Miska & 
Mendenhall, 2018; Pasricha, Singh & Verma, 2017; Sims, 2000). More recently, the proliferation of 
risk management principles in anti-corruption practice has drawn the attention of scholars who 
critically examine the effects of such a change, pointing out the merits and weaknesses of this 
approach (Hansen, 2011; Slager, 2017). As risk, anti-corruption addresses organizational corruption 
from a collective perspective but also becomes commercialized and instrumentalized, however, at the 
expense of morality. 
These studies have paid relatively little attention to those who actually implement anti-corruption in 
organizations and the ways they think about anti-corruption. Compliance officers are important in 
understanding anti-corruption because they are located in the focal and vantage position of integrating 
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abstract anti-corruption rules into everyday guidelines and practice. They are the ‘moral compass’ of 
modern corporations (Sampson, 2016), and in this capacity their objective and duty ‘is to ensure there 
are adequate internal procedures and processes to drive integrity and ethical conduct throughout the 
organization’ (Gottschalk, 2011, p. 64). Indeed, compliance officers report compliance related issues 
to the executive management as the ‘ethical watchdogs of their companies’ (Sampson, 2016, p. 72), 
‘encourage employees to do the right thing’ (Sampson, 2016, p. 72), and utilize risk management to 
locate and prioritize corruption risks (Hardy & Maguire, 2016; Power, 2007). 
I employ a government analytics approach (Dean, 2010) to understand how anti-corruption is thought 
of in corporations. Government analytics build on governmentality studies where the study of 
government is no less than the study of ‘regimes of practices’ as the organized and routinized ways 
of doing and thinking about government. As such, regimes of practices belong to the level of thought 
as a collective product not of the mind but of the explicit available knowledge and expertise people 
draw upon when they talk about governing. What is emphasized here is how ‘mentalities of 
government’ (Rose & Miller, 1992) are embedded in language and technologies of government 
usually taken for granted and thus not problematised by practitioners (Dean, 2010). To analyze a 
regime of practices therefore requires its identification as a field of governance, to examine its 
technical and rational dimensions as well as the identities formed within it, and problematize it against 
the bodies of knowledge it rests on. The understanding of such an assemblage of elements as 
intentional but non-subjective leads eventually to the construction of the logic or strategy of 
government (Gordon, 1980). 
The paper contributes to anti-corruption literature by examining and problematizing the concept of 
anti-corruption for its robustness. Usually perceived as a unified set of controls with a single aim, this 
paper shows that not only does anti-corruption consist of different modes of thought but that these 
thoughts may point towards different orientations. In particular, anti-corruption as informed by 
compliance and business ethics programs, prioritizes self-responsibility as the reactive and proactive 
objective that will lead to the elimination of the problem of organizational corruption. In contrast, 
risk management rather seeks to organize and manage anti-corruption by acknowledging the role of 
individuals but at the same time elevating the responsibility to counter corruption on the 
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organizational and collective levels. This tension in anti-corruption, I suggest, reflects our 
inconclusive knowledge on corruption’s peculiar nature. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section two, I briefly examine anti-corruption from the compliance, 
business ethics, and risk management perspectives, arguing that these reforming programmes 
represent ways of thinking regarding anti-corruption. In section three, I discuss Dean’s (2010) 
government analytics, its conceptual origins, and I elaborate on the theoretical framework’s main 
concepts. Section three concerns the methodology and methods employed, and in section four, I 
present the analysis in three subchapters, namely: making anti-corruption visible; rationalizing anti-
corruption as self-responsibility; and the formation of the business advisor identity. I conclude in 
section five by discussing the strategy of anti-corruption and in particular how programs of 
compliance and business ethics on the one hand and risk management on the other lead to different 
orientations of the anti-corruption regime of practices.  
2. Anti-corruption programs 
Below I briefly review and discuss the literature on anti-corruption by focusing on three major 
approaches by which it has been practiced and analyzed, namely compliance, business ethics, and 
risk management. These approaches appear both in the academic literature and the professional 
practice of anti-corruption in organizations (Adelstein & Clegg, 2016; Bromiley et al., 2014; Nygaard 
et al., 2017). A major part of this paper’s objective is to show that what people think about anti-
corruption is shaped both from practice and theory without, however, giving priority to either. Each 
approach promises effectiveness in curbing corruption or more broadly unethical behavior in 
corporations, and their influence in corruption control is depicted in anti-corruption mechanisms such 
as risk assessments, training, and codes of conduct. This is not to say, however, that the three 
approaches are alike: compliance prioritizes an authoritative rule-based system to control individual 
behavior; business ethics seek to proactively predict and correct individual behavior by diffusing an 
ethical culture in the organization; and risk management borrows elements from both approaches in 
that it recognizes that individual behavior plays a role in curbing corruption but promotes a collective 
and organizational response to this challenge. Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) for example 
suggests ‘the integration of all risks to an organisation’s objective in a portfolio to inform 
organisational strategy’(Schiller & Prpich, 2014, p. 999) . I conclude the paper by arguing that the 
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three approaches informing anti-corruption require further examination as to their underlying logic 
or strategy which ultimately allows them to co-exist in corruption control programs. 
 
 
Compliance 
Anti-corruption as compliance refers to the top-down imposition of rules aimed at regulating and 
controlling employee behavior (Gottschalk, 2011). Compliance’s function resembles a legalistic 
system whereby an authority regulates a field of activity with a set of written rules. These rules are 
supported by guidelines on their implementation as well as enforcement mechanisms and punishment 
measures in case of misbehavior. Compliance is based on rational choice theory in which individuals 
are considered as rational actors seeking to maximize their utility by calculating the costs and benefits 
of their prospective action (Kaufman, 1999). If the benefits from misbehavior are more than the costs 
then the individual will act so. Compliance thus tries on the one hand to increase the costs associated 
with corrupt practices, and on the other hand to increase the benefits for compliant behavior, although 
the latter is less common than the former. A good and paradigmatic example of how compliance is 
supposed to work in corporations is governmental legislation. The UK Bribery Act of 2010, for 
instance, makes it an offence for individuals to offer and receive bribes, as well as for companies to 
avoid using ‘adequate measures’ to prevent corrupt practices (Yeoh, 2012). With its extra-territorial 
authority, the UK Bribery Act can be applied by British authorities to cases of misconduct which 
occurred outside of the UK, and as the recent corruption case of Rolls Royce showed, companies face 
financial as well as reputational costs (Rose, 2012).  
At the organizational level, compliance requires the development of a skillset comprised of a 
dedicated leadership, design and communication of anti-corruption policy, consistent enforcement of 
that policy, as well as reporting and monitoring systems (Freeman, MCP & MCT, 2007). In effect, 
the role of governmental legislation is supplemented by corporate Codes of Conduct (CoC), 
compliance’s instrument of rule enforcement (Healy & Iles, 2002; Schwartz, 2001, 2004), and 
employee behavior shaping (Singh, 2011; Stevens, 2008). The CoC works as a filter through which 
the relevant regulatory framework under which a company operates is translated and integrated into 
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the business as basic guidelines that govern daily operation (Adelstein & Clegg, 2016). It is prescribed 
as a communicative tool of a corporation’s or organization’s dedication to anti-corruption internally 
and externally, and contains the ethical principles, values, corporate rules and policies of an 
organization (and consequences in case of breach) (Kaptein, 2004). CoC contain information on how 
employees should behave should they find themselves in a situation in which bribes are requested, 
for instance. Likewise, CoCs can contain guidelines on employee behavior regarding entertainment 
costs such as dining, gift-giving, and accommodation of business and third party partners. The 
underlying logic of compliance is that the more and better implemented and communicated are the 
rules, the less the possibility for corrupt practices to occur in the company (Verhezen, 2010). Having 
said that, the successful implementation of a CoC rests to a great extent to the determination of 
corporate leadership to impose anti-corruption rules in the organization even under the threat of 
sanctions (Stevens, 2008).  
Business ethics 
However, it has been argued by scholars that the rule-based top-down compliance is not adequate to 
strengthen anti-corruption in companies (David-Barrett, Yakis-Douglas, Moss-Cowan & Nguyen, 
2017; Nygaard, Biong, Silkoset & Kidwell, 2017; Webley & Werner, 2008). Scholars of business 
ethics, for example, advance a principle-based reasoning of anti-corruption aiming at proactively 
predicting and controlling employee behavior (Weaver & Treviño, 1999). In theory, business ethics 
refer to ‘the interaction of ethics and business’ (De George, 1987, p. 204), which practically means 
how moral standards apply to individual or corporate policies and behavior regarding business 
(Goodpaster, 1996; Velasquez, 2014). In this line of thought, Adler and Borys (1996) maintain that 
employees will behave in a predicted way only if they can identify with the organization’s goals. 
Indeed, as studies have shown, if the culture of a corporation is perceived as ethical, it is more likely 
that employees will follow, rendering the need for coercive means of rule imposition irrelevant 
(Goebel & Weißenberger, 2017; Integrity, 1994; Nygaard et al.). Consequently, anti-corruption is 
presented here as a norm and culture that can be diffused in an organization and infused to its 
members, thereby shaping their behavior. Nevertheless, while it can be difficult to empirically prove 
that a culture of anti-corruption exists in any given company, the comment of Uwe Dolata, 
representative of the association of federal criminal investigators in Germany concerning Siemens 
172 
 
and its well-publicized corruption case that ‘Siemens had institutionalized corruption’ tends to give 
credit to such a claim (Schubert & Miller, 2008).  
According to scholars concerned with business ethics, an ethical organizational culture is diffused by 
the ethical and exemplar behavior of corporate leadership (Levine & Boaks, 2014; Minkes, Small & 
Chatterjee, 1999; Toor & Ofori, 2009), also known as the ‘tone from the top’. Moreover, Paine (1994) 
argues that business ethics and compliance overlap since they more often than not use the same 
mechanisms and procedures; but business ethics are deeper, broader, and more demanding initiatives 
because they require ethos, responsibility, and active effort as opposed to rules, enforcement, and 
punishments. Most importantly, Paine (1994) continues, business ethics is ‘the work of the 
management’ (p. 111). Indeed, much of the literature on business ethics have sought to study the 
relationship, influence, and importance of leadership in establishing an ethical culture in corporations 
(Minkes et al.; Nygaard et al., 2017; Pasricha et al., 2017; Schaubroeck et al., 2012; Sims, 2000; 
Thomas, Schermerhorn & Dienhart, 2004; Toor & Ofori, 2009). Ardichvili, Mitchell and Jondle 
(2009), for instance, argued that the effectiveness of leadership is one out of the five characteristics 
of ethical corporate cultures. In another study, Grojean, Resick, Dickson and Smith  (2004) suggest 
seven different ways leadership influences organizational culture. One can side with Schwartz (2013) 
then, who argues that strengthening ethical, or in our case anti-corruption, behavior in companies 
requires a set of values, a set of mechanisms, and an ethically exemplary management all three 
reinforcing one another.  
Business ethics and compliance approaches to anti-corruption match with regards to the attributed 
importance of the ‘top’ for effectiveness. But while for compliance, leadership is important for its 
legitimacy and authority to impose rules, for business ethics, leadership is important in promoting an 
ethical culture where coercive means are effectively complemented but conceptually replaced by the 
training of employees on ethical behavior (Ferrell, LeClair & Ferrell, 1998; Palmer & Zakhem, 2001; 
Ruiz, Martinez, Rodrigo & Diaz, 2015; Verma, Mohapatra & Löwstedt, 2016). In a study of 200 
business professionals, Hauser (2018), found evidence that anti-corruption training increases the 
likelihood of rejecting the rationalization of corruption. Indeed, other scholars have also found a 
positive correlation between training and an ethical corporate culture in organizations (Arthur, 
Bennett, Edens & Bell, 2003; Ruiz et al.; Warren, Gaspar & Laufer, 2014). Anti-corruption training 
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may be offered under different schemes, depending on the learning objectives and the setup of the 
organization (Biegelman & Biegelman, 2010). Managers or employees, for example, who face 
increased risk of misbehavior, require face to face methods as these have been considered more 
effective since they allow interaction in real time. When, however, the objective is to increase 
awareness to as many employees around the world as possible, e-learning methods may be more 
appropriate (Biegelman & Biegelman, 2008). 
Risk management 
In recent years, more and more companies approach anti-corruption as a risk. Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM) for example, has dominated the risk management market during the last 15 years 
as ‘a holistic approach for assessing and evaluating the risks that an organization faces’ by allowing 
the integration of all risks faced by a company into a single platform where they can be collectively 
managed (Arena, Arnaboldi & Azzone, 2010, p. 659; Bromiley, McShane, Nair & Rustambekov, 
2014). Garland (2003, p. 18) points out that a risk approach differs from ‘traditional forms of moral 
and judicial reasoning’ because it borrows and combines elements from the compliance and business 
ethics approaches. Risk management neither seeks to punish the misbehavior of individuals as a 
compliance approach implies, nor does it expect individuals to abide by the same ethical norms as a 
business ethics approach advances. Rather, it refers to a more complex understanding of social reality 
and rests on the premise that since individual actions can have an impact on many, then the 
responsibility is shared and risks can be managed collectively (Garland, 2003). Indeed, corporations 
are extremely complicated social and economic structures and their ability to expand across borders 
employing thousands of employees with different cultural backgrounds and ambitions only adds to 
their complexity. A risk management approach to anti-corruption therefore comes as an answer to 
this complexity by acknowledging the role of individuals in corruption, while at the same time 
elevating the responsibility to counter and manage it on the collective level.  
According to Power (Power, 2004), there are two kinds of risks that corporations face − primary and 
secondary or reputational. The first refers to those risks caused by the default operation of 
corporations such as sustainability risks or hazards (Beck, 1992). The mining industry for example 
has been severely criticized for the environmental devastation their operation causes to the natural 
environment (Dashwood, 2012). The second refers to the risks constructed by corporations as a 
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defensive mechanism aiming at managing the changes caused by primary risks. Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), including anti-corruption, for example, has been argued to be such a mechanism 
devised to actually prevent governments from introducing regulations in areas of corporate activity 
(Eichar, 2017). Of course, risk assessments can locate primary risks such as geographical and 
functional dangers for corruption, but they can also initiate what Hardy and Maguire (2016) call a 
‘riskification’ process whereby anti-corruption becomes entrenched as the default way to talk about 
corruption. Once a business practice is framed as risky for corruption, its management or mitigation 
can begin (Hansen, 2011). In this sense, anti-corruption seems more like an ‘organized uncertainty’ 
(Power, 2007) since its discursive construction (Slager, 2017) allows it to be understood both as a 
risk to be managed and an opportunity as well (Andersen et al., 2014; Hansen, 2011). 
Compliance, business ethics, and risk management can be understood as programs informing the 
practice of anti-corruption. Despite their inherent differences as to their point of departure and focus 
on individual and collective responsibility, they do share one thing − they are forms of reasoning 
representing ways of thinking about how corruption should be curbed in organizations. However, 
these ‘deliberate and relatively systematic forms of thought that endeavour to transform’ the practice 
of anti-corruption do not exhaust its intelligibility (Dean, 2010, p. 32). This is to say that in order to 
better comprehend anti-corruption, an analysis and construction of its logic is required. In the 
following section, I discuss governmentality and the analytics of government as a way to construct 
the ‘intrinsic logic or strategy’ (Dean, 2009, p. 4) constituted by the interplay between programs of 
compliance, business ethics, and risk management, and the rationalities and identities of anti-
corruption.  
3. Governmentality and government analytics 
The paper draws on Dean’s (2010) government analytics and conceptualizes anti-corruption as a 
regime of practices. In so doing, it challenges the institutional and organizational robustness of anti-
corruption by focusing on the multiple technical and conceptual elements constitutive of anti-
corruption. Dean (2010) builds on Foucauldian studies of government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ 
(Foucault, 1991, 1995), shifting attention from a singular understanding of government as the 
exclusive activity of political authorities, to government as the exercise of power by a broad range of 
societal institutions and sites including schools, the church, professionals, and the family to name but 
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a few, aiming at shaping and cultivating the behavior of other actors towards certain directions 
(Garland, 1997). To study the government of anything thus means to understand it as a practice which 
includes more than hierarchical power relations of who rules, by what legitimacy and authority (Dean, 
2010). In this sense, governmentality is more than thorough descriptions of an event or practice and 
the exercise of power towards certain objectives. It means to be attentive to what constitutes the 
practice of government or what people think about governing, the knowledge that shapes their 
thoughts, the techniques employed, the identities of the governor and governed, as well as the spatial 
area where the above take place (Lemke, 2002; Rose, 2004).  
The study of anti-corruption in corporations then requires more than an inquiry on the exercise of 
anti-corruption rules through technologies or techniques of rule. If anti-corruption is a governing 
practice then it can be studied as an organized regime of practices composed by such techniques, 
rationalities, fields of government, and identities (Dean, 2010). Regimes of practices refer to the 
routinized ways of doing things in certain times and places as well as to the ways we think about 
those practices. They are informed by programs in the form of bodies of knowledge and expertise 
which shape and are being shaped by the practices of government (Gordon, 1980). Programs are 
‘deliberate and relatively systematic forms of thought that endeavour to transform those practices’ 
(Dean, 2010, p. 32). An analytics of government approach takes into consideration how regimes of 
practices and programs interplay by constructing through analysis the intrinsic logic or strategy of a 
certain regime of practices (Dean, 2010). Strategy or logic concerns the broad orientation towards 
ends of a regime of practices found on the non-subjective assemblage of all the aspects of a practice.  
The analytics of government is the analysis of the four aspects of governing namely the technologies, 
rationalities, identities, and fields of visibility, and their logic which ‘are necessary, somewhat 
autonomous and irreducible’ (Dean, 2010, p. 42). Technologies of government refer to the 
mechanisms by which government becomes possible (Miller & Rose, 2008) because they allow 
rationalities to be realized as certain desired outcomes and therefore assist in shaping and directing 
the conduct of people (Rose, 2004). Moreover, it is the use of technologies which highlights the 
capacity of the governor to act as an authority even ‘at a distance’ (Callon, Law & Rip, 1986, p. 10). 
In the case of anti-corruption, they may include training schemes, assessment procedures and indexes, 
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standardization systems, reporting and awarding/punishing devices, as well as a range of best 
practices such as compliance champions and contests to increase awareness.  
The government of anything, however, cannot be reduced to solely technical means. The analytics of 
government pay attention also to the dimension of rationalities understood as thoughts, expertise, 
knowledge, and strategies arise but also shape the practice of government (Dean, 2010). How people 
think about the practice of government is not a neutral process but implies a systematic way of 
reasoning. It is shaped by certain bodies of knowledge and expertise which in turn shape the practice 
of government as well (Rose, 2004). For example, thought about anti-corruption is shaped by the 
professional and academic expertise found in business related bodies of knowledge such as 
compliance, business ethics, risk management and so on. At the same time, thought produces its own 
expertise and knowledge. For example, performing bribery risk assessments informs the practice of 
government as to what the objectives of anti-corruption should be in a particular context.  
Dean suggests that, in addition to technologies and thoughts,  the analytics of government should 
include two more dimensions − self-identities, and fields of visibility − in their analysis. Government 
as the ‘conduct of conduct’ requires free people who can act and think and therefore may willingly 
participate in the government of others but also of themselves (Dean, 2010). In other words, humans 
can to some extent choose what thoughts and actions shape government. If that is the case, 
participation in government means that identities shape and are also being shaped. As we shall see in 
the analysis of anti-corruption in corporations, the identity of compliance officers has changed or is 
changing from ‘corporate cops’ and ‘promoters or salespeople’ of a particular way of doing business 
to entrusted business advisors.  
The remaining dimension pertains to the visibility of the area of government. This is to say, the 
analysis should capture how actors ‘see’ who and what is to be governed, where government should 
take place, what the problem is and of course the proposed solution (Rose & Miller, 1992). By 
‘seeing’ is not just meant a description of an area, place, or situation; rather it implies to locate and 
understand what is illuminated or obscured, who relates to whom and what and how these 
relationships play with each other (Dean, 2010). Therefore to render a practice of government visible 
is to analyze how it is perceived by those who think and act in this government. In this study, for 
example, anti-corruption is illuminated by the perceived need to protect the corporation through 
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compliance to anti-corruption rules. Light is also shed on what people do in a corporation, and who 
is responsible for what, but at the same time the broader social role of the corporation is obscured by 
that focus on the corporation. 
However, the analytics of government and the purpose of this article is not exhausted in the analysis 
of the programs shaping anti-corruption but also aims to constitute the ‘intrinsinc logic or strategy’ 
of the anti-corruption regime of practices. The logic or strategy differs from programs in that it is not 
the property of any actor engaged in the practice. Rather, it borrows elements from all dimensions of 
the practice to form a non-subjective rationality which is irreducible to its constituents. Where 
programs are employed to reform a regime of practices, its strategy seeks to make this reform 
purposive for some ends. These ends are not to be confused with the subjective objectives and 
intentions of the reforming programs. As Gordon (1980) quite nicely put it, ‘What is important is to 
avoid merging the concept of strategy into that of the programme by way of the image of the grand 
strategist and his plan’ (p. 251). This is why the strategy or logic of anti-corruption is not to be found 
in the analysis of reforming programs of compliance, business ethics, and risk management but rather 
to be constructed through the analysis of the interplay of  these programs and their operational non-
subjective rationality (Gordon, 1980).  
To sum up, anti-corruption is conceptualized as a regime of practices composed by technologies, 
rationalities, visibility, and identities which are shaped by programs of compliance, business ethics, 
and risk management. The objective of this study is to deconstruct anti-corruption as it is shaped by 
programs and in so doing to reconstruct through analysis the logic and strategy of anti-corruption. 
4. Methods and data analysis 
The purpose of the analysis was to understand and reconstruct how anti-corruption is thought of by 
compliance officers. I collected data through 21 interviews conducted with anti-corruption and 
corporate compliance experts during 2017 in Denmark and China (Table 1). The sample of experts 
consists of corporate officers and managers as well as anti-corruption and compliance consultants 
(Table 1). The two sources of interviews are complementary and helped me to acquire a more holistic 
view of the anti-corruption practice. Furthermore, Denmark and China were selected so the empirical 
data covers both the designing phase of corporate anti-corruption taking place in the headquarters but 
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also the implementation phase and initiatives in subsidiaries. Furthermore, changing countries and 
field mitigated the risk of ‘enmeshing’ the researcher in particular networks which may reinforce or 
silence other voices (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). Doing fieldwork in China, for example, and 
approaching non-Danish companies and individuals allowed me to ‘see’ anti-corruption from a non-
Danish and non-Western point of view.  
Fieldwork was based initially on snowballing but halfway through the process it started to become 
more purposive and targeted (Ritchie, Lewis & Elam, 2003). For instance, while I was seeking to 
interview CSR managers, it became clear after the very first meetings that at least in corporations, 
the people I should be interested in are compliance officers and managers. The criterion of selection 
was the self-proclaimed experience of the expert in anti-corruption either in corporations or in other 
private organizations. The interviewees were contacted through LinkedIn which was also helpful in 
determining their level of experience through their publicly available CVs. The average duration of 
interviews was 55 minutes and interviews were conducted in an open manner and with the help of an 
elaborate topic guide. Elaborate means that the topic guide contained the main topics the interview 
should ideally touch upon without, however, defining the interview’s development and structure 
which is built on the ‘communicative opening up’ of implicit stores of knowledge (Bogner & Menz, 
2009, p. 48). The interviewees were asked to discuss their duties and daily activities as professionals, 
their understanding of anti-corruption, and their broader role in the company or as consultants. In 
later stages, as my understanding and knowledge on the topic grew, I asked for more elaboration and 
details on the above themes. Once I had a clear view of the formal compliance network and function 
in companies, I became interested in getting data on informal practices including thoughts, actions, 
and sayings of anti-corruption experts. Some of the quotes used below highlighting and pointing to 
rationalities of self-responsibility, or the changing role of the compliance officer from a ‘corporate 
cop’ to a trusted business advisor for instance, were the outcome of those elaborations.  
In the analysis of the verbatim transcribed interviews, I followed the guidelines of the theory 
generating expert interview (Bogner & Menz, 2009). That is to say, the objective of the analysis was 
the production of ‘interpretive knowledge’ constructed only after it has been interpreted by the 
researcher. As Bogner and Menz (2009, p. 53) put it, ‘interpretative knowledge is always the result 
of an act of abstraction and systematization performed by the researcher, an “analytic construction”’. 
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The analytical process consists of six stages, namely transcription, paraphrasing, coding, thematic 
comparison, sociological conceptualization, and theoretical generalization (Meuser & Nagel, 2009) 
(Table 2).  
Following the transcription of the audio files, the data from each interview were paraphrased. Similar 
to the open coding process of grounded theory, paraphrasing played the role of an initial screening of 
data (Strauss, 1987). Each interview was scanned and thematized without altering either the original 
sequence of statements or terminology used by the respondents so to ‘avoid giving away reality’ 
(Meuser & Nagel, 2009, p. 35). Likewise, in preparation for the next phase of ‘coding’, the themes 
derived from the initial screening of the data were arranged thematically for each interview 
separately. 
Table 1: Interview sources 
Date Location Professional Title Assigned 
Interview No. 
Duration  
Winter 
2016/17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Denmark 
 
Consultant A16 60 min 
Consultant A18 32 min 
Compliance Officer A30 50 min 
Senior Compliance Director  A29 55 min 
Global Compliance Officer A9 30 min 
Spring/ 
Summer 
2017 
Consultant A7 54 min 
Senior Compliance Officer A2 44 min 
Consultant A6 67 min 
Compliance Officer A3 52 min 
Compliance Officer A4 66 min 
Compliance Counsel  A1 61 min 
Autumn 
2017 
 
Chief Compliance Officer A5 48 min 
Compliance Officer/Senior Technical 
Advisor 
A20 56 min 
 
 
 
 
China/ 
Beijing 
 
Legal Advisor A21 52 min 
Consultant A12 81 min 
Compliance Director A22 86 min 
Compliance Officer A24 77 min 
Winter 
2017/201
8 
Senior Director & Associate General 
Counsel 
A25 72 min 
Consultant A26 53 min 
Consultant A28 53 min 
Regional Compliance Director A27 54 min 
Total /Average min 21/55 min 
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Each theme was examined more carefully now and coded in a focused manner (Saldana, 2009). Once 
passages from each interview were arranged thematically and coded, the process of thematic 
comparison took place. From that point on, the analysis surpasses the single interview. Themes from 
different interviews were compared to form major and collective ‘second order’ themes which are 
supported by the codes produced in the previous phase. In this process of meaning condensation 
(Kvale, 1996), going back and forth from data to codes and, where needed revising some, was 
necessary. 
 
Table 2: The theory generating expert interview analysis process (Meuser & Nagel, 2009) 
In the phase of sociological conceptualization, the objective was to form categories based on the 
comparison of themes. These categories were reviewed and revised, bearing in mind theories that 
could be applied without, however, altering, if possible, the empirical terminology. For example, self-
responsibility was constructed as a main category following the comparison of a number of 
‘responsibility’ themes found in several interviews (Table 3). It became apparent at that moment that 
for anti-corruption to function, compliance officers assign different roles and expect different 
responsibilities to be fulfilled. These responsibilities may be as common as a general dedication 
against corruption but also as different as the roles of the executive management and sales agent. 
Likewise, the identity of compliance officers as trusted business advisors was constructed from a 
number of themes found in several interview passages specifically concerning the responsibility of 
compliance officers. As we have seen, compliance officers are responsible for ensuring anti-
Transcription
Paraphrasing/Thematizing
Coding/meaning
condensation
Thematic
comparison
Sociological
conceptualization
Theoretical
generalization
(Governmentality)
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corruption compliance, diffusing business ethics, and locating and mitigating risks. It is the latter that 
revealed a pattern by which compliance officers claim the role of business advisor since neither 
locating risks nor preaching ethics or compliance per se justifies their presence in business meetings. 
Rather, it is their claimed ability to offer business oriented solutions. 
 
Main constructed 
category 
Interview themes Indicative quotes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Self-responsibility 
Key stakeholders’ 
responsibility 
‘And in that sense when we talk about corporate 
environment and ethical standards a lot of time is the 
influence by its key stakeholders and especially the 
internal stakeholders.’ (Interview A12) 
 
Manager 
responsibility 
 
‘Also in the code of conduct it’s where you can find where 
your responsibility is, and where it’s your manager’s 
responsibility. Because they do have more responsibility 
and it is compliance 101 because if you see that the 
manager does not respect or abide by the code of conduct 
why should I do that. It is very important to get them on 
board and also get them to be proactive if there is one of 
their employees who is not abiding that they need to 
speak up.’ (Interview A3) 
 
Employee 
responsibility 
 
‘We also tell our employees in this way that it is their 
responsibility. It is their behavior that counts at the end of 
the day.’ (Interview A20) 
 
Company 
responsibility 
 
‘I guess no companies in Denmark would have an anti-
corruption compliance program because it is so much 
closely built into the Danish culture. But due to the fact 
that we are an export country then we need to live in an 
export world. We have to be aware of that and we have to 
take that responsibility as a global company.’ (Interview 
A7) 
 
Compliance officer 
responsibility 
 
‘It is our responsibility to ensure that they know what is 
the right way because not all our staff has a background to 
know this.’ (Interview A20) 
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Executive 
management 
responsibility 
 
‘And then like I said we do spent a lot of time on more 
what I call governance resource types discussions with 
senior executives to try and help them realize what it is 
they need to do.’ (Interview A6) 
Table 3: Indicative example of constructed category (self-responsibility) 
Finally, in the last phase of theoretical generalization, the findings and concepts are informed by a 
theoretical perspective, in this case governmentality and government analytics. In so doing, the 
reconstructive process is completed not only because of the findings in the forms of concepts but also 
because of their relationships, as these have been found but also informed by government analytics. 
In this study, for instance, the rationality of self-responsibility, along with the self-identity of trusted 
business advisor, and the field of corporate compliance relate to the mechanisms of anti-corruption 
and all together are constitutive of its strategy or logic. 
5. Analysis 
The current paper pertains to the analysis of the rationalities, technologies, identities and fields of 
visibility of anti-corruption as a regime of practices. While one can argue that anti-corruption 
government as compliance, business ethics, and risk management are about thought and therefore 
quite similar, their conceptual categorization is required in order to reconstruct the logic of anti-
corruption. Since the logic of a regime of practices is non-subjective, however, none of the below 
sections or even quotes should be read independently and cut off from each other. The section starts 
by setting the scene with an analysis of how anti-corruption becomes visible and therefore governable 
in corporations. It continues by presenting rationalities of self-responsibility and identities of trusted 
business advisor. The unearthing of these two elements of the anti-corruption regime of practices 
reveals a tension in anti-corruption’s logic in that the former element seeks to counter corruption with 
morality while the latter seeks to rather curb it with better organization and management. As I argue 
below this tension rests on the also contradictory reforming programs of compliance, business ethics, 
and risk management as well as on corruption’s rather peculiar nature. 
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Making anti-corruption visible  
Before anti-corruption compliance is governed it has to become visible to those who are supposed to 
govern it and also to those who will be governed by it (Dean, 2010), since being visible is necessary 
for governing anything (Rose, 1999). In other words, this section on visibility demarcates and delimits 
anti-corruption in several respects. For example, it makes clear that the application of anti-corruption 
refers to the corporation and its operation strictly. In this respect, visibility refers to the psysical 
borders of a corporation and what becomes visible to the people within these facilities.  
While it can be argued that senior management plays an important role in supporting anti-corruption 
with its expected exemplar behavior and dedication to the fight against it, it is compliance officers 
who actually bear the burden of making it visible across the organization. As a compliance manager 
put it:  
‘And they (compliance officers) go to the internal meetings and really sit down with the 
business people, be visible to the business people, get information and provide advice.’ 
(Interview A12) 
On the one hand, compliance officers have to be present and thus visible in corporate meetings to 
‘get information and provide advice’. Their presence in board meetings should send a message that 
anti-corruption is an important feature of the company’s operation. On the other hand, the subject of 
governance becomes also visible; the business people and in particular the way they implement (or 
not) anti-corruption and compliance principles when they perform their professional activities. 
However, the governance of anti-corruption does not take place only in board meetings. According 
to a compliance officer, it also includes the physical facilities and how these are being used to 
facilitate anti-corruption: 
‘I'd look around the physical facility and I look for signs of compliance efforts activities. Is 
my hotline posted in the employee lounge? In the easily accessible places, do people know 
who to call, where to call when they have a question?’ (Interview A25) 
This in turn relates to the fact that anti-corruption compliance has not always been a corporate ‘thing’ 
or a subject to governance. For instance, up until mid-1990s and with the excemption of the U.S, 
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corruption and in particular bribery of public officials by MNCs was considered an acceptable, and 
tax deductible, way of doing business (Hansen, 2012). As a result, and despite the fact that globally 
there has been much regulation, information, and access to advice and guidance, at the organizational 
level anti-corruption may still be a challenging endeavor. As one interviewee put it: 
‘They (employees) probably do know what is right and wrong but maybe not in every detail 
and maybe they don't have ways to handle it. We are trying, as a part of the training, to show 
them what they can do to get out of it’. (Interview A20) 
Governing anti-corruption in corporations therefore includes making it visible to the broader 
population of the organization through the use of its physical facilities but as the above quote shows, 
anti-corruption, just like corruption, is about people and how they behave. Much of the effort by 
practitioners then is focused on enabling channels of communication between those who demand 
information on anti-corruption and those who supply such expertise. A common way by which 
companies try to make anti-corruption compliance visible and mobilize their people towards getting 
informed is by introducing the institution of the ‘compliance champion’: 
‘For instance in China, we innovated with a new way to help our staff, which is to appoint a 
compliance champion. For each of our business units we appointed one person as a 
compliance champion…The key task for that is to have a local point approachable for any of 
our employees.’ (Interview 27) 
The ‘champions’ are regular employees of the company who have been trained in compliance. Their 
work is voluntary, meaning they neither get paid more nor do they get any other advantage for the 
extra work; they are trained and announced as compliance champions and their objective is to provide 
guidance and advice on anti-corruption and compliance issues to their colleagues when asked to do 
so. As a first point of contact, a compliance champion is supposed to provide advice and guidance to 
their colleagues on compliance matters. Cases are escalated to the compliance department only when 
action and experienced handling is required. The rationale behind the positioning of a compliance 
champion in each working space was of course that it should be easy for employees to get information 
on how to stay compliant. However, placing a compliance champion in every business unit serves 
also in making anti-corruption visible to all employees. 
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Another way of making anti-corruption visible is through collective events with the aim to engage 
people with the topic. For example, a compliance department asked their colleagues in the company 
to enter a competition for the best anti-corruption poster design:  
‘What we did in fact was that we had a competition. We asked the employees to design their 
own poster on what our compliance team and culture should look like. Then we used the 
posters and we went to some designers to make it look nicer, but keep the content … just to 
make them look nice and more professional and we produced these posters and posted them 
everywhere. ’ (Interview A29) 
The participants were asked to draw designs based on their own perception of what the company’s 
culture on that matter should be and how they would like to see the compliance department 
functioning. The winning designs would be used as the main posters in the company’s anti-corruption 
campaign. Participants had three months to design their own poster and they uploaded them to a 
dedicate website where their colleagues voted for their favorite designs. The resulting top ten designs 
were sent to senior management which also voted for the best three designs. The winning designs 
were then sent to a professional designer to ‘polish’ and make them appropriate for official use.  
The posters were hung on well visible walls of working spaces in the company. The aim of the 
campaign was to engage but also keep reminding employees of the importance of anti-corruption and 
indeed compliance. The message was quite simple, focusing more on the ethical side of anti-
corruption. Moreover there was a prompt to employees to ‘speak up’ in case they faced relevant 
challenges or if they are aware of such cases. For that reason, directions on where to find instructions 
and support in the company if needed were also included and highlighted. In the same fashion, but 
with the intention of having a little more personalized effect on the individual and his or her private 
working space, traditional style stickers were also utilized. These stickers are usually stuck on the 
telephone surface or on the frame of the PC screen where they are easily visible and noticeable. The 
message again is simple and a characteristic word like ‘compliance’ in bold letters is accompanied 
by a corporate phone number or a hotline.  
In some cases, however, illuminating anti-corruption is easier said than done. The reasons why anti-
corruption does not seem to have an effect can range from personal to collective or institutional in 
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organizations (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Pinto et al., 2008),. For instance, 
resistance to anti-corruption and compliance can be a matter of demographics and gender as a 
compliance officer explained: 
‘It is usually older males who have been working for this business for more than 20 years who 
complain about it (anti-corruption compliance). They couldn’t see that the landscape is 
changing and it doesn’t really matter if you are working for company A, B, or C.’ (Interview 
A4) 
Nevertheless, in the case of non-compliance with anti-corruption rules, disciplinary measures can 
also be utilized. As a compliance manager put it: 
‘We review not only a manager’s business achievements but also how they achieve those 
based on a compliance factor. We review whether he or his team had violated the company’s 
policy in the past year in achieving that result. If yes, maybe his bonus will be reduced by 
30%, or no salary increase, or no promotion.’ (Interview A27) 
In more extreme cases when individual behavior does not change regardless of the efforts, it is also 
common to let these people go from the company:  
‘And (we) also fired very talented people from management simply because they didn’t get 
the point and continued doing business in the old way and with those guys and partners there, 
you don’t really signal change.’ (Interview A12) 
The above example comes from a compliance officer who used to work for a company which was 
found guilty of corruption by the US authorities and as consequence had to re-structure its 
organizational compliance function. Those who did not align themselves with the company’s new 
anti-corruption philosophy were let go, showing that in some cases proper behavior can be more 
important than short-term profits in corporations. As one of his colleagues expressed it: 
‘But I would say for us, the most important driver right now is actually the idea of 
sustainability. The idea that you do business with a long-term perspective. Working long term 
and looking more like a sustainable business rather than either protecting ourselves from 
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something bad or taking on responsibilities that go beyond what is normally considered 
company responsibility.’ (Interview A9) 
The common denominator observed in the quotes used in this chapter was the physical as well as 
institutional space of the corporation and how it is defined by the government of anti-corruption. 
Within this space, anti-corruption illuminates both the problem of corruption and the solution of anti-
corruption, as well as the actors involved in it by distributing roles. This is a quite different case 
compared with narratives of corporate social responsibility since it places the focus of anti-corruption 
not in the social sphere but in the corporate. In this sense, making anti-corruption visible as something 
to be governed concerns the governance of the company and its overall interests and not the 
governance of society or even social issues as the governance literature has been highlighting for the 
last two decades.  
Anti-corruption as rationality of self-responsibility 
This next section concerns how compliance officers think about governing anti-corruption. 
Answering this question, however, requires us to look first into why people think that anti-corruption 
needs to be governed and what sort of rationalities are required in order to do so. In short, this section 
argues that compliance officers promote a sense of self-responsibility as a means to eliminate 
corruption. This self-responsibility concerns all corporate employees including themselves as well. 
This notion of self-responsibility is derived from established and traditional bodies of knowledge and 
expertise of compliance and business ethics reviewed in the literature review section and expressed 
in the interviews. As in the case of visibility, however, people first need to know what compliance is 
about. As an ex-compliance officer and current owner of a compliance consultancy states: 
‘I've met a lot of leaders and lawyers who work for companies but when I talk to them about 
compliance they are a little confused as to what this is exactly … I work for the people who 
need some kind of compliance awareness. I educate them what compliance is, let them know 
what it is about and try to push it in their daily operational work.’ (Interview A26) 
According to the interviewee, there is a gap of knowledge regarding what anti-corruption compliance 
is about. Anti-corruption experts appear here as filling in this gap by projecting knowledge and 
expertise on the subject matter:  
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‘There is also an element of compliance that you are not familiar with and we are going to 
teach you what it means, what it means to you. So we identify the different areas that need 
additional focus through training and you set learning targets and then you identify this is 
what we like to achieve through the training’. (Interview A2) 
By taking the position of the teacher or educator, compliance officers rationalize government of anti-
corruption towards at least two directions. First, as a responsibility of compliance officers to educate 
their colleagues on what the right way of doing business is, and second as a responsibility of the 
employees to follow rules. 
‘It is our responsibility to ensure that they know what is the right way. They may know based 
on their values, background and education which by the way can be different around the 
world. They probably do know what is right and wrong but maybe not in every detail and 
maybe they don't have ways to handle it.’ (Interview 20) 
The ‘right way’ to do things advocated by compliance officers in turn implies a certain truth (Dean, 
2010). There are probably many ways out there to do business but only one or few is right. Usually, 
when compliance officers say the ‘right way’ they mean the corporate way which is to be found in 
the company’s code of conduct, a document to actually be followed as legal (Interview A4). As 
another compliance officer expressed it: 
 
‘So while you may in some cultures go out for drinks before you do any kind of business that 
is not the perceived as ethical. So we don’t necessarily follow the local norms if they don’t 
leave up to the same standards as we have globally.’ (Interview A2) 
Additionally, compliance officers rationalize anti-corruption governance towards a second direction; 
that of the responsibility of the employees to do what they have been taught to do so in such cases: 
‘Well, it is their (employees’) responsibility when they are in a situation where they meet 
bribes and they need to act in the right way … We are not just illustrating this as a bad situation 
but we bring in what can be done in this situation. They can do this and this and get out of it. 
Call your manager, do not accept it. Try to find an explanation to why you do not accept an 
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envelope full of money … It is your behavior that counts at the end of the day.’ (Interview 
20) 
In the literature, this process is known as ‘responsibilization’ (Shamir, 2008). Indeed, as Siltaoja, 
Malin and Pyykkönen (2015) argue, employees can be objects but also subjects of corporate social 
responsibility. Employees as objects refer to the responsibility of the company to secure an 
employee’s well-being. Therefore, the necessary people and institutions/controls need to be in place 
when people seek them. In contrast, as subjects, employees, are expected to perform their duties, 
responsibly through the use of ‘legal norms, moral exhortation, informal sanctions and tacit 
conventions’ or in business terms codes of conducts and ethics (Siltaoja et al., p. 445). 
The rationality of self-responsibility in anti-corruption governance requires self-governance which in 
this case takes the form of realization of a problem and the will to do something about it. As a 
compliance manager put it: 
‘I think what would be most important for me is for them to get a feeling for the culture. A 
culture to speak up and ask questions. You have to work on all these kind of things around it, 
so people feel good, so they're not afraid to actually tell you or talk to you or come to you. I 
think that’s the most important thing, to create this kind of safety feeling.’ (Interview A1) 
The government of anti-corruption is informed here also by a broader narrative and objective of 
establishing a particular culture of communication between members of the company. So far we have 
seen how the problem of corruption becomes visible and what sort of assistance is provided in solving 
this issue. Self-responsibility refers here to the will of actors to seek help if and when they will face 
such an issue. Unless people speak up about the challenges they face neither they, nor the company, 
can seriously take on any responsibility. Similarly with visibility, challenges not only need to be made 
known in order for them to be answered but also to be thought as ‘not right’ before help is sought. 
Indeed, as I show in the next section, compliance officers think of themselves not just as investigators, 
punishers, or even moral guides of the corporation but rather as advisors offering their help and 
services. 
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The formation of business advisor identity 
What kind of identities are being formed and help in the formation of the above thoughts? The three 
identities discussed below show the evolution of compliance officers and in so doing the different 
understandings or ways of thinking about anti-corruption through the years. First, is the identity of 
compliance officers as corporate police seeking to enforce rules by locating and punishing 
misbehavior. Second, is the identity of compliance officers as sales agents of ethical principles 
whereby the objective is the establishment of an ethical corporate culture through exemplar behavior. 
And third is the identity of business advisor where both rule and moral underpinnings of anti-
corruption are overshadowed by the corporate element and business identity. This in not to say that 
one mode of thought replaced the previous but rather that knowledge and expertise on this particular 
area of activity is accumulated to form the current identity of business advisors. As will be discussed 
in the concluding section, ‘policing’ and ‘selling’ compliance and ethical rules is still a major part of 
the compliance officer’s duty yet not their ultimate objective:  
‘The problem with our department is that it is kind of like being a police officer. You know 
when you are driving your car and suddenly the police wagon comes behind you and you are 
nervous even though you are doing nothing wrong. And I think some people feel the same 
way. They have done nothing wrong in their entire life and they are like ‘ohh it’s compliance 
… I wonder … no I better not say’. And it can’t really be explained not because we are 
criminals because it is just … compliance is like an internal police department.’ (Interview 
A4) 
Policing business is to some extent a point of departure for corporate compliance. ‘A corporate 
compliance program is a system designed to detect and prevent violations of law by the agents, 
employees, officers, and directors of a business’ (Freeman et al., 2007, p. 358) and therefore it 
requires the existence and work of ‘corporate cops’ (Weber, 2006). The rules in turn which 
compliance officers seek to ‘enforce’ come to a great extent from the requirements set by legislation 
such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) (2002) as well as the recommendations of the US Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines regarding corporate financial reporting. Hence, the presence of compliance 
officers point to the enforcement of certain rules against non-compliant behavior which incurs 
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punishment. However, it is interesting that compliance has been seen as a police function, meaning 
punishment, and not protection which is what the police as an institution is also supposed to do.  
Towards this direction, some compliance officers presented themselves not only as police officers 
but also as salesmen: 
‘You need to have both sides. You need to be able to be a policeman sometimes because 
otherwise you wore out your own rules and policies although being proactive is preferable. 
And that is also why I act as a salesperson because I already have the policeman role before I 
even enter the room.’ (Interview A3)  
The view of the compliance officer as a salesperson derives more or less from their attitude in 
performing their duties. According to an article from Business Insider (2012), good sales people listen 
more than they talk while at the same time focus not on short term sales but on long term business. 
Indeed, a major part of being a compliance officer is also being able to listen to what your colleagues 
say about the challenges they face in performing their professional duties. This is what a risk 
assessment process is about (Kenyon, 2013); listening, learning, and uncovering in the end where and 
in which business practices are people prone to misbehavior. Moreover and as we have seen, the 
objective of a compliance system is to build and support sustainable rather than temporarily 
successful businesses. In this sense, compliance does not just enforce and punish if needed, but 
protects the company’s long term survival. 
Between the reactive role of a ‘corporate cop’ and the proactive role of a salesperson there is a third 
identity deriving from the work and sayings of compliance officers, that of being not just supportive 
but also the guide of the organization. Closely linked with the idea of ‘educating’ people on anti-
corruption discussed above, guiding here implies that corporations had to some extent lost their way 
or lost the ‘right way’:  
‘Basically because it’s the industry’s own fault. It used to engage in all kinds of behavior 
where you wouldn’t necessarily be sure that you weren’t unduly influencing stakeholders … 
So that was the norm, and for many reasons the public has a lack of trust in (our) industry. 
Our objective now is to ensure that we are in compliance with whatever kind of legislation is 
relevant to us and that our business provides products in an ethical way.’ (Interview A2) 
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Adherence then to rules is required in order to ‘re-calibrate’ the organization but only to the extent 
that these rules do not obstruct and moreover support long term sustainable business. As one 
compliance officer put it: 
‘So it is really about striking the right balance between the controls you have in place and the 
expectations for growth, and then also build trust with the business’. (Interview A3)  
Of importance for this role is the building of trust with the business. Indeed, one of the ways anti-
corruption government is thought of is as a culture of communication between individual and 
departmental parts of the organization. As a compliance officer explains, a way of gaining trust is by 
providing solutions which enable the company to both stay compliant but also achieve its targets: 
‘So we looked at those areas and really thought where the risk is coming from and where we 
could have a more feasible solution. We came up with these solutions because we hired 
capable people and these people build trust base relationship with our business team. So they 
had these discussions and came up with solutions acceptable to our parties. Last but not least 
we also took harsh measures where we found some violations.’ (Interview A12) 
A more concrete example of how this trust gets realized comes from another interviewee with 
experience in consulting multinational companies on how to successfully and legally compete with 
the alleged bribery of the market by their local competitors in China: 
‘As a foreign company you have an international brand and you should use it more. You 
should advocate the good quality your product has and you should advocate about your 
technology … especially today, with Chinese consumers no longer looking at what’s the 
cheapest but at what’s the best quality because they can afford much more. I think the foreign 
company should really catch these opportunities because they do have certain advantages 
whereas the local companies do not.’ (Interview A22) 
Thus, the identity of a business advisor is being used to overcome both the identity of police officer 
and that of sales agent by in fact imitating both. Compliance officers gain the trust of their colleagues 
by solving problems created by the application of a regulatory framework on the company’s 
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operation, and by using the qualities of salesman to sell a compliance framework as a solution that 
will secure the company’s long term survival. In the words of a compliance manager: 
‘I would say for us, the most important driver right now is actually the idea of sustainability. 
The idea that you are doing business with a long term perspective.’ (Interview A9) 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, I dealt with the broad question of how anti-corruption is thought of in corporations. 
Taking my departure in government analytics, I sought to unearth the implicit strategy and logic of 
anti-corruption as a regime of practices informed and shaped by explicit bodies of knowledge such 
as compliance, business ethics, and risk management. The data for this effort were collected through 
semi-structured interviews with compliance officers and their analysis offered evidence on how anti-
corruption becomes visible and delimited in the organization, setting the scene for the rationality of 
self-responsibility promoted by compliance officers who consider themselves as business advisors. 
The combination of the latter two elements of the anti-corruption strategy, however, implies a blurry 
orientation of anti-corruption in which one element contradicts the other. In particular, the rationality 
of self-responsibility sides well with the application of anti-corruption as compliance and business 
ethics because it seeks to eliminate (ideally) corruption proactively. It contradicts, however, risk 
management since the latter is based on collective responsibility. In contrast, the practice of anti-
corruption by compliance officers who consider themselves as business advisors is closer to the risk 
management program since its goal is to collectively manage and organize anti-corruption instead of 
eliminating it through judicial and ethical incentives advanced by the compliance and business ethics 
programs respectively. I argued that this tension is caused by the inconclusiveness of practice and 
research regarding the causes of corruption.  
Corruption has been attributed to, among other things, individual motives, group mentalities, as well 
as organizational, cultural, international economic and national factors, all based on valid 
argumentation and evidence. However, it is quite difficult to decisively pin down corruption to a 
single cause simply because regardless of the evidence, corruption is secretive and takes place under 
privacy (Everett, Neu & Rahaman., 2006). In other words, the exact workings of corruption, 
regardless of how common it may seem in some cases, it is not so clear after all. A reasonable and 
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practical way to deal with this issue from a policy perspective is to offer adequate guidance so to 
cover as many aspects of corrupt behavior as possible. That is probably why the corruption control 
measures prescribed by national and international public and private authorities offer such a variety 
of tools and reasonings. Some find this an appropriate reaction to the problem of corruption. Everett 
et al., for example, point out, that there are different kinds of corruption, and thus different 
intervention methods may be required. Others seems less tolerant, however, and go a step further by 
arguing that we have failed to understand corruption empirically and it may be best to examine it 
theoretically (Breit, Lennerfors & Olaison, 2015).  
Anti-corruption usually refers to ‘internal rules and procedures aimed at preventing and detecting, as 
well as remedying and/or reporting corrupt activities’ (Jorge & Basch, 2013, p. 166) implying that 
the objective of anti-corruption is the elimination of corruption through prevention. Regardless of 
whether corruption is seen as an individual or organizational phenomenon (Pinto et al., 2008), the 
control of people’s behavior individually and collectively is deemed as most crucial for anti-
corruption (Hauser, 2018; Paine, 1994). This has been more or less the logic behind both business 
ethics and compliance approaches no matter their differences otherwise. Indeed, any reasonably made 
corporate CoC starts with the statement that the company does not tolerate any kind and form of 
corruption though this may not be enough (Gorta, 2013). Likewise, if we take business ethics as a 
paradigm, the establishment of a corporate culture of integrity has as its objective a proactive 
approach to countering corruption (Warren et al., 2014).    
Self-responsibility therefore appears as the key objective that will deem an organization corruption-
free. If all people abide by the same authoritative or moral code that forbids misbehavior then 
corruption will vanish as a phenomenon. In order for this to happen, people need to possess some sort 
of expertise on what corruption and anti-corruption is, meaning that they need to be able to identify 
problematic cases and find solutions as well (Hauser & Hogenacker, 2014; Ruiz et al., 2015).  
The same cannot be argued, however, about anti-corruption and risk management; risk management 
builds on the perception that corporate operation necessarily creates risks (Becker, Hauser & 
Kronthaler, 2013) and therefore their elimination is not a realistic target. What can be done is that 
these risks can be managed or organized collectively depending on corporate strategy and risk 
appetite (Aven, 2013; Power, 2007). In order for risks and anti-corruption to be managed collectively, 
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then a robust internal system of reporting needs to be in place so the corporation is aware of the risks 
taken (Miceli & Near, 2002). The responsibility of the person, therefore, is not to avoid or deal with 
misbehavior but rather to report it. This is a significant difference I argue for anti-corruption in 
corporations since it points to different roles and meanings of its practice. 
Likewise, anti-corruption as practiced by compliance officers who consider themselves as business 
advisors points to similar argumentation regarding the anti-corruption regime of practices and its 
orientation. If the desired outcome is to ‘speak up’ and report cases of misbehavior then the role of 
compliance officers is adjusted to that reality, meaning that they offer advice on what would be most 
suitable and manageable for the business approach to a risky situation. This is why the role of 
compliance officers has developed from ‘corporate cop’ and ethics ‘sales agent’ to business advisor. 
In other words, what makes a compliance officer different from their colleagues in the legal 
department or internal audit is that they offer mitigation strategies. To mitigate a risk means to take 
the necessary measures to reduce ‘the extent of exposure to a risk and/or the likelihood of its 
occurrence’ (BusinessDictionary.com, 2019). Indeed, as others have pointed out, ‘When economists 
or business people talk about ‘managing risk they do not mean eliminating it entirely’ (Garland, 2003, 
p. 68). But in doing so, morality and the benevolent objective of treating corruption and its adverse 
consequences in social and corporate terms is ruled out by definition in favor of an ‘everything goes’ 
mentality including the confidence that corruption is manageable (David-Barrett et al., 2017). This 
means that the attentiveness on managing the risk of corruption rather than eliminating it excludes 
notions of integrity and dedication to anti-corruption rules found in business ethics and compliance 
programs.  
This is not to say, however, that because one objective is prioritized the other is totally excluded; 
rather it becomes an instrument serving a different goal. In the case of risk management, for example, 
both compliance and business ethics turn from being ends to mediums. Rules are required for 
reporting and managing risks and it is the corporate leadership setting these rules and the risk appetite 
of the company. Likewise, ethics can be a very useful incentive for employees to buy-in to the whole 
risk approach. In a similar vein, risk management becomes a medium for business ethics and 
compliance approaches at least when ‘red flags’ need to be recognized or to the organization of anti-
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corruption since it allows resources to be allocated properly and according to risk likelihood and 
assessment. 
It is not this paper’s intention to advance a certain way for anti-corruption to be practiced. As an 
observer and student of anti-corruption, however, I would like to draw attention to the different 
possibilities, orientations, and potential outcomes such differentiations lead to. As Slager (2017, p. 
380) wrote recently, though in a more direct way, ‘all actors and organizations involved in fighting 
corruption would do well to critically evaluate the implications of using risk discourse in the anti-
corruption regime’. 
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Paper 3: Anti-corruption in practice 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Anti-corruption has emerged as a global norm and prohibition regime during the last decades. I argue 
that much can be learned about anti-corruption if we develop a practice approach attentive to its social 
infrastructure. In this paper, I build on International Practices theory, and I analyze four regular but 
not exclusive to anti-corruption practices namely anti-corruption conferencing, certifying expertise, 
monitoring implementation, and public-private partnering. I utilized a praxiographic approach to 
collect data through expert interviews, participant observation, and document analysis. I demonstrate 
the intended as well as unintended consequences of practicing anti-corruption. Along with the 
creation of a collective identity, professionalization, isomorphism, and cooperation norm-based 
approaches prioritize, this study shows that anti-corruption is also ‘built’ on elitism, self-interest, 
resistance, and blurred responsibilities. By fleshing out these phenomena, a more realistic and holistic 
understanding of anti-corruption is revealed. Moreover, in contrast with what one might expect, 
unintended consequences are not necessarily unwanted or alien to the practice of anti-corruption but 
rather are supportive and constitutive of it. 
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1. Introduction 
Anti-corruption has drawn the attention of both academics and practitioners over the last 40 years. In 
particular, lots of attention has been put on anti-corruption as a global norm and regime (Getz, 2006; 
McCoy & Heckel, 2001; Weber & Getz, 2004), its development (Jakobi, 2013a; Nadelmann, 1990) 
and transformation into a prosperous ‘industry’ (Sampson, 2010) influencing domestic legislation 
(Rose, 2015). In this line of thought others have analyzed anti-corruption as enforcement, self- 
regulatory, and hybrid mechanisms (Lord, 2013), as a risk to be managed (Hansen, 2011), as well as 
how corruption risk is socially and discursively constructed (Breit, 2010; Slager, 2017). 
Crucial to the analysis of anti-corruption as a norm are landmark events and achievements.  Starting 
with the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in the late 1970s which introduced anti-corruption 
in the international arena, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention), and the UN Convention against 
corruption (UN Convention) in the 1990s and 2000s respectively which consolidated anti-corruption 
as an international problem (Pacini, Swingen, & Rogers, 2002), as well as the role of Transparency 
International (T.I) and its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in spreading the anti-corruption 
movement globally (Hansen, 2012; Jakobi, 2013a). More recently, the UK Bribery Act of 2010 has 
also been considered as a landmark in the fight against corruption by introducing the failure to prevent 
corruption as an offence (Yeoh, 2012) .  
The focus on norms and regimes, however, tends to obscure the myriad of everyday practices that 
constitute social order (Adler & Pouliot, 2011a; Doty, 1996). Norm-based approaches to anti-
corruption focus on institution and regime-building and its deterministic effect on actors (McCoy & 
Heckel, 2001) and as a result ignore a range of usually informal activities that take place regularly in 
the performance of anti-corruption. For example, conventions like the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD 
Convention) have drawn the attention of scholars as significant events in anti-corruption because they 
popularized and criminalized bribery (Pacini et al., 2002) or established the norm of anti-corruption 
(Jakobi, 2013a). Rarely, however, have scholars looked into the regular practice of ‘monitoring the 
implementation of such treaties’ through which the OECD Convention and their objectives have been 
expressed and instantiated.  
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To address this lack of focus on the ‘social infrastructure’ of anti-corruption (Pouliot & Thérien, 2017, 
p. 163), I study four practices regularly, but not exclusively, met in anti-corruption namely, 
conferencing, certifying expertise, monitoring progress, and public-private partnering. For each of 
these practices, I discuss its development, practice, and intended and unintended consequences. 
Taking the public-private partnering practice as an example, I discuss how such a partnering came 
about as a remedy to the problem of corruption in certain cases by uniting traditionally opposing 
public and private authorities but at the same time blurring the boundaries and responsibilities of 
these authorities.  
Building on international practice theory (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b; Bueger & Gadinger, 2015), I 
suggest that besides norms and rules and their institutional gravity, anti-corruption consists also of 
typical and often unwritten practices meant as ‘socially organized and meaningful patterns of 
activities that tend to recur over time’ (Pouliot & Thérien, 2017, p. 163). Practices allow the study of 
social phenomena by situating the focus on interests, norms, and ideas to the ‘material’ that makes 
the world ‘hang together’, by highlighting the everyday habitual activities of practitioners 
reproducing the social and political realms (Bueger & Gadinger, 2014). The object of analysis in this 
paper is these regular and subtle activities and ways anti-corruption is practiced in international and 
national contexts and which are usually obscured by the brightness of major events and landmarks of 
anti-corruption. 
A practice approach offers three theoretical contributions. First, in approaching anti-corruption from 
a practice perspective, I show that anti-corruption is more dynamic as a process than one would expect 
and that it involves more action on behalf of a variety of actors. It becomes possible then to study the 
doings of these actors and to understand how anti-corruption is actually socially constructed through 
the recursive nature of such practices (Slager, Gond, and Moon, 2012). Second, it allows for the 
analysis of the politics of anti-corruption beyond the state (Pouliot & Thérien, 2017). That is to say, 
the practices of anti-corruption under study are not and should not be seen as the outcome of a single 
agent’s action, ‘but that of a community of representatives whose members enter in patterned 
relations, within an organized social context, thanks to similar background dispositions’ (Adler & 
Pouliot, 2011a, p. 10). My study of anti-corruption reveals, therefore, the variety of actors 
underpinning anti-corruption as it includes not just rule-makers but also users and third parties. Third, 
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the paper highlights the intended and also the often neglected unintended consequences of these 
patterned relations. In contrast with what one would expect, unintended consequences are not 
necessarily unwanted or alien to the practice of anti-corruption (Merton, 1936) but rather are 
supportive of it. A practice approach thus sheds light on both the written and unwritten ways of doing 
anti-corruption. 
In the following section, I briefly review the anti-corruption literature and I argue that a focus on anti-
corruption as a global norm and regime obscures its social infrastructure. As a consequence, the next 
chapter is dedicated to the concept of practices, its methodology, and I also provide information on 
the empirical cases I utilized. These cases are not indicative, exemplar, or representative of a larger 
number of cases but rather indicative as to what the study of practices can offer in the study of anti-
corruption and social phenomena more broadly. In other words, what can be generalized from this 
study is not necessarily the findings (although this might be the case as well) but the method. Hence, 
the choice of Denmark as the main locale to draw cases from reflects reasons of convenience and not 
a peculiar, extreme, or even regular case study. In section four, I analyze the four practices and I 
conclude by discussing their intended and unintended consequences, their importance, as well as 
arguing for the merits of using a practice approach in the study of anti-corruption. 
2. Anti-corruption as a global norm 
One of the first works in international relations literature to conceptualize anti-corruption as an 
emerging norm was Nadelmann’s (1990) study on global prohibition regimes. Global prohibition 
regimes are institutionalized norms which prohibit state and non-state actors from performing 
particular activities. A precondition for the formation of a global prohibition regime is that the 
criminal activities of concern should transcend national borders and in so doing reduce also the ability 
of a single state to act unilaterally. Through a five-stage norm development process, Nadelmann, 
explains how from relatively weak and mostly domestic activity, ‘transnational moral entrepreneurs’ 
lead to the consolidation of such regimes. Regimes in turn have been classified by their scope as 
global, regional, or associative, or based on the functional domain depending on the activity, problem, 
or industry with which they are concerned (Preston & Windsor, 1992). Anti-corruption belongs to 
the latter category of regimes as a norm concerning a specific function of international business. 
Indeed, by the start of the 21st century, scholars pointed out that a global anti-corruption norm had 
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emerged (Abbott & Snidal, 2002; Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006; Getz, 2006; McCoy & Heckel, 2001; 
Webb, 2005). Getz (2006), for instance, reviewed its emergence and reached similar conclusions with 
Nadelmann (1990) in that its effectiveness rests with the complexity of the problem at hand; as an 
activity that takes place under privacy, corruption is unlikely to be completely eliminated by the anti-
corruption regime.  
A significant number of scholars focus on the role of state legislation in the establishment of the anti-
corruption regime (Darrough, 2010; Lord, 2013; Mark, 2012; Weismann, 2009; Yeoh, 2012). Some 
highlight the influence of the US government and other critical states in forming a homogenized 
crime governance (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006; Jakobi, 2013b). Jakobi (2013a), for example, sees 
similarities between the development of the anti-corruption and anti-money laundering regimes in 
that in both cases the US government’s efforts were crucial for the initiation of the regimes. In a 
similar vein, others argue for the role of the US in global crime control (Andreas & Nadelmann, 
2006). Others, however, take a more critical stance by questioning the effectiveness and sufficiency 
of state law enforcement. Some scholars, for instance, examine the effectiveness of the FCPA in 
battling corruption and conclude that it has not been an effective measure either domestically or 
internationally (Cragg & Woof, 2002; Darrough, 2010; Weismann, 2009; Weismann, Buscaglia, & 
Peterson, 2014). Similarly, Lord (Lord, 2013), argues for the limited capacity of German and the UK 
authorities to enforce anti-corruption due to the complexity of doing so. Nevertheless, the above 
studies show that more or less effective state-led legislation and enforcement play a significant role 
in the establishment of an anti-corruption regime.  
In addition to the role of states and legislation in the anti-corruption prohibition regime, scholars 
agree that the emergence of the global anti-corruption norm was benefited from the mobilization of 
organizational platforms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) including non-public and private 
organizations which facilitated its diffusion in global scale in the 1990s and early 2000s (Hindess, 
2005; McCoy & Heckel, 2001). Jakobi (2013c, 2016), for example, emphasizes, among other things, 
the importance of Transparency International in pushing OECD member states to take action against 
corruption. In a similar line of thought, other scholars argue that the OECD Convention and the 
uniform set of rules it imposes on states will have a positive impact on the effectiveness of anti-
corruption (Baughn, Bodie, Buchanan, & Bixby, 2010; Moran, 2003; Pacini et al., 2002).  As in the 
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case of state legislation, however, scholars have scrutinized the actual impact of non-public 
organizations and their role in the anti-corruption regime. Webb (2005), for example, recognizes the 
UN Convention for its innovative provisions but remains skeptical with regard to the convention’s 
real impact on corruption. Rose (Rose, 2015) examines initiatives such as the UN and OECD 
Conventions, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and the Financial Action Task 
Force (FATF), and argues that their influence on domestic legal systems varies depending on the 
inclusiveness each of these initiatives requires regarding their member parties.   
What is central to the above analyses of the anti-corruption regime and norm is the role of 
transnational moral entrepreneurs. These can be anything from individuals, critical states, 
organizational platforms, and more recently private actors acting as norm entrepreneurs (Finnemore 
& Sikkink, 1998). These norm entrepreneurs mobilize popular and political support both within 
national borders and abroad by invoking a universal moral sense that transcends strict national 
interests (Nadelmann, 1990). As a result, much of the literature on anti-corruption revolves around 
the public and private actors, organizations, and states behind the development of the global anti-
corruption norm and regime as this is reflected in a series of initiatives and landmarks of the anti-
corruption regime. As Doty argues, however (1996, p. 1), the overly strong focus on regimes and 
institutional approaches, ‘obscures the productivity of the practices that have been important aspects’ 
of these regimes (emphasis in the original) (emphasis added).  
Anti-corruption and practices as terms are not strangers to each other; anti-corruption has been 
analyzed as a governing practice (Hansen, 2011; Hansen & Tang-Jensen, 2015), corporate and 
business practice (Klinkhammer, 2013; Vincke & Heimann, 2003), enforcement and self-regulatory 
practice (Lord, 2013), as a neoliberal reforming program (Hindess, 2005), and industry (Sampson, 
2010). Hansen and Tang-Jensen for example (2015, p. 365), ‘focus on anti-corruption in-practice’ by 
examining the deployment of technologies and assumptions made by professionals when performing 
the process of due-diligence. Likewise, Sampson (2010, p. 261), critically assesses ‘the global 
institutionalisation of anti-corruptionist discourse and anti-corruption practice’. Along the same lines, 
Slager (2017), analyzes the use of risk discourse by accountants and how anti-corruption is 
constructed as a risk. She argues that a risk approach to anti-corruption ultimately demotes it from its 
collective and therefore social objective to an internal solution aimed to serve only the corporation. 
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Despite these efforts, however, an explicit effort to highlight the usefulness of a practice approach to 
anti-corruption as ‘an integrated set of meaningful practices’ is largely missing (Pouliot & Thérien, 
2017, p. 364). In the following section, I discuss what an international practice is and what it brings 
to the study of anti-corruption. 
3. International Practices 
Practice theory consists of a large and diverse set of approaches of the study of social phenomena. As 
such, it has been increasingly used in sociological (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Lounsbury, 2008), 
management (Cabantous, Gond, & Johnson-Cramer, 2010), organizational (Czarniawska & Sevon, 
1996), technology (Orlikowski, 2000) and international relations (Adler & Pouliot, 2011b; Bueger & 
Gadinger, 2014) studies. Its history can be captured in a series of ‘turns’ in social theory; from the 
interpretive turn (Rabinow & Sullivan, 1979), to the ‘practice turn in contemporary theory’ (Schatzki, 
Cetina, & Savigny, 2001), and more recently to the ‘practice turn in international relations theory’ 
(Adler & Pouliot, 2011b; Bueger & Gadinger, 2014).  
In effect, practice approaches are more an ontological position than a theory. Whereas institutional 
and agential theories explain the world based on norms and interests respectively, practice theorists 
consider practice as the core unit of analysis (Bueger & Gadinger, 2015; Reckwitz, 2002; Schatzki, 
2002). This means that the focus of the researcher is redirected to discourses, ideas, norms, and 
interests as meaningful elements of a practice producing social order (Bueger & Gadinger, 2015). 
Practices are ‘socially meaningful patterns of action’(Adler & Pouliot, 2011b, p. 6); they are agential 
in that they are constituted through the competent performance of human beings, and they are also 
normative in that this competent performance is patterned since it generally happens repeatedly over 
time as part of a socially organized context. For a performance to be competent, an audience to 
interpret it along similar standards and appraise it is required (Goffman, 1956). The everyday doings 
of anti-corruption specialists and practitioners then become the object of inquiry because it is in their 
doings that action and norms, discourse and materiality coexist. In so doing, practice theory advances 
the unveiling of previously taken for granted and subtle processes constituting social phenomena such 
as anti-corruption.  
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Unveiling these subtle processes is the first contribution a practice approach makes to anti-corruption 
studies. Indeed, how does what practitioners do in an organizational context relate to the global anti-
corruption framework and norms? And if they do, how do these different ‘levels of analysis’ meet? 
Anti-corruption includes a diverse set of practices ranging from conferences, to attending a 
certification class, monitoring the implementation of international treaties, joining public-private 
initiatives, drafting rules, using a computer to run background checks, and generally everything 
people do when they perform their professional routine as anti-corruption experts. Along with written 
rules and procedures there is therefore an infinite number of practices that make all the above 
meaningful. Indeed, Hansen and Tang-Jensen (2015, p. 370), urge scholars to take a closer look at 
the anti-corruption assemblage, as an ‘entanglement of heterogeneous human and non-human 
elements – people, objects and networks – and their formation into a field of thought and action’, and 
unveil both its features and tensions. 
The latter point brings us to the next contribution of a practice approach in anti-corruption studies, 
namely the intended and unintended consequences of  the practice of anti-corruption (Feldman & 
Orlikowski, 2011). Practices are socially productive in the sense that they shape the world (Adler & 
Pouliot, 2011a). It is within practices where actors and the norms or interests shape their behavior 
interact and make social phenomena possible. These phenomena are not necessarily intended or even 
compatible with each other but they are tied to one another as indispensable parts of larger social 
phenomena such as anti-corruption. Slager (2017), for example, explains that the construction of anti-
corruption as a risk crowds out other alternative concepts such as business ethics and integrity culture 
in the private sector. Likewise, others show how global governance practices generate both 
inclusionary and exclusionary effects (Pouliot & Thérien, 2017). After all, anti-corruption itself is to 
a certain extent a reaction to a ‘bad thing’ known as corruption (Walters, 2008).  
This, however, takes nothing from the importance of practices and their effects as the social 
infrastructure of anti-corruption. By fleshing out these phenomena, a more realistic and holistic 
understanding of anti-corruption is revealed. This understanding does not seek to offer statistical-like 
generalizations but theoretical ones. As Feldman and Orlikowski argue (2011, p. 1249), statistical 
generalizations seek to explain universal variation whereas theoretical generalizations are better 
conceptualized ‘as principles that can explain and guide action’. Although not generalizable a priori, 
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these principles can shed light on the dynamics and micro dynamics in similar though not necessarily 
identical situations. In light, therefore, of the increasing international and global regulations in areas 
such as data governance, environment, artificial intelligence, and human rights, the findings from a 
practice approach on anti-corruption may ‘travel’ to other relevant areas of inquiry (Feldman & 
Orlikowski, 2011).  
In the following pages the four anti-corruption practices are presented and analyzed. Before we 
proceed, however, I must explain the methodology and the practices I have chosen to study. With 
regards to the methodology utilized for this study, I have followed the prescribed for practice based 
approaches of ‘praxiography’ (Bueger, 2014). Praxiography resembles to some extent traditional 
qualitative and interpretive methodologies since it relies heavily on expert interviews, participant 
observation, and document analysis. Praxiography, however, differs from traditional interpretive 
studies in that its goal is not the reconstruction of cultures, norms, interests or any other kind of 
explicit knowledge, but the reconstruction of practices. In order to do so, the focus of the collection 
and inquiry of data has to be on tacit or background knowledge. Interestingly, tacit knowledge cannot 
be transmitted through usual means such as oral or written speech or signs (Collins, 2001). As 
practices are considered the mediators and carriers of such knowledge, praxiographers argue that in 
order to understand a phenomenon, a study of its practices is required (Bueger, 2014).  
For this paper, I have used a praxiographic approach to data collection consisting of expert interviews, 
participant observation, document analysis and desk research aiming to reconstruct the practice of 
anti-corruption as a ‘regime of practices’  (Dean, 2010) (Table 1). Interviews were conducted with 
anti-corruption experts in Denmark and China during 2017-18 and the experts represented a variety 
of industry sectors such as the pharmaceutical, information, manufacturing, energy, services, 
consultancies, and legal firms. What connects this diverse set of anti-corruption experts is that they 
were asked to describe in detail how anti-corruption is performed in multinational companies. 
Depending on their profession and experience, answers varied from detailed organizational insights 
to also detailed extra-organizational inputs. Moreover, I participated in several anti-corruption events 
such as certification classes, seminars and webinars, workshops as well as an anti-corruption summit. 
Last but not least, I collected over 500 pages of slides and documents − not all of them publicly 
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available − with best practices, recommendations, and guidelines on how to establish a compliance 
and anti-corruption function in a company.  
Based on these data and fieldwork, I chose to study four common practices of anti-corruption; 
conferencing, certifying expertise, monitoring progress, and public-private partnering. These were 
chosen because they play a central, though sometimes underestimated, role in the area of business 
ethics and compliance; human rights, environmental protection, or anti-corruption, all seem to have 
similar patterns of development where the above practices take place. To be clear here, I do not claim 
exclusiveness in studying the above four areas of activity. The monitoring process of international 
treaties for examples is mentioned in several works as part of the broader study of such treaties like 
the OECD and UN Conventions constituting the anti-corruption regime or norm (Getz, 2006; Jongen, 
2018; Rose, 2015).  Likewise, public-private partnerships have been a huge area of academic work 
(Greve, 2010; Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; Moog et al., 2015; Rees et al., 2012). I do however claim that 
in my knowledge this is the first time these practices are analyzed as social practices constitutive of 
anti-corruption. Moreover, I chose these four practices deliberately because while it is anti-corruption 
experts and compliance officers who make them happen, and while these practices concern MNCs, 
they are not restricted as organizational function meant to operate within corporations. In contrast, 
they offer a broader –like infrastructure- point of view on compliance in general and anti-corruption 
in particular.   
For each of these practices I followed an empirical case. The empirical cases are respectively, the 
ISO/TC 309 Plenary meeting where the new ISO 37001 Anti-bribery management systems standard 
was discussed; an anti-corruption certification course offered by private actors in Denmark; the 
OECD’s Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions (WGIBT) and monitoring 
of the Danish authorities on the matter of facilitation payments; and the Fight Against Facilitation 
Payments Initiative (FAFPI) in Denmark. In the following pages, I discuss each one of these practices 
by exploring their origins and development, practice, and intended and unintended consequences 
(Table 1).  
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Practice Definition Empirical 
case 
Methods 
Conferencing Social events serving the objective of bringing people with 
similar backgrounds and interests together to broadly 
speaking improve their business. 
ISO/TC 309 
Plenary 
Meeting 
Participant 
observation, 
interviews 
Certifying 
expertise 
Professional training and assurance of qualifications to 
perform a certain task or job. 
Certification 
master class 
course 
Participant 
observation, 
interviews 
Monitoring 
progress 
The process by which an organizational body monitors the 
implementation of agreed or recommended changes in the 
national anti-corruption legislation of member states. 
Working 
Group on 
Bribery 
(OECD) 
Document 
analysis, 
interviews 
Public-private 
partnering 
Arrangements and cooperation between public and private 
authorities. 
Fight 
Against 
Facilitation 
Payments 
Initiative 
(FAFPI) 
Interviews, 
desk 
research 
Table 3: Anti-corruption practices 
4. Anti-corruption in practice 
Anti-corruption conferencing  
Conferences are social events serving the objective of bringing people with similar backgrounds and 
interests together to meet, and depending on the occasion discuss, negotiate, draft, cooperate, and 
broadly speaking improve their business (Rogers, 2008). Likewise, and depending on the occasion, 
the organizer, the purpose, or the participants, conferences can take different names such as 
convention, congress, meeting, forum, summit, assembly, initiative, and even gathering. Today, 
conferences play an important role in global governance (Pouliot & Thérien, 2017), and take place 
regularly around the world; anti-corruption is not an exception. Some indicative examples are the 
landmark conferences of global anti-corruption like the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption, and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, as well as the more regularly organized 
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International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC), the C-5 Anti-Corruption conferences, the Annual 
European Compliance & Ethics Institute conferences, the IBA Anti-Corruption Conference, and the 
ISO 37001 & Anti-bribery Conferences to name but a few.  
I take as my case the latter series of conferences and in particular the ISO/TC 309 Plenary Meeting 
on Anti-bribery Management Systems which I attended in 2017 in Shenzhen, China where the ISO 
37001 Anti-bribery Management International Best Practice Symposium concluded. The event was 
organized by the Shenzhen Institute of Standards and Technology, and hosted by the International 
Organization for Standardization/Governance of Organizations Technical Committee (ISO/TC 309) 
and the Standardization Administration of the People’s Republic of China. The Plenary Meeting itself 
intended to present but also gain feedback on the newly introduced ISO 37001 Anti-bribery 
management system standard from a wide pool of stakeholders.  
ISO is a global network of national standards bodies with the objective to provide international 
standards. ISO standards are voluntary and bring together all kinds of experts from governing bodies, 
NGOs, to academia, business and other private entities as a depiction of expertise on common issues 
as variable as aircraft and space vehicles, and bribery (Timmermans & Epstein, 2010). The ISO 37001 
Anti-bribery management systems is a standard introduced in 2016 with the objective to ‘instill an 
anti-bribery culture within an organization and implement appropriate controls’ (International 
Organization for Standardization, 2016). As the Chairperson of the Technical Committee 309 on 
Governance of Organizations responsible for ISO 37001 and moderator of the first session put it when 
opening the event, ‘ISO is the global expert opinion and bribery is no exception’. Very briefly, the 
development of an ISO standard including 37001 on anti-bribery starts with a demand or need from 
the industry or any other stakeholder to the relevant Technical Committee (TC). The TC then drafts 
a preliminary text for discussion and deliberation with the interested national standards bodies until 
a consensus is reached (ISO, 2016). In the following paragraphs I present and discuss the criticism 
and concern that was voiced during these sessions on ISO’s overly strong focus on the ‘tone from the 
top’ principle. In short, the ‘tone from the top’ is how anti-corruption legislation and compliance 
experts express the necessity and importance of organizational leadership’s dedication in curbing 
corruption. The analysis shows how the socially organized context of conferencing enables anti-
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corruption practitioners to competently perform the action of communicating and inquiring on aspects 
of the newly introduced the ISO 37001 Anti-bribery management systems. 
I was invited to participate as a guest at the meeting on ISO 37001 by one of the Chinese delegates I 
had met earlier that year in Beijing. The meeting attracted more than 170 experts including 
representatives from the public and private sectors. The event itself was organized around four 
sessions namely the introduction and three rounds7 of speakers and panelists representing local and 
international governmental authorities and private companies and organizations who in one way or 
another had engaged with deliberations on the ISO standard. After a short introduction on ISO’s 
history and role, the development of the ISO 37001 Anti-bribery management system standard and 
how we reached this moment was explained in a bit more detail. The event was set up in the following 
way; three panels of five panelists each of them presenting to the plenum and then receiving questions. 
The first panel concerned the international efforts on anti-corruption, while the other two the ISO 
Standard and its development and implementation. Subsequently, the panels for the latter two 
sessions consisted of experts who had taken part in the deliberations for the creation of the standard 
and thus of interest for the current study. Each panel concluded with a general Q&A session where 
the audience had the chance to ask questions to the panelists.  
Within this set up, some participants expressed their concern that the ISO standard lacked a focus on 
the human element of anti-corruption and compliance in organizations. According to these 
participants, the problem was that the standard, does not utilize or even consider the full range of 
people involved in cases of organizational (anti)corruption. In particular, the Director and Chief 
Compliance Officer (AA) of a major IT multinational company (who I sought to interview) 
skeptically questioned the panelists how the ISO standard accounts for the role and experience of 
middle managers in bribery and anti-bribery especially when considering that usually it is the middle 
managers who are under pressure and pass that pressure to their people to achieve unrealistic targets. 
The panelists replied in various capacities but along the general argument that middle managers 
should also be trained and that the ‘tone from the top’ is quite important. The debate continued in the 
next Q&A session when other members of the audience continued to challenge the standard’s 
                                                          
7 Event sessions: 1) International Anti-corruption Effort; 2) ISO 37001 Anti-bribery Management Systems − Meeting 
the requirements; and 3) ISO 37001 Anti-bribery Management Systems − Certification Issues. 
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dependence on the ‘top’ to change the corporate culture by highlighting that sometimes it is the 
leadership which is corrupt or that other times the CEO does not really know what happens in the 
company and the challenges his employees face in terms of corruption. When later I met and asked 
AA about his insistence in criticizing ISO’s 37001 overly strong focus on the ‘tone from the top’ 
principle he commented that it’s important to consider in the efforts to fight corruption those who 
actually deal with it. The tone from the top is fine but for employees most of the time, the top is not 
the CEO but rather their manager; and these managers may or may not know much about anti-
corruption but they may know about corrupt practices because they see a lot and we should listen to 
what they have to say.  
The intended purpose of anti-corruption conferences is to enable communication between relevant 
stakeholders and audiences and initiate a dialogue and discussion on topics of common interest. In so 
doing, conferences also ‘forge’ the anti-corruption industry (Sampson, 2010) and identity as a 
pluralistic assemblage of public and private stakeholders similar to that we have been experiencing 
as global or public-private governance during the last 30 years (Börzel & Risse, 2002; Cashore, 2002; 
Wood & Wright, 2015). When we look closer at this assemblage, however, an unintended 
consequence comes forth as well; we can see that this alleged unity of what we call anti-corruption 
rests not only on the inclusion of as many stakeholders as possible but also on the exclusion of others 
the voices of whom have thus been silenced. In the above presented case the voice of middle managers 
was excluded and we might as well think of others like sales agents who may not had access to the 
deliberations. As a result, the identity of anti-corruption that is forged remains quite independent from 
the problem it was initially intended to solve, corruption. Indeed, as Sampson for instance (2010, p. 
261) explained, the anti-corruption industry coexists ‘along with the corruption it ostensibly is 
combating’. This new identity of anti-corruption not only has its own actors, needs, and objectives 
which are barely related to corruption, but does so by excluding others who may be more related to 
it.  
Certifying anti-corruption expertise 
The practice of certifying expertise concerns the professional training and assurance of qualifications 
to perform a certain task or job. As knowledge about corruption and anti-corruption piles up, gets 
institutionalized, systematized, and standardized, it also gets disseminated by public or private 
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educational or professional organizations and third parties in the form of professional training and 
certification courses (Sampson, 2010). Today, it is difficult not to notice the supply of anti-corruption, 
compliance, business ethics, sustainability, CSR, or risk management certification courses for 
professionals. What is more, the global nature of anti-corruption makes such certification processes 
and training in national and international levels relevant. As a result, whole industries consisting of 
accreditors, accountants, consultants, and certifiers have been charged with disseminating such 
standards (Brunsson & Jacobsson, 2002). Similar but more recent is the history of compliance and 
anti-corruption expertise certification. Corporate compliance rose as a profession after the 
introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002. SOX set the standards for a proper 
compliance function and therefore ‘the compliance officer position was further developed into being 
responsible for having the right controls, education and reporting channels to increase transparency’ 
(Gottschalk, 2011, p. 64). Other similar guiding principles on the compliance profession are the UK 
Bribery Act as well as the FCPA or other relevant regulations.  
There are several anti-corruption training and certification courses available online but also through 
in-person courses. Some require personal attendance while others are online. Likewise, some require 
an examination to be passed while others do not. Nevertheless, most of them offer training and 
certification in corporate anti-corruption and compliance and related best practices. I attended one 
such course in Copenhagen, Denmark during 2017 to become trained and certified as a compliance-
anti-corruption expert. The course consisted of six modules taught between May and September 2017 
and each module was dedicated to a key aspect and function of the profession of compliance officer 
starting with the main legislative and regulatory anti-corruption framework, and continuing with 
standard compliance practices such as risk assessments and compliance governance, training and 
organizational buy-in, integrity due-diligence, internal investigation, and whistleblowing and crisis 
management.  
The course attracted the attention and attendance of public, private, and corporate employees from 
Denmark and abroad. Some of them had already some experience in compliance while others were 
just starting to engage with it. Roughly one third of the participants were lawyers who saw a business 
opportunity in offering compliance services. Each course-day consisted of presentations and lectures 
from experienced anti-corruption and compliance experts from the private and public sectors, follow-
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ups, discussions, and Q&A sessions where we had the opportunity to ask questions and discuss 
compliance matters. Each module concluded with a workshop where we had the opportunity to get 
hands-on experience by simulating roles in real-life based cases. With the conclusion of the modules, 
we were awarded a certificate confirming the completion, organizers, presenters and educational 
programme of the Master class. The below discussion concerns the first class we attended where the 
main focus was on introducing anti-corruption as profession and as a global area of regulation for 
companies. The analysis shows how instructors perform anti-corruption training and how this 
performance becomes competent as recognized as such by the participants of the course. In effect, 
this performance and recognition derive from the roles of instructor and student who engage in a 
discussion regarding the challenges of the compliance profession. 
An early discussion at the course concerned the clarification of what corporate compliance and the 
compliance profession are about. According to the instructors, the justification of why corporations 
need compliance departments and officers rests with the wealth of regulations and legislations a 
company has to operate within. One of the organizers, for example, argued that companies neither 
know the regulatory framework they are operating within, nor are aware that operation in certain 
areas of the world is more risky for producing financial and reputational costs than others. Some more 
inexperienced participants followed up on this that even if one wants to be compliant, the amount of 
available laws and regulations on anti-corruption is a cause of confusion since it is virtually 
impossible to follow all of them. In light of the fact that it is very likely that governments will continue 
increasing regulation, the main instructor and organizer of this very first session explained that the 
main role of a compliance officer is to help in the company’s navigation through such a challenging 
regulatory environment while also ‘choosing’ which of these regulations the company will be 
compliant with.  
For that reason, the presenters and experts who discussed the role of compliance and compliance 
officer in a company insisted particularly on placing compliance fairly high in the corporate hierarchy 
and close to the leadership along with the finance and legal departments which are also management 
controls. This argument was based on a couple of rather practical conclusions drawn from the 
experience of the instructors; the first conclusion was that only from such a position are compliance 
officers legitimized to advise all levels of a company. The second conclusion was that compliance 
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officers are not covered by any law but rather need to be protected by the corporate leadership and 
internal audit committees as the gatekeepers of the company or organization on legal, ethical, and 
risk-related matters. As one of the instructors put it, ‘it is the professionalization of compliance 
officers that will allow them to be heard and be taken seriously in the company and not the logic and 
righteousness of a cause’.  
In itself, this intended development has a positive meaning; it denotes a recognition of the problem 
of corruption and most importantly that it requires expert knowledge to be countered. Expertise 
certification results to the professionalization of anti-corruption compliance by ‘positioning’ the 
compliance officer within the organization of a corporation and clarifying their role. The 
professionalization of anti-corruption in the private sector shows thus the maturation of anti-
corruption as an organizational function to the extent that it develops into an independent status 
assigned with the task of ensuring compliance with both legal and ethical rules. 
On the other hand, however, professionalization brings forth an unintended consequence as well. It 
symbolizes also the maturation of compliance officers as a professional group and therefore the rise 
of their self-interests. Interestingly, for example in anti-corruption certification, one has to become or 
be already practicing compliance before he or she can be certified as such. This raises questions as to 
why both are needed and if so to what end? One reason can be that by being certified and hence a 
member of a professional association or group, compliance officers can secure and promote the future 
of their newly established profession. Indeed, Tsingou (2018) has found that in the similar case of 
anti-money laundering compliance, officers are not only interested in following certain and well 
known rules, but also in shaping the governance of compliance to their own professional benefit and 
security. Another reason can be that as experts in their own area of corporate activity, certification 
allows experts to maintain some independence. Brunsson and Jacobsson (2002) point out, for 
instance, that experts know what is best to do but they remain responsible to no one. In this sense, 
what is raised as an unintended consequence of the maturity of anti-corruption is the professional 
self-interest and self-preservation of the certified as experts in anti-corruption compliance officers. 
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Monitoring anti-corruption progress 
Monitoring progress is the process by which an organizational body follows up and monitors the 
implementation of agreed or recommended changes in the national anti-corruption legislation of its 
member states. A relevant example is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions and its Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions (WGB), 
which is responsible for monitoring progress and make recommendations on the member states 
regarding the integration of the Convention into national legislation (OECD, 1997). According to 
Transparency International’s website, the WGB’s peer to peer monitoring process is the golden 
standard of monitoring and its purpose is to ensure that the signatory states conform with the 
Convention.  
The monitoring process takes place in four successive phases; in phase 1 the adequacy of a country’s 
legislation to implement the OECD Convention is assessed. In phase 2, the application of the current 
legislation is also assessed. In phase 3, the focus is on the enforcement of the OECD Convention, and 
in phase 4 the deliberating parties are interested in the tailored application and enforcement of the 
OECD Convention in the local anti-corruption legislation. In all phases, a standard procedure is 
followed in order for the objective to be achieved (OECD, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c). A preliminary 
evaluation is drafted by the WGB and sent to the country under examination in the form of a 
questionnaire. At the same time, two countries are appointed to act as lead examiners of the country 
under examination and these countries choose the experts who are to be involved in the process. Once 
the country under examination returns the questionnaire with its replies, the experts prepare a 
preliminary report on the country’s progress depending on the phase and objectives. The report is 
discussed and evaluated by the WGB which consists of all member states of the OECD. A follow-up 
report follows where the examined country explains how it has addressed the Working Group’s 
recommendations. The procedure ends with the adoption of a report and recommendations on country 
performance which will also be part of the subject matter of the next phase of evaluation.8 Below we 
will see how the patterned relations of the actors performing the practice of monitoring anti-
                                                          
8  For a detailed view of the evaluation process visit: https://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-
bribery/countryreportsontheimplementationoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm 
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corruption progress produce effects. Taking departure in Denmark’s experience in implementing the 
OECD Convention in its national legislation, this section shows how the repeated interaction between 
Danish authorities and the OECD WGB produced on the one hand to the alignment of the Danish 
legislation with the OECD Convention, and on the other,  resistance by the actors whose interests 
were affected by such changes. 
The Danish Parliament (Folketing) amended the Danish Criminal Code in 2000 (Act No. 228 of 4 
April 2000) to ensure that Denmark was compliant with- and able to ratify and implement- the OECD 
Convention (Langsted & Langsted, 2015). This was also the initiation point of the first phase of the 
monitoring process by the WGB. The amendments introduced provisions and articles aligned with 
the OECD Convention on a wide range of relevant areas such as the offence of bribery of foreign 
public officers, responsibility of legal persons, sanctions, jurisdiction, enforcement, statute of 
limitations, money laundering, accounting, extradition, and responsible authorities. Although the 
overall assessment of  Denmark’s status and legislation upon which the OECD Convention would be 
implemented was found to generally conform to the Convention’s standards (WGB-Phase 1, 2000), 
this first phase of monitoring was concluded with some concerns including one over the use of the 
term ‘unlawfully’ in the description of  the offence of bribery of public officials.9  
According to the Danish authorities, the use of the term ‘unlawfully’ (uberettiget) excludes from the 
offence of bribery cases such as a) usual gifts, b) grants of gifts as rewards for an act already carried 
out without any advance promise, and c) small payments in countries where special conditions apply 
(WGB-Phase 1, 2000). This exclusion was meant to match Commentary 9 of the OECD Convention 
on small ‘facilitation’ payments as also corrosive but not bribes in the sense of obtaining or retaining 
business or other improper advantage and thus states should use good governance instead of 
international criminalization (OECD, 1997, p. 15). Problems arose here because according to the 
Danish legal tradition no definitions or explanations are offered with regards to the terminology of a 
law. Rather and when required Danish courts draw on the travaux preparatoires10 to interpret a term. 
                                                          
9 Section 122 of the Danish Criminal Law (Danish Criminal Code, 2005) defines the offense of bribery of public officials 
as ‘Any person who unlawfully grants, promises or offers some other person, who is working in Danish, foreign or 
international public service or functions, a gift or other favor in order to induce that other person to do or fail to do 
anything in the service, shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding three years.’ 
10 Travaux preparatoires or ‘preparatory works’, are the official records and documentation of negotiations that 
precede a final treaty or legal text. 
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In the case of small facilitation payments, however, the WGB raises reservations regarding the 
qualification of the travaux preparatoires to ensure a narrow and ‘under the Convention’ 
interpretation of cases of small facilitation payments. For this reason and despite the reassurance of 
Danish authorities that the term ‘unlawfully’ will be interpreted narrowly, the WGB asserted that this 
matter will be monitored with regard to its implementation for its implementation in Phase 2. 
Phase 2 of the WGB monitoring process of Denmark’s implementation of the OECD Convention 
took place with a five day on-site visit of experts from the Slovak Republic and Sweden in early 2006, 
and included meetings of the evaluation team with representatives of Danish public, private, and civil 
society stakeholders. The report following phase 2 recognizes Denmark’s efforts to update its 
legislation so to implement the Convention but urges further improvements in certain areas including 
the defense of small facilitation payments discussed in phase 1 (WGB-Phase 2, 2006, pp. 5, 45–49). 
In particular, the WGB recommends Denmark to ‘clarify all instances of small facilitation payments 
given to induce a foreign public official to act in breach of his/her duties in the context of an 
international business transaction are illegal pursuant to the Danish Criminal Code’ (WGB-Phase 2, 
2006, p. 64). As a response to this recommendation the Danish Ministry of Justice (MOJ) published 
a booklet (2007) stating that such unlawful payments in the context of international business 
transactions were always undue and thus punishable. However, in its follow-up report of phase 2 
(2008), the WGB insisted in its phase 1 suggestion that this matter should be further monitored for 
its application and in Danish courts. 
In phase 3 and its follow up reports (2013; 2015), the WGB acknowledges some improvement but 
remains concerned over Denmark’s progress with regards to the small facilitation payments defense. 
In particular, the WGB (2015) sees as a step forward the revision of the MOJ’s 2007 booklet (Danish 
Ministry of Justice, 2007, 2015), and moreover the issuance of binding guidelines for the police and 
prosecutors on this matter by Denmark’s Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). However, WGB 
maintains that neither the revised booklet nor the new guidelines have the force of law to override the 
travaux reparatoires of the Criminal Code. The latter, accompanied with a lack of enforcement cases, 
led the evaluation team to consider these particular recommendations as not fully implemented and 
thus subject to further monitoring. Phase 4 has been scheduled to take place in 2022 (WGB-
Monitoring Schedule, 2016). 
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Monitoring the integration and implementation of anti-corruption in national legislation contributes 
the most to what is known as the global anti-corruption regime and norm by aligning legislation 
internationally. Maybe not as effective as an actual policing-like enforcement mechanism, its 
influence has been nevertheless more than obvious in the behavior of business and governments at 
the national level (Getz, 2006; Rose, 2015). At the same time, however, the monitoring mechanism 
and practice feeds forms of resistance realized as delays. As the above case highlights, it may take 
more than 20 years of evaluations and negotiations before national legislation is aligned with the 
actual international treaty on anti-corruption. This could be attributed to the strong lobbying of 
multinational and local business that would be affected by such changes or to the reservation of 
governments to disrupt their business’ performance environment. For instance, as one my 
interviewees put it when discussing the Danish government’s role in anti-corruption:  
‘I think the Danish government tends to be very business oriented and pragmatic. Obviously 
the anti-corruption agenda is bad for business short term.’ (Interview A14) 
Indeed, during phase 2s on-site visit to Denmark all business representatives who met with the 
WGB’s evaluation committee ‘stated that a zero tolerance policy towards small facilitation payments 
was impracticable’(WGB-Phase 2, 2006, p. 14). The practice of monitoring anti-corruption process 
also offers intended and unintended consequences. On the one hand, it does help national legislations 
to fall into line with international treaties. On the other however, it also brings unintended 
consequences in the form of resistance by the actors who are affected the most by such alignment.  
Public-private partnering against corruption 
Public-private partnering (PPP) are arrangements and cooperation between public and private 
authorities (Greve, 2010) with the aim of countering social issues on the international or local scale 
(Flyverbom & Bislev, 2008; Haufler, 2003). Also known as multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSI) 
(Haufler, 2003; Rasche, 2012), third sector organizations (TSO) (Etzioni, 1973; Rees, Mullins, & 
Bovaird, 2012), or non-governmental systems of regulation (O’Rourke, 2006), such initiatives are 
usually seen as epitomes of cooperation and (global) governance between the public and private 
sectors which were for a long time considered as opponents (Thérien & Pouliot, 2006). Others point 
out on the practical benefits of PPPs in terms of sources of finance (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004), long-
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term planning and effectiveness (Jordana & Levi-Faur, 2004), innovation (Greve, 2010), and as a 
method of regulating corporate conduct (Moog, Spicer, & Böhm, 2015). PPPs have been part and 
parcel of the government-to-governance transition widely discussed in late 1990s and early 2000s 
(Héritier, 2002; Reinicke, 1998). According to such discussions, a number of changes in the national 
and global system led policy-makers to seek assistance from the private sector. 
 
Once more, anti-corruption has not been an exception in this development. The UN Global Compact 
(UNGC), the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as well as local initiatives such as 
the Fight Against Facilitation Payments Initiative in Denmark (FAFPI) are some examples of PPPs 
in the area of anti-corruption. Therefore, PPPs as a mode of anti-corruption governance, depict the 
norm established in the mid-1990s that  corruption is not only a political problem but also an 
economic one (Wolfensohn, 1996), and thus a responsibility of political and economic actors alike. 
In this sense, PPPs are offered both as a remedy for the so called retreat of governments from global 
social issues and also as a legitimizing vehicle for private and especially corporate actors seeking to 
legitimize their authority in a globalized economic system (Haufler, 2001).  
 
In this context, the Fight Against Facilitation Payments Initiative (FAFPI)11 came about not only as a 
response to the enduring problem of facilitation payments but also as a socially organized platform 
upon which public and private actors can work together (FAFPI, 2018). It was inspired by the practice 
of anti-corruption in the Danish private sector, promoted by the Confederation of Danish Industry, a 
collective business organization, and requires the cooperation of Danish authorities to be effective. 
Facilitation payments are small bribes paid to government officials to speed up the performance of a 
routine process to which the payer is already legally entitled (Transparency International, 2019). 
FAFPI’s course to realization, however, was not as smooth as one would expect. A major issue, 
especially at the beginning of the project, was a lack of trust and incompatibility between private and 
public actors due to the fact that the two sectors were used to working as opponents rather than 
teammates. As one of the project initiators put it:  
                                                          
11 For more information on FAFPI visit: https://www.fafpi.com/ 
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‘For example, in the fight against facilitation payment initiative, one of the first things we had to 
consider from a business point of view was to ensure that we were not incriminating ourselves. 
Because, going to an authority or to public office and telling them that you know we have some 
problems with facilitation payments, they would probably be obliged to say ‘ok we have to look into 
that and deep down’, and that could kind of skew the whole idea of cooperation rather than we want 
to reveal some bad things happening.’ (Interview A7)Likewise, the Danish government was also 
cautious in engaging with the project. The project was not only technically ambitious since it required 
strong IT infrastructure but also raised questions regarding the ownership and privacy of the data the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs would have to handle and use. It was only when it was decided that the 
18th International Anti-corruption Conference (IACC) would take place in 2018 in Copenhagen that 
engaged actors were motivated to overcome difficulties and push forward with the project. Indeed, 
FAFPI was further discussed by experts in a workshop during IACC 2018, organized by the 
Confederation of Danish Industry, where participants and attendees heard and voiced their opinions 
on the necessity for this initiative and how FAFPI can be an effort concerning all actors (IACC, 2018).   
In practice theoretical terms this means that the competent performances of public and private actors 
were appraised differently by society. Indeed, corporations have long been considered as ‘breeders’ 
of corruption and therefore in need of regulation by state authorities (Wrage & Wrage, 2005). 
Similarly, governments are considered at least in the national context as the highest authorities 
responsible for maintaining order and safeguarding the broader social interest. In the case of FAFPI, 
we can see how such understandings regarding the role and activities of public and private actors 
have changed to consider corporations and governments as allies in fighting corruption. 
Consequently, FAFPI, kicked off its activities with its first meeting in early 2019 seeking to fulfil 
two objectives. As one of FAFPI’s main supporters and promoters explained to me: 
‘So the initiative has two parts. One is the internal and how do you set up an internal system 
to handle and strengthen your anti-corruption program and use the network to share 
experience on policies like whistleblowing and training and all the other issues surrounding 
facilitation payments and bribery… And the other part is the external with the reporting and 
the ministry of foreign affairs.’ (Interview A16) 
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As a reporting and networking tool for those companies and organizations interested in fighting 
facilitation payments, FAFPI seeks to fulfil two objectives. On the one hand, FAFPI, plays the role 
of an anti-corruption forum in which member companies share experiences about anti-corruption and 
facilitation payments on a regular basis. On the other hand, FAFPI collectively answers the problem 
of facilitation payments because it is not a problem any company or organization can deal with on its 
own let alone in the long-term. It offers an online reporting tool for reporting facilitation payments 
paid by Danish companies and organizations; first, companies need to report who, when, where, and 
for what purpose they paid facilitation payments. Second, once a sufficient amount of information 
has been gathered, it will be shared with the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs which will then use 
its diplomatic channels and influence to push local authorities to deal with the issue.  
FAFPI thus approaches facilitation payments in two ways: first, it enables collective action and 
experience to be shared and utilized; and second, it engages local and host country public authorities 
in the fight against facilitation payments: 
‘It can be difficult in some situations for one individual company to always say ‘no we don’t 
want to pay’, but if you stand with the whole Danish business community at your back it’s 
much easier. You have a higher leverage basically. Also, when you stand with the ministry of 
foreign affairs it’s even easier because they have the local contacts with the authorities in the 
countries where facilitation payments are an issue. Instead of just putting pressure on the local 
authority where the companies or organizations meet the problems, I think it makes more 
sense to work with the local authorities and that could be possible through the embassies and 
their network and contacts already.’ (Interview A16) 
Besides the intended contribution in providing a platform upon which public and private actors can 
cooperate in order to deal with corruption, the practice of anti-corruption public-private partnering 
brings forth some unintended consequences. Cooperation between public and private actors blurs the 
boundaries and consequently the responsibilities of each towards each other and society. This raises 
questions as to who governs and who takes responsibility for governance. The corporate power 
discourse of the last decades seemed to clearly position corporations in a vantage point for governance 
due to their supreme economic power and technological edge (Fuchs, 2007; Hall & Biersteker, 2002; 
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Scherer & Palazzo, 2011). However, the practice of PPP in anti-corruption shows an opposite 
situation to unfold whereby private companies seem to require the help of local and host-country 
public authorities to deal with an issue considered as economic as well for the last almost 30 years. 
Keeping in mind that both governments and multinational companies have been considered as the 
cause and solution of corruption simultaneously, one can only raise questions as to who governs anti-
corruption and who is corrupt. In other words, public-private partnerships in anti-corruption offer a 
platform for public-private cooperation but this comes with a consequence of blurring the boundaries 
between the two authorities. 
5. Conclusion 
In this article I have sought to analyze anti-corruption from a practice perspective. This endeavor 
began as a response to the well-established and utilized regime approach to the study of anti-
corruption, which as I have argued after reviewing the literature, ‘obscures the productivity of the 
practices that have been important aspects’ (emphasis in the original/emphasis added) (Doty, 1996, 
p. 1) of the anti-corruption regime. I presented and analyzed four regular, but not exclusive, to anti-
corruption practices; conferencing, certifying expertise, monitoring implementation, and public-
private partnering. I showed how the competent performances of anti-corruption experts within 
certain socially organized contexts produces both intended and unintended consequences. In the 
following discussion I make the argument  that although unintended consequences are rather 
unforeseen they can be desirable (Merton, 1936) since together with the intended ones they are 
constitutive of the practice of anti-corruption.  
The findings show that along with the intended development anti-corruption, further unintended 
phenomena, usually unnoticed under the influence of norms and regimes, follow (Table 2). 
Conferencing, for example, sets the platform for the creation of a common identity and at the same 
time gives space for elitism to emerge by excluding some rather focal groups for the struggle against 
corruption in organizations. Likewise, the professionalization of anti-corruption experts through the 
practice of certifying expertise is accompanied by the cultivation of their self-interest without having 
the possibility to ever be certain to what extent that is. On top of that, the isomorphism and uniformity 
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of anti-corruption regulations spread out through the practice of monitoring implementation creates 
opportunities of resistance for those who were left outside or unsatisfied.  
Intended consequences Unintended consequences 
Collective identity Elitism/exclusion 
Professionalization Self-interest 
Uniformity/isomorphism Resistance 
Cooperation Blurred responsibilities/roles 
Table 2: Indented and unintended consequences of practicing anti-corruption 
Last but not least, PPPs allow the cooperation and matching of public and private actors in the fight 
against corruption, but they also bring forth a blurring of the boundaries between them and their roles 
in society.  
These unintended consequences however should not be understood as undesirable or having a 
necessarily negative effect (Merton, 1936) on anti-corruption by definition. Rather they should be 
seen as necessary elements constitutive of anti-corruption practice since they are produced and 
reproduced through the competent performances of practitioners. Take for example the 
professionalization of compliance officers and the subsequent rise of their also professional self-
interest. Both of them are necessary for the endurance of anti-corruption although only the former 
was indeed intended by the regulations and laws upon which the profession of compliance was 
established. Compliance officers play an important role nowadays in anti-corruption; they are seen 
as government and management tools against bribery (Greenberg, 2014), shapers of rules and 
standards (Tsingou, 2018), as well as considered the ‘moral compass of firms’ shaping the governance 
of companies ‘that need to compete in a global market where ethics may be viewed as a cost that 
inhibits profitability’ (Sampson, 2016, pp. 65, 80).  
Similarly, if we take the example of public-private partnerships and the produced intended and 
unintended consequences of cooperation and blurred responsibilities respectively in anti-corruption, 
we can see how the later enables the former and vice versa. Without blurred boundaries between the 
private and the public sectors meaning the detachment of each sector from their narrow roles as 
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regulators and regulated there would be much less cooperation. Indeed, the argumentation on the role 
of corporations in corruption (Baughn et al., 2010b; Calderón et al., 2009; Heineman, 2009; 
Rodriguez et al., 2006) matched time-wise the rise of the assumption that governments were reluctant 
to take on their responsibility to alleviate problems caused by globalization leaving thus space in 
corporations to mobilize their economic and technological power to take on responsibilities that were 
once considered as governmental (Hall & Biersteker, 2002; Scherer et al., 2006; Strange, 1988).  
For anti-corruption studies this means first, that the use of practice theory allows our understanding 
of anti-corruption to go beyond levels of analysis. This becomes possible since the focus of inquiry 
remains with the action of practitioners of anti-corruption, but at the same time considers these actions 
as not properties of the mind but rather of the practice which includes among other the socially 
organized context and patterned relations within which such actions take place. In other words, 
practicing anti-corruption stops being a private matter, since it happens out of the mind, and becomes 
a public one (Mattern, 2011) meaning that it can also be local, national, international and global at 
the same time depending on the context. Indeed, Hansen and Tang-Jensen (2015), found similar 
patterns between the vocabulary and practices of anti-corruption professionals and the values of the 
anti-corruption regime. Second, and as a result of the above, anti-corruption is rather understood not 
as a linearly organized phenomenon, but as a multiplicity or an ‘assemblage’ of heterogeneous objects 
composed of discrete flows of other phenomena such as people, signs, chemicals, knowledge and 
institutions (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; Haggerty & Ericson, 2000). In this sense, anti-corruption can 
neither be solely the work of ‘moral’ or ‘norm entrepreneurs’ regardless if these are individuals, 
governments, or other organizations, nor a norm and regime in itself (Getz, 2006; McCoy & Heckel, 
2001; Nadelmann, 1990), since such views ignore a whole lot other constitutive of anti-corruption 
elements.  
Finally, utilizing a practice approach offers great value to anti-corruption studies since it enriches its 
empirical pool. This is to say that along with the focus in the few important landmark events in the 
development of anti-corruption, scholars can as well as direct their attention to a virtually infinite 
number of everyday actions which constitute the practice of anti-corruption. ‘Scaling down’ thus to 
the study of practices enables not only opportunities for theoretical contributions but also empirical 
ones by shedding light to actions and practices usually considered by definition ‘a matter of 
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indifference’ (Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 285). Communication through e-mail and telephone for 
example passes rather unnoticed when talking about anti-corruption yet much of the guidance 
compliance officers offer to their colleagues does happen with e-mails and telephone calls. Future 
studies therefore should pay more attention to these everyday practices as these unfold in daily 
professional routines of experts and their expertise (Bogner, Littig, & Menz, 2009).  
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